Editing Resource curse (section)

=== Violence and conflict ===
{{Anchor|Conflict}}
A 2019 meta-analysis of 69 studies found "that there is no aggregate relationship between natural resources and conflict."<ref>{{Cite journal|title=A meta-analysis of natural resources and conflict|journal=Research & Politics|volume=6|pages=205316801881823|date=2019|doi=10.1177/2053168018818232|last1 = o'Brochta|first1 = William|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to a 2017 review study, "while some studies support the link between resource scarcity/abundance and armed conflict, others find no or only weak links."<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|last1=Koubi|first1=Vally|last2=Spilker|first2=Gabriele|date=2017-06-28|chapter=Natural Resources, Climate Change, and Conflict|volume=1|doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.346|title=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics|isbn=9780190228637}}</ref> According to one academic study, a country that is otherwise typical but has primary commodity exports around 5% of GDP has a 6% risk of conflict, but when exports are 25% of GDP the chance of conflict rises to 33%.<ref name="collier1">Bannon, Ian; Collier, Paul (eds.), [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15047/282450Natural0resources0violent0conflict.pdf ''Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions'']. World Bank (2003), p.3.</ref> "Ethno-political groups are more likely to resort to rebellion rather than using nonviolent means or becoming terrorists when representing regions rich in oil."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dreher|first1=Axel|last2=Kreibaum|first2=Merle|date=2016-07-01|title=Weapons of choice: The effect of natural resources on terror and insurgencies |journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=53|issue=4|pages=539–553|doi=10.1177/0022343316634418|s2cid=143350892|issn=0022-3433}}</ref>

There are several factors behind the relationship between natural resources and armed conflicts.<ref name=":2" /> Resource wealth may increase the vulnerability of countries to conflicts by undermining the quality of governance and economic performance<ref>{{cite journal |last=Norman |first=C. S. |title=Rule of Law and the Resource Curse |journal=Environmental and Resource Economics |volume=43 |issue=2 |pages=183–207 |doi=10.1007/s10640-008-9231-y |year=2008|s2cid=59417490 }}</ref> (the "resource curse" argument). Secondly, conflicts can occur over the control and exploitation of resources and the allocation of their revenues (the "[[resource war]]" argument). Thirdly, access to resource revenues by belligerents can prolong conflicts (the "[[conflict resource]]" argument).<ref>Le Billon, Philippe (2006), "Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts", ''[[Adelphi Paper]]'' 373, [[IISS]] & [[Routledge]]</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Adhvaryu|first1=Achyuta|last2=Fenske|first2=James E.|last3=Khanna|first3=Gaurav|last4=Nyshadham|first4=Anant|date=February 2018|title=Resources, Conflict, and Economic Development in Africa |journal=NBER Working Paper No. 24309 |doi=10.3386/w24309 |s2cid=31976233|doi-access=free}}</ref> A 2018 study in the ''Journal of Conflict Resolution'' found that rebels were particularly likely to be able to prolong their participation in civil wars when they had access to natural resources that they could smuggle.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2018|title=Rebel Natural Resource Exploitation and Conflict Duration |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=63|issue=3 |pages=591–616|doi=10.1177/0022002718755853|last1=Conrad|first1=Justin M|last2=Greene|first2=Kevin T|last3=Walsh|first3=James Igoe|last4=Whitaker|first4=Beth Elise|s2cid=158710051 }}</ref>

A 2004 literature review finds that oil makes the onset of war more likely and that lootable resources lengthen existing conflicts.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?|journal = Journal of Peace Research|pages = 337–356|volume = 41|issue = 3|doi = 10.1177/0022343304043773|first = Michael L.|last = Ross|year=2004|s2cid = 85511470}}</ref> One study finds the mere discovery (as opposed to just the exploitation) of petroleum resources increases the risk of conflict, as oil revenues have the potential to alter the balance of power between regimes and their opponents, rendering bargains in the present obsolete in the future.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Oil Discoveries, Shifting Power, and Civil Conflict |journal = International Studies Quarterly|date = 2015-09-01|issn = 1468-2478|pages = 517–530|volume = 59|issue = 3|doi = 10.1111/isqu.12150|first1 = Curtis|last1 = Bell|first2 = Scott|last2 = Wolford|doi-access = free}}</ref> One study suggests that the rise in mineral prices over the period 1997–2010 contributed to up to 21 percent of the average country-level violence in Africa.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa|ssrn = 2627073|date = 2015-06-29|first1 = Nicolas|last1 = Berman|first2 = Mathieu|last2 = Couttenier|first3 = Dominic|last3 = Rohner|first4 = Mathias|last4 = Thoenig}}</ref> Research shows that declining oil prices make oil-rich states less bellicose.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Oil prices and interstate conflict |journal = Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume = 34|issue = 6|pages = 575–596|date = 2015-10-19|issn = 0738-8942|doi = 10.1177/0738894215606067|first = Cullen S.|last = Hendrix|s2cid = 155477031}}</ref> Jeff Colgan observed that oil-rich states have a propensity to instigate international conflicts as well as to be the targets of them, which he referred to as "[[petro-aggression]]".<ref name=":6">{{cite book|last=Colgan|first=Jeff|title=Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War|date = 2013 | isbn =9781107654976|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Colgan|first=Jeff D|date=2021|title=Oil and Security: The Necessity of Political Economy|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa008|journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|volume=6|issue=1|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogaa008|issn=2057-3170}}</ref> Arguable examples include Iraq's invasions of Iran and Kuwait; Libya's repeated incursions into Chad in the 1970s and 1980s; Iran's long-standing suspicion of Western powers; the United States' relations with Iraq and Iran. It is not clear whether the pattern of petro-aggression found in oil-rich countries also applies to other natural resources besides oil.<ref name=":6" /> Some scholars argue that the relationship between oil and interstate war is primarily driven by the case of the [[Iran–Iraq War]] and that the overall evidence points in the direction of an oil-peace.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jang|first1=Hye Ryeon|last2=Smith|first2=Benjamin|date=2021|title=Pax Petrolica? Rethinking the Oil–Interstate War Linkage|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1914718|journal=Security Studies|volume=30|issue=2|pages=159–181|doi=10.1080/09636412.2021.1914718|s2cid=236221366 |issn=0963-6412}}</ref>

