Editing Tariq Aziz (section)

=== Gulf War ===
{{Main|Gulf War}}
As tensions escalated following the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, attention turned to Cairo after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called for an emergency summit on August 8 to discuss the crisis.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title=Summit Finds Arabs More Divided Than United {{!}} The Washington Institute |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/summit-finds-arabs-more-divided-united |access-date=2025-03-20 |website=www.washingtoninstitute.org |language=en}}</ref> The meeting was seen as a crucial moment in the unfolding Gulf crisis, as regional and international pressure mounted against Iraq.<ref name=":7" /> According to journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Mubarak made diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation.<ref name=":7" /> On the morning of August 9, Mubarak summoned Iraqi Ambassador to Egypt Nabil Najm and asked him to deliver a verbal message to Saddam, advising that if Iraq could not attend the summit, it should at least send a high-level delegation willing to adopt a flexible approach.<ref name=":7" /> Later that day, Baghdad announced that a top-level Iraqi delegation was en route to Cairo.<ref name=":7" /> That evening, an Iraqi aircraft landed at [[Cairo International Airport|Cairo Airport]], carrying a delegation led by Taha Yassin Ramadan including Aziz.<ref name=":7" />

Upon arrival, tensions arose immediately.<ref name=":7" /> Unlike other delegations, the Iraqi representatives were housed in a government guest palace rather than a hotel, which led Tariq Aziz to question the decision.<ref name=":7" /> He reportedly asked, ''“Why are we placed in a guest palace while all other delegations are in hotels?”'' <ref name=":7" /> Egyptian officials responded that the Iraqi delegation faced unique security concerns.<ref name=":7" /> Aziz remained skeptical, stating, ''“Is this for our protection or to isolate us? If it is for our protection, we can take responsibility for ourselves. We trust the Egyptian people.”'' An Egyptian official responded, ''“The issue is not with the Egyptian people, but with the tens of thousands of Kuwaitis now in Cairo.”<ref name=":7" />''

Further tensions arose when only Taha Yassin was invited to meet President Mubarak on the evening of August 9, excluding Aziz.<ref name=":7" /> Aziz objected, arguing that the delegation had arrived as a unified body and that he himself had a personal friendship with Mubarak.<ref name=":7" /> Despite his objections, the meeting proceeded as planned, with Ramadan attending alone.<ref name=":7" /> During their discussions, according to Heikal, Mubarak and Ramadan exchanged firm positions.<ref name=":7" /> Mubarak later claimed that Ramadan had insisted Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was ''“final and irreversible”'' and could not be subjected to Arab discussion.<ref name=":7" /> Meanwhile, Ramadan recounted that he had expressed Iraq’s belief that certain Arab states had already aligned irreversibly with the U.S., though Iraq still had confidence in Mubarak’s leadership.<ref name=":7" />

The delegation arrived in Cairo already suspicious of U.S. military movements in the region.<ref name=":7" /> The visit of U.S. Defense Secretary [[Dick Cheney]] to [[Jeddah]], accompanied by [[Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.|General Norman Schwarzkopf]], had raised alarms in Baghdad.<ref name=":7" /> The announcement that the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower was approaching the Suez Canal further heightened Iraqi fears that military action was imminent.<ref name=":7" /> According to Heikal, the summit seemed more like a public relations event than a decisive diplomatic initiative, reflecting the broader disarray within the Arab world at the time.<ref name=":7" /> The summit itself was chaotic.<ref name=":7" /> The Arab League General Secretariat, responsible for organizing the event, barely arrived in time, with Secretary-General [[Chedli Klibi]] and his aides landing in Cairo at the last minute.<ref name=":7" /> No official agenda had been prepared, adding to the confusion.<ref name=":7" /> The disorder that followed would ultimately mark a turning point in Iraq’s diplomatic isolation in the lead-up to the Gulf War.<ref name=":7" /> Since then Saddam stopped making foreign visits and mostly sent either Aziz or Ramadan.<ref name=":7" />