Editing Channel Dash (section)

==Battle==

===Night, 11/12 February===
[[File:Bundesarchiv DVM 10 Bild-23-63-46, Schlachtschiff "Scharnhorst".jpg|thumb|''Scharnhorst'' in 1939]]
The ships at Brest were scheduled to depart at {{nowrap|8:30 p.m.}} on 11 February but an air raid by 18 Wellington bombers delayed the departure. The all clear sounded at {{nowrap|10:15 p.m.}} and ''Scharnhorst'', ''Gneisenau'' and ''Prinz Eugen'', accompanied by six destroyers sailed thirty minutes later.{{sfnm|1a1=Middlebrook|1a2=Everitt|1y=2014|1p=234|2a1=Richards|2y=1974|2p=365}} A British agent in Brest was unable to signal that the Brest Group was departing because of German wireless jamming; ''Sealion'', patrolling outside the harbour, had withdrawn to recharge its batteries.{{sfn|Hendrie|2010|pp=166–167}}{{efn|[[Reginald Victor Jones|Reginald Jones]] wrote that the signal from Brest had been received on the night of 11/12 February but that the duty officer neglected to pass this information on because he claimed he had already read it in a London evening paper and assumed that the Admiralty already knew of it.{{sfn|Jones|1998|p=235}}}}<!--[[Heinkel He 111]]s dropped {{lang|de|[[Chaff (countermeasure)|Düppel]]}} to jam British radar, ship-borne [[Arado Ar 196]] floatplanes reconnoitred and [[Junkers Ju 88]] bombers made low-level raids on Plymouth and nearby airfields.{{cn|date=October 2016}} blanked for lack of citation-->

Patrol ''Stopper'', near Brest, was being flown by an ASV Hudson from [[No. 224 Squadron RAF|224 Squadron]] when the Brest Group began assembling outside the port. At the patrol height of {{cvt|1000|-|2000|ft|m}} the ASV had a range of about {{cvt|13|nmi|mi+km}} but the Hudson was flying south-west as the ships turned towards Ushant and received no contact. The last eight minutes of the next ''Stopper'' sortie came within about {{cvt|9|nmi|mi+km}} of the ships but received no contact on the radar.{{sfn|Richards|1974|pp=365–366}}

''Line South East'' ran past Ushant to the vicinity of [[Jersey]], to find a sortie from Brest which had turned up the Channel. The Brest Group crossed ''Line South East'' at {{nowrap|0:50am}} on 12 February, but the Hudson patrol was not there, having been ordered to return when its ASV failed. Joubert was short of aircraft and sent no replacement, also because ''Stopper'' had reported nothing untoward and if the Brest Group had sailed before ''Stopper'' began, it would already have passed ''Line South East''. ''Habo'', the third patrol line, from [[Cherbourg-en-Cotentin|Cherbourg]] to [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] was conducted as usual, until a dawn fog was forecast over British airfields and the aircraft was called back at {{nowrap|6:30am,}} when the Brest Group was still west of the line.{{sfn|Richards|1974|pp=365–366}}{{efn|''Stopper'' was usually conducted by four consecutive flights but this night, the ASV on the first Hudson broke down and the crew flew back to change to a spare, putting back the {{nowrap|7:30 p.m.}} start until {{nowrap|10:38 p.m.}} The Board of Enquiry found that the German ships had sailed through the ''Stopper'' patrol line before it was re-established but this was later found to be untrue, the delayed patrol had begun before the Brest Group sailed.{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=366}}}}

===12 February===

====Morning====

[[File:EnglishChannel.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Satellite image of the English Channel, 2002}}]]
The only patrol over the Channel was the routine dawn patrol by Fighter Command from [[Ostend]], south to the mouth of the [[Somme (river)|Somme]], which the Brest Group passed at {{nowrap|10:00 a.m.}} From {{nowrap|8:25 to 9:59 a.m.}} RAF radar operators under Squadron Leader [[Bill Igoe]], using an un-jammed radar frequency, noticed four plots of German aircraft circling in places north of [[Le Havre]], which at first were thought to be air-sea rescue operations.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|p=137}}{{sfn|Kemp|1957|pp=197–199}} At {{nowrap|10:00 a.m.}} [[No. 11 Group RAF|11 Group]] [[RAF Fighter Command]] realised that the plots were moving north-east at {{cvt|20|–|25|kn}} and sent two Spitfires to reconnoitre at {{nowrap|10:20 a.m.,}} about the time that news reached Fighter Command headquarters that radar-jamming had begun at {{nowrap|9:20 a.m.}} and that the station at [[Beachy Head]] was detecting surface ships. Radar stations in Kent reported two large ships off Le Touquet at {{nowrap|10:52 a.m.}} and when the Spitfire patrol landed at {{nowrap|10:50 a.m.,}} having kept [[radio silence]], the pilots reported a flotilla off [[Le Touquet]] (near Boulogne) but not the capital ships.{{sfn|Richards|1974|pp=366–367}}

