Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
RC4
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
===Biased outputs of the RC4=== The keystream generated by the RC4 is biased to varying degrees towards certain sequences, making it vulnerable to [[distinguishing attack]]s. The best such attack is due to Itsik Mantin and [[Adi Shamir]], who showed that the second output byte of the cipher was biased toward zero with probability 1/128 (instead of 1/256). This is due to the fact that if the third byte of the original state is zero, and the second byte is not equal to 2, then the second output byte is always zero. Such bias can be detected by observing only 256 bytes.<ref name="mantin">{{cite conference |author1=Itsik Mantin |author2=[[Adi Shamir]] |date=2001 |title=A Practical Attack on Broadcast RC4 |conference=FSE 2001 |pages=152β164 |url=https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F3-540-45473-X_13.pdf |doi=10.1007/3-540-45473-X_13}}</ref> [[Souradyuti Paul]] and [[Bart Preneel]] of [[COSIC]] showed that the first and the second bytes of the RC4 were also biased. The number of required samples to detect this bias is 2<sup>25</sup> bytes.<ref>{{cite conference |author1=[[Souradyuti Paul]] |author2=[[Bart Preneel]] |title=Analysis of Non-fortuitous Predictive States of the RC4 Keystream Generator |conference=[[Indocrypt]] 2003 |pages=52β67 |url=http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-86.pdf }}</ref> [[Scott Fluhrer]] and David McGrew also showed attacks that distinguished the keystream of the RC4 from a random stream given a gigabyte of output.<ref>{{cite conference |author1=Scott R. Fluhrer |author2=David A. McGrew |title=Statistical Analysis of the Alleged RC4 Keystream Generator |conference=FSE 2000 |pages=19β30 |url=http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/FluhrerMcgrew.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140502020708/http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/FluhrerMcgrew.pdf |archive-date=2 May 2014 |df=dmy-all }}</ref> The complete characterization of a single step of RC4 PRGA was performed by Riddhipratim Basu, Shirshendu Ganguly, Subhamoy Maitra, and Goutam Paul.<ref>{{cite journal |first1=Riddhipratim |last1=Basu |first2=Shirshendu |last2=Ganguly |first3=Subhamoy |last3=Maitra |first4=Goutam |last4=Paul |title=A Complete Characterization of the Evolution of RC4 Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm |journal=Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |pages=257β289 |volume=2 |issue=3 |year=2008 |doi=10.1515/JMC.2008.012 |s2cid=9613837 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Considering all the permutations, they proved that the distribution of the output is not uniform given i and j, and as a consequence, information about j is always leaked into the output.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)