A 2016 study finds that "oil production, oil reserves, oil dependence, and oil exports are associated with a higher risk of initiating conflict while countries enjoying large oil reserves are more frequently the target of military actions."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Strüver|first1=Georg|last2=Wegenast|first2=Tim|date=2016-04-01|title=The Hard Power of Natural Resources: Oil and the Outbreak of Militarized Interstate Disputes |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis|doi=10.1093/fpa/orw013|issn=1743-8586|page=orw013}}</ref> As of 2016, the only six countries whose reported military expenditures exceeded 6 percent of GDP were significant oil producers: Oman, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Algeria (data for Syria and North Korea were unavailable).<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex |title=SIPRI Military Expenditure Database |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |access-date=13 July 2016}}</ref> A 2017 study in the ''[[The American Economic Review|American Economic Review]]'' found that mining extraction contributed to conflicts in Africa at the local level over the period 1997–2010.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Nicolas|first1=Berman|last2=Mathieu|first2=Couttenier|last3=Dominic|first3=Rohner|last4=Mathias|first4=Thoenig|date=June 2017|title=This Mine Is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa|journal=American Economic Review|volume=107|issue=6|pages=1564–1610|doi=10.1257/aer.20150774|issn=0002-8282|citeseerx=10.1.1.715.4065|s2cid=53402320}}</ref> A 2017 study in ''[[Security Studies (journal)|Security Studies]]'' found that while there is a statistical relationship between oil wealth and ethnic war, the use of [[Qualitative research|qualitative methods]] reveals "that oil has rarely been a deep cause of ethnic war."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Tang|first1=Shiping|last2=Xiong|first2=Yihan|last3=Li|first3=Hui|date=2017-07-03|title=Does Oil Cause Ethnic War? Comparing Evidence from Process-tracing with Quantitative Results |journal=Security Studies|volume=26|issue=3|pages=359–390|doi=10.1080/09636412.2017.1306392|s2cid=148921315|issn=0963-6412}}</ref>

The emergence of the [[Sicilian Mafia]] has been attributed to the resource curse. Early Mafia activity is strongly linked{{qualify evidence}} to Sicilian municipalities abundant in sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia|url = https://zenodo.org/record/1134881|journal = The Economic Journal|date = 2015-08-01|issn = 1468-0297|pages = F175–F202|volume = 125|issue = 586|doi = 10.1111/ecoj.12236|first1 = Paolo|last1 = Buonanno|first2 = Ruben|last2 = Durante|first3 = Giovanni|last3 = Prarolo|first4 = Paolo|last4 = Vanin| hdl=10446/41026 |s2cid = 55694103|hdl-access = free}}</ref> A 2017 study in the ''[[The Journal of Economic History|Journal of Economic History]]'' also links{{qualify evidence}} the emergence of the Sicilian Mafia to surging demand for oranges and lemons following the late 18th-century discovery that citrus fruits cured [[scurvy]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dimico|first1=Arcangelo|last2=Isopi|first2=Alessia|last3=Olsson|first3=Ola|date=2017|title=Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons |journal=The Journal of Economic History|volume=77|issue=4|pages=1083–1115|doi=10.1017/S002205071700078X|issn=0022-0507|doi-access=free}}</ref>

A 2016 study argues that [[petrostates]] may be emboldened to act more aggressively because of the inability of allied great powers to punish the petrostate.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Kim|first1=Inwook|last2=Woods|first2=Jackson|date=2016-08-01|title=Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression |journal=International Studies Perspectives|volume=17|issue=3|pages=231–249|doi=10.1093/isp/ekv004|issn=1528-3577|hdl=10722/229405|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The great powers have strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons.<ref name=":3" />

A 2017 study found evidence of the resource curse in the American frontier period of the [[Western United States]] in the 19th century (the [[Wild West]]).<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal|last1=Couttenier|first1=Mathieu|last2=Grosjean|first2=Pauline|author2-link=Pauline Grosjean|last3=Sangnier|first3=Marc|date=2017|title=The Wild West IS Wild: The Homicide Resource Curse |journal=Journal of the European Economic Association|volume=15|issue=3|pages=558–585|doi=10.1093/jeea/jvw011|url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01267373/file/WP%202016%20-%20Nr%2005.pdf}}</ref> The study found, "In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income."<ref name=":8" />

A 2018 study in the ''Economic Journal'' found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries."<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Nordvik|first=Frode Martin|title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? the Answer Is Yes|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129|issue=619|pages=1425–1456|doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604|issn=1468-0297|year=2018|hdl=11250/2657360 |s2cid=158738285}}</ref> The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.<ref name=":02" /> A 2020 study determined that low levels of oil and gas revenue actually increases the likelihood of nonviolent resistance in autocratic countries, despite the general logic of the resource curse.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pinckney |first1=Jonathan |title=Curving the resource curse: Negative effects of oil and gas revenue on nonviolent resistance campaign onset |journal=Research and Politics |date=2020 |volume=7 |issue=2 |pages=1–6 |doi=10.1177/2053168020936890|s2cid=220069995 |doi-access=free }}</ref>