News of the sighting was rushed to 11 Group and the Navy at Dover by {{nowrap|11:05 a.m.}} (One pilot then mentioned a big ship and a certain sighting was received as he was being [[Debriefing|debriefed]].) By coincidence, two senior fighter pilots from [[RAF Kenley]] had decided to fly an intruder mission to the French coast at {{nowrap|10:10 a.m.,}} while the other pilots were grounded due to the bad weather. The pair spotted two [[Messerschmitt Bf 109]]s (Bf 109) and attacked, then found themselves over a German flotilla of two big ships, a destroyer screen and an outer ring of E-boats. The Spitfires were dived on by about {{nowrap|12 German}} fighters and escaped through anti-aircraft fire from the ships, [[Strafing|strafed]] an E-boat and made off at wave-top height. After they landed at {{nowrap|11:09 a.m.,}} the pilots reported that the German ships had been {{cvt|16|nmi|mi+km}} off Le Touquet at {{nowrap|10:42 a.m.}} by {{nowrap|11:25 a.m.,}} the alarm had been raised that the Brest Group was entering the Straits of Dover with air cover.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|p=137}}{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=367}}

At {{nowrap|11:27 a.m.}} Bomber Command had been alerted that the Brest Group was near Dover and warned the groups to be ready. Including aircraft that had flown the night before and those at four hours' notice, Air Marshal [[Richard Peirse]] had about {{nowrap|250 aircraft}} but the {{nowrap|100 bombers}} on two hours' notice had been loaded with semi-armour-piercing bombs which were effective only if dropped from {{cvt|7000|ft|m}} or higher. Visibility was poor with rain and {{nowrap|8/10ths}} to {{nowrap|10/10ths cloud}} cover, down to {{cvt|700|ft|m}} and unless there were breaks in the cloud just when needed the task was impossible. Peirse ordered general-purpose bombs to be loaded, which could only cause superficial blast damage and attacks at low altitude, in the hope that the attacks would distract the Brest Group as Coastal Command and the Navy made torpedo attacks.{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=371}}

====Noon====

{{see also|Cross-Channel guns in the Second World War#Dover|l1=Dover guns}}

[[File:Dover AST 2001073 lrg.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Satellite photograph of the Strait of Dover (NASA Terra Satellite image, March 2001)}}]]
At Dover in 1940, there were four {{cvt|6|in|mm|0}} guns with a range of {{cvt|12000|yd|m}}, two [[BL 9.2-inch Mk IX – X naval gun|{{cvt|9.2|in|mm|0}} guns]] with a range of {{cvt|18000|yd|m}}, two modern 6-inch batteries with {{cvt|25000|yd|m}} range and four more 9.2-inch guns on new mountings with a range of {{cvt|31600|yd|m}} and then {{cvt|36300|yd|m}} with supercharging. (After the fall of France, Axis ships could avoid the Dover mine barrage by sailing close to the French coast.) A supercharged naval {{cvt|14|in|mm|0}} gun could fire shells {{cvt|48000|yd|m}} but was difficult to use against moving targets.{{sfn|Collier|2004|pp=131–132}} The [[South Foreland]] Battery of the Dover guns, with their new K-type radar set, tracked the ships of the Brest Group coming up the Channel towards Cap Gris Nez.{{sfn|Ford|2012|pp=44–45}}

