Editing Value theory (section)

=== Sources of value ===
Various theories about the sources of value have been proposed. They aim to clarify what kinds of things are intrinsically good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA357 357]}} | {{harvnb|Oliveira|2016|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Kershnar|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwMN7WRb2fEC&pg=PA37 37]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> The historically influential theory of [[hedonism]]{{efn|This view is sometimes called ''axiological hedonism'' to distinguish it from related theories under this label.<ref>{{harvnb|de Bres|2014|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-rawls-lexicon/hedonism/602FBE3D4ACFED4422C43BCCBA3BAB48 336–338]}}</ref>}} states that how people feel is the only source of value. More specifically, it says that [[pleasure]] is the only intrinsic good and [[pain]] is the only intrinsic evil.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 359]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> According to this view, everything else only has instrumental value to the extent that it leads to pleasure or pain, including knowledge, health, and justice. Hedonists usually understand the term ''pleasure'' in a broad sense that covers all kinds of enjoyable experiences, including bodily pleasures of food and sex as well as more intellectual or abstract pleasures, like the joy of reading a book or happiness about a friend's promotion. Pleasurable experiences come in degrees, and hedonists usually associate their intensity and duration with the magnitude of value they have.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 359–360]}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref>{{efn|Qualitative hedonists argue that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor influencing its value besides intensity and duration. Some distinguish higher pleasures of the mind, like enjoying fine art and philosophy, from lower pleasures of the body, like enjoying food and drink.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} }}</ref>}}

Many hedonists identify pleasure and pain as symmetric opposites, meaning that the value of pleasure balances out the disvalue of pain if they have the same intensity. However, some hedonists reject this symmetry and give more weight to avoiding pain than to experiencing pleasure.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA360 360]}}</ref> Although it is widely accepted that pleasure is valuable, the hedonist claim that it is the only source of value is controversial.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA361 361]}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.3 Other Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> [[Welfarism]], a closely related theory, understands [[well-being]] as the only source of value. Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person, which can include other aspects besides pleasure, such as health, [[personal growth]], meaningful [[Interpersonal relationship|relationships]], and a sense of purpose in life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=Lead section, § 5.1 Welfarism}} | {{harvnb|Hall|Tiberius|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zZdGCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA175 175–176]}} | {{harvnb|Nebel|2024|loc=§ Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Hooker|2015|pp=15–16}} }}</ref>

Desire theories offer a slightly different account, stating that desire satisfaction{{efn|Some theorists use the terms ''desire satisfaction'' and ''desire fulfillment'' as synonyms while others distinguish between them. According to the latter view, desire satisfaction is a subjective state involving a possibly false belief that a desire is satisfied. Desire fulfillment is an objective state present if the desired outcome actually exists, even if the person does not know about it.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OTElDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}}</ref>}} is the only source of value.{{efn|Some desire theories aim to explain goodness in general while others restrict themselves to goodness for a person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA362 362–363]}} | {{harvnb|Scanlon|1993|pp=186–187}} }}</ref>}} This theory overlaps with hedonism because many people desire pleasure and because desire satisfaction is often accompanied by pleasure. Nonetheless, there are important differences: people desire a variety of other things as well, like knowledge, achievement, and respect; additionally, desire satisfaction may not always result in pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA361 361–362, 364]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> Some desire theorists hold that value is a property of desire satisfaction itself, while others say that it is a property of the objects that satisfy a desire.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA362 362–363]}}</ref> One debate in desire theory concerns whether every desire is a source of value. For example, if a person has a false belief that money makes them happy, it is questionable whether the satisfaction of their desire for money is a source of value. To address this consideration, some desire theorists say that a desire can only provide value if a fully informed and rational person would have it, thereby excluding misguided desires from being a source of value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA362 362–363]}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2016|pp=138–140}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 3.2 Fitting Attitudes}} | {{harvnb|Scanlon|1993|pp=186–187}} }}</ref>

[[Perfectionism (philosophy)|Perfectionism]] identifies the realization of [[human nature]] and the cultivation of characteristic human abilities as the source of intrinsic goodness. It covers capacities and character traits belonging to the bodily, emotional, volitional, cognitive, social, artistic, and religious fields. Perfectionists disagree about which human excellences are the most important. Many are pluralistic in recognizing a diverse array of human excellences, such as knowledge, creativity, health, beauty, free agency, and moral virtues like benevolence and courage.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shea|Kintz|2022|p=461}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA364 364–366]}} | {{harvnb|Wall|2021|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> According to one suggestion, there are two main fields of human goods: theoretical abilities responsible for understanding the world and practical abilities responsible for interacting with it.<ref>{{harvnb|Hurka|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA364 364]}}</ref> Some perfectionists provide an ideal characterization of human nature as the goal of human flourishing, holding that human excellences are those aspects that promote the realization of this goal. This view is exemplified in [[Aristotle]]'s focus on [[rationality]] as the nature and ideal state of human beings.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA365 365–366]}} | {{harvnb|Wall|2021|loc=§ 1. Perfectionism and Value Theory}} }}</ref> Non-humanistic versions extend perfectionism to the natural world in general, arguing that excellence as a source of intrinsic value is not limited to the human realm.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wall|2021|loc=§ 1. Perfectionism and Value Theory}} | {{harvnb|Gill|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VMcFEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA85 85]}} }}</ref>