Editing Truth (section)

====Deflationary====
{{Main|Deflationary theory of truth}}

Modern developments in the field of philosophy have resulted in the rise of a new thesis: that the term ''truth'' does not denote a real property of sentences or propositions. This thesis is in part a response to the common use of ''truth predicates'' (e.g., that some particular thing "...{{nbsp}}is true") which was particularly prevalent in philosophical discourse on truth in the first half of the 20th century. From this point of view, to assert that "'2 + 2 = 4' is true" is logically equivalent to asserting that "2 + 2 = 4", and the phrase "is true" is—philosophically, if not practically (see: "Michael" example, below)—completely dispensable in this and every other context. In common parlance, truth predicates are not commonly heard, and it would be interpreted as an unusual occurrence were someone to utilize a truth predicate in an everyday conversation when asserting that something is true. Newer perspectives that take this discrepancy into account, and work with sentence structures as actually employed in common discourse, can be broadly described:
* as ''deflationary'' theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of the words "true" or ''truth'',
* as ''disquotational'' theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in cases like the above example, or
* as ''minimalist'' theories of truth.<ref name=EPT/><ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'' in the Introductory section of the book.</ref>

Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that "the predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis."<ref name=EPT/> Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. Among the theoretical concerns of these views is to explain away those special cases where it ''does'' appear that the concept of truth has peculiar and interesting properties. (See, e.g., [[Semantic paradox]]es, and below.)

The scope of deflationary principles is generally limited to representations that resemble sentences. They do not encompass a broader range of entities that are typically considered true or otherwise. In addition, some deflationists point out that the concept employed in "...{{nbsp}}is true" formulations does enable us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences; for example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:
{{blockindent|1=''Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red or he says{{nbsp}}... etc.''}}
This assertion can instead be succinctly expressed by saying: ''What Michael says is true''.<ref>[[Richard Kirkham]], ''[[Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction]]'', MIT Press, 1992.</ref>

=====Redundancy and related=====
{{Main|Redundancy theory of truth}}

An early variety of deflationary theory is the [[redundancy theory of truth]], so-called because—in examples like those above, e.g. "snow is white [is true]"—the concept of "truth" is redundant and need not have been articulated; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to anything in reality. This theory is commonly attributed to [[Frank P. Ramsey]], who held that the use of words like ''fact'' and ''truth'' was nothing but a [[periphrasis|roundabout]] way of asserting a proposition, and that treating these words as separate problems in isolation from judgment was merely a "linguistic muddle".<ref name="EPT"/><ref>Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990</ref><ref>Le Morvan, Pierre. (2004) "Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey", ''The British Journal for the History of Philosophy'' 12(4), pp. 705–718.</ref>

A variant of redundancy theory is the "disquotational" theory, which uses a modified form of the logician [[Alfred Tarski]]'s [[#Semantic theory of truth|schema]]: proponents observe that to say that "'P' is true" ''is'' to assert "P". A version of this theory was defended by [[C. J. F. Williams]] (in his book ''What is Truth?''). Yet another version of deflationism is the prosentential theory of truth, first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and [[Nuel Belnap]] as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims. They argue that utterances such as "that's true", when said in response to (e.g.) "it's raining", are "[[prosentence]]s"—expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions. In the same way that ''it'' means the same as ''my dog'' in the statement "my dog was hungry, so I fed it", ''that's true'' is supposed to mean the same as ''it's raining'' when the former is said in reply to the latter.<ref>{{Cite book |last=David |first=Marian Alexander |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=szl6AsLmKIEC |title=Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth |date=1994 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-507924-1 |language=en}}</ref> 

As noted above, proponents of these ideas do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is not a ''property;'' rather, they can be understood to say that, for instance, the assertion "P" ''may well'' involve a substantial truth—it is only the redundancy involved in statements such as "that's true" (i.e., a prosentence) which is to be minimized.<ref name=EPT/>