At {{nowrap|12:19 p.m.,}} the Dover guns fired their first salvo but with visibility down to {{cvt|5|nmi|mi+km}}, there could be no [[Artillery observer|observation]] of the [[Indirect fire|fall-of-shot]]. The gunners hoped that the radar would detect the shell splashes and allow corrections to be made, although this method had never been tried before. "Blips" on the K-set clearly showed the ships zig-zagging but not where the shells were landing.{{sfn|Ford|2012|pp=44–45}} Full battery salvo firing began and the four 9.2-inch guns fired {{nowrap|33 rounds}} at the German ships, which were moving out of range at {{cvt|30|kn|mph+km/h|lk=in}} and all missed. German sources state that the fleet had already passed Dover when the coastal artillery opened fire and that the shells landed well astern of the major German units.{{sfn|FC|2013|pp=44–51}} The coastal guns ceased fire when light naval forces and torpedo-bombers began to attack and by {{nowrap|1:21 p.m.}} the German ships passed beyond the effective range of the British radar.{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=370}}

====Afternoon====
The six Swordfish torpedo-bombers of 825 Squadron FAA, took off from Manston at {{nowrap|12:20 p.m.,}} after Esmonde decided that he could wait no longer, meeting the Spitfire escorts of [[No. 72 Squadron RAF|72 Squadron]] at {{nowrap|12:28 p.m.,}} all setting off for a point {{cvt|10|nmi|mi+km}} north of Calais. The escorts of 121 Squadron and 401 Squadron were late and tried to rendezvous en route to the ships but missed them and turned back to search for the Swordfish at Manston. The Spitfires of 72 Squadron flying close escort sighted the German ships at {{nowrap|12:40 p.m.}} but were bounced by Bf 109s and FW 190s and lost contact with the Swordfish. The first section of three torpedo-bombers pressed on through the destroyer screen and Esmonde's aircraft was shot down before he could launch his torpedo. The other two aircraft continued through the German anti-aircraft barrage, dropped torpedoes and then ditched their aircraft which had been hit by flak. The second section of three Swordfish were seen to cross over the destroyer screen and disappear in the cloud and smoke.{{sfn|Richards|1974|pp=368–369}}{{efn|Five of the six crew were rescued by small craft but the second section, with 13 aircrew was lost with all hands. The Spitfires of 121 Squadron and 401 Squadron found no Swordfish at Manston and flew back out to sea. Arriving a few minutes after the Swordfish attack, they encountered the covering German fighters and were engaged in an air battle. Esmonde had flown in the [[Last battle of the battleship Bismarck|sinking of ''Bismarck'']] and had been killed in the attack, for which he received a [[Victoria Cross]] posthumously. Ramsay later wrote, "In my opinion the gallant sortie of these six Swordfish aircraft constitutes one of the finest exhibitions of self-sacrifice and devotion to duty the war had ever witnessed", while Ciliax remarked on "...the mothball attack of a handful of ancient planes, piloted by men whose bravery surpasses any other action by either side that day".{{sfn|Kemp|1957|pp=199–200}}}} While the German fighter escorts were absent, two sections (eight aircraft) of [[No. 452 Squadron RAAF|452 Squadron]] RAAF strafed several German ships and silenced the return fire of a destroyer, for a cracked perspex hood to one Spitfire.{{sfn|Southall|1958|pp=128–129}}{{efn|[[Keith Truscott|Bluey Truscott]] was awarded a Bar to his DFC for this action.{{sfn|Southall|1958|pp=128–129}}}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv DVM 10 Bild-23-63-11, Schlachtschiff "Gneisenau".jpg|thumb|{{center|''Gneisenau'' in 1939}}|alt=photograph of a German warship]]
The five operational [[Fairmile D motor torpedo boat|Motor Torpedo Boats]] (MTBs) based at Dover left harbour at {{nowrap|11:55 a.m.}} and sighted the German warships at {{nowrap|12:23 p.m.}} The RAF fighter cover for this attack was not airborne in time, one MTB had engine-trouble and the rest found their approach blocked by twelve E-boats in two lines. The defective MTB fired torpedoes at the extreme range of {{cvt|4000|yd|nmi+mi+km}} before returning to Dover; the rest were not able to get much closer and torpedoed through the gap between the E-boat lines, mistakenly claiming a hit on ''Prinz Eugen''. Two [[motor gun boat]]s (MGBs) arrived from Dover in time to defend the last MTB from a German [[Narvik-class destroyer]]. Two more MTBs had left Ramsgate at {{nowrap|12:25 p.m.}} but approached from too far astern of the German squadron and were unable to get into a position to attack before deteriorating weather and engine problems forced them to turn back.{{sfn|Ford|2012|pp=47–48}}

