Editing Strategic Hamlet Program (section)

===Security shortcomings===

Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Strategic Hamlet Program was its failure to provide the basic security envisioned by its proponents. This failure was partly due to poor placement of the hamlets. Ignoring the "oil-blot" principle (establish first in secure areas, then spread out), the South Vietnamese government began building strategic hamlets as quickly as possible and seemingly without considering "geographical priorities," according to a U.S. official. The randomly placed hamlets were isolated, not mutually supporting, and tempting targets for the Vietcong.<ref>''Foreign Relations of the United States: 1961–1963: Vietnam'', 4 vols. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 2:429; Hilsman, Roger, ''To Move a Nation'', p. 441.</ref>

Each hamlet was given a radio with which to call for South Vietnamese army [[ARVN]] support, but in fact ARVN forces were unreliable in responding to calls for help, especially when attacks occurred after nightfall. The villagers were also given weapons and training, but were only expected to hold out until conventional reinforcements arrived. Once it became clear that ARVN could not be relied upon, many villagers proved unwilling to fight even small Vietcong detachments, which could then capture the villagers' weapons. "Why should we die for weapons?" asked one Vietnamese peasant.<ref>''Foreign Relations'', 4:688; Castan, "Vietnam’s Two Wars", p. 35; Knoebl, ''Victor Charlie'', p. 261.</ref>