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Voting machine
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==Current voting machines== An [[electronic voting machine]] is a voting machine based on [[electronics]]. Two main technologies exist: ''[[optical scan voting system|optical scanning]]'' and ''[[direct-recording electronic voting machine|direct recording]]'' (DRE). ===Optical scanning=== {{main|Optical scan voting system}} {{further|Vote counting#Optical scan counting|Electronic voting#Paper-based electronic voting system|Electronic voting in the United States#Optical scan counting}} [[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]] In an [[optical scan voting system]], or marksense, each voter's choices are marked on one or more pieces of paper, which then go through a scanner. The scanner creates an electronic image of each ballot, interprets it, creates a tally for each candidate, and usually stores the image for later review. The voter may mark the paper directly, usually in a specific location for each candidate. Or the voter may select choices on an electronic screen, which then prints the chosen names, and a bar code or QR code summarizing all choices, on a sheet of paper to put in the scanner.<ref name="vv-bmd">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/ballot-marking-devices/ |title=Ballot Marking Devices |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |access-date=February 28, 2020 |archive-date=August 5, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200805185249/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/ballot-marking-devices/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> Hundreds of [[Electronic voting in the United States#Errors in optical scans|errors in optical scan systems]] have been found, from feeding ballots upside down, multiple ballots pulled through at once in central counts, paper jams, broken, blocked or overheated sensors which misinterpret some or many ballots, printing which does not align with the programming, programming errors, and loss of files.<ref name="bren10">{{Cite web |last=Norden |first=Lawrence |date=September 16, 2010 |title=Voting system failures: a database solution |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Voting_Machine_Failures_Database-Solution.pdf |access-date=July 7, 2020 |website=Brennan Center, NYU |archive-date=November 26, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201126221213/https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Voting_Machine_Failures_Database-Solution.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> ===Direct-recording electronic (DRE)=== [[File:IVotronicVVPAT.jpg|thumb|DRE with paper for voter to verify (VVPAT)]] {{main|DRE voting machine}} {{further|Vote counting#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting#Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system|Electronic voting in the United States#Direct-recording electronic counting}} In a [[DRE voting machine]] system, a touch screen displays choices to the voter, who selects choices, and can change their mind as often as needed, before casting the vote. Staff initialize each voter once on the machine, to avoid repeat voting. Voting data are recorded in memory components, and can be copied out at the end of the election. Most of these machines also print names of chosen candidates on paper for the voter to verify, though some studies have indicated that fewer than 40% of voters do so.<ref name="bmd-cohn">{{Cite news |last=Cohn |first=Jennifer |url=https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/what-is-the-latest-threat-to-democracy-ballot-marking-devices-a-k-a-electronic-pencils-16bb44917edd |title=What is the latest threat to democracy? |date=May 5, 2018 |work=Medium |access-date=February 28, 2020 |language=en |archive-date=November 20, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201120233043/https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/what-is-the-latest-threat-to-democracy-ballot-marking-devices-a-k-a-electronic-pencils-16bb44917edd |url-status=dead }}</ref> The paper ballot, whether paper tape or separate ballot sheets, the paper ballot is securely stored, creating a [[voter-verified paper audit trail]] (VVPAT) that can be used for [[election audit]]s and [[recount]]s if needed. For machines without VVPAT, there is no record of individual votes to check. For machines with VVPAT, checking is more expensive than with paper ballots, because on the flimsy thermal paper in a long continuous roll, staff often lose their place, and the printout has each change by each voter, not just their final decisions.<ref name="ga">{{Cite web |date=April 10, 2007 |title=VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL Pilot Project Report |url=http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081126235810/http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |archive-date=November 26, 2008 |access-date=February 15, 2020 |website=Georgia Secretary of State}}</ref> Problems have included public web access to the software, before it is loaded into machines for each election, and programming errors which increment different candidates than voters select.<ref name="bren10"/> The [[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]] found that with existing machines could not be allowed because they could not be monitored by the public.<ref>[https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2009/bvg09-019.html German Federal Constitutional Court, Press release no. 19/2009 of 3 March 2009] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090404111620/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html |date=April 4, 2009 }}</ref> According to [[University of Iowa]] [[computer scientist]] [[Douglas W. Jones|Douglas Jones]], a specialist in the use of computers in elections, there has been no evidence of hackers accessing electronic voting machines in public use, though some hacks have been achieved in controlled laboratory settings.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-08-23 |title=Machine Politics: How America casts and counts its votes |url=https://www.reuters.com/graphics/USA-ELECTION/VOTING/mypmnewdlvr/ |access-date=2024-10-15 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref>
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