Several [[Westland Whirlwind (fighter)|Whirlwind]] fighters on a routine patrol were intercepted by the fighter screen at {{nowrap|2:00 p.m.}}<!--source?-->{{sfn|FC|2013|pp=44–51}} The seven Beauforts at Thorney Island were closest to the Brest Group when it was sighted. Two Beauforts had been bombed up and one went unserviceable, before the other four took off at {{nowrap|1:25 p.m.}} The four Beauforts were late to meet their fighter escorts at Manston and the torpedo-bombers and fighters were ordered independently to the German ships. The position, course and speed of the Brest Group was given by voice ([[radiotelephone|R/T]]) to the Spitfires and Morse ([[wireless telegraphy|W/T]]) to the Beauforts. The torpedo-bombers failed to receive the orders, because [[No. 16 Group RAF|16 Group]] forgot that they had been fitted with R/T for Operation Fuller. When the Beauforts reached Manston they circled with numerous fighters which appeared to ignore them. Two Beauforts flew to the French coast, found nothing and landed at Manston where the confusion was resolved. The other two aircraft had already landed at Manston, where the crews found out what was going on and set off for the Belgian coast, arriving at {{nowrap|3:40 p.m.}} (when the Nore Command destroyers were attacking). Both bombers flew through the German flak and attacked ''Prinz Eugen'', dropping their torpedoes at {{cvt|1000|yd|m}}, to no effect.{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=270}}

The 42 Squadron Beauforts from Scotland had to divert to [[RAF Coltishall]] in Norfolk because of snow but the torpedoes to be loaded were over 100 miles away at [[RAF North Coates]] in Lincolnshire and came by road too late. Nine of the aircraft had flown south with torpedoes on and took off at {{nowrap|2:25 p.m.,}} leaving the other four behind to rendezvous with their fighter escorts and several Hudsons, intended to create a diversion. The Beauforts reached Manston at {{nowrap|2:50 p.m.}} and tried to formate behind the Hudsons, which did the same thing; attempts to get the fighters to join the formation also failed. The Beaufort crews had been briefed that they would be escorted all the way, the fighters that they were to cover the Dover Strait in general and the aircraft circled Manston for thirty minutes, each formation under the impression that another one was leading. The Beaufort commander then set off, using the position of the Brest Group given at Coltishall and six Hudsons followed, the other five circling and waiting for the fighters, before giving up and landing at {{nowrap|4:00 p.m.}}{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=371}}

The Beauforts and Hudsons flew towards the Dutch coast and lost touch in the cloud and rain but the Hudsons made ASV contact and attacked the ships, two being shot down for no result. Six of the Beauforts then attacked through the flak and released their torpedoes, also with no effect. (The other three Beauforts had already attacked, possibly against British destroyers.) The two 217 Squadron Beauforts that had flown earlier had reached Manston, set off again independently and made ASV contact, attacking ''Scharnhorst'' at {{nowrap|5:10 and 6:00 p.m.}} The remaining Beauforts at St Eval in Cornwall had been sent to Thorney Island, arriving at {{nowrap|2:30 p.m.}} to refuel and be briefed to link with fighters at Coltishall in East Anglia, where they arrived at {{nowrap|5:00 p.m.}} to find no escorts waiting. The Beauforts pressed on to a position sent by wireless and at {{nowrap|6:05 p.m.,}} as dark fell, with visibility down to {{cvt|1000|yd|m}} and the cloud base at only {{cvt|600|ft|m}} saw four German minesweepers. One bomber attacked a "big ship" but flak damage jammed the torpedo and as night fell around {{nowrap|6:30 p.m.,}} the rest turned for Coltishall; two Beauforts were lost to flak or the weather.{{sfn|Richards|1974|pp=372–373}}{{efn|Coastal Command aircraft with ASV independently shadowed the Brest Group from {{nowrap|4:00 p.m.,}} gained two sightings, then several ASV contacts after dark, one at {{nowrap|1:55 a.m.}} on 13 February, showing that the Brest Group had split up but the information was too late to use.{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=373}}}}

====Evening====

{{Location map+ |Netherlands |width=150 |float=right |caption={{centre|Southern North Sea}}|places=
{{Location map~ |Netherlands |lat=51.430833 |long=3.528889 |label=[[Scheldt|Scheldt Estuary]] |label_size=80 |position=right |marksize=6}}
{{Location map~ |Netherlands |lat=53.4 |long=5.316667 |label=[[Terschelling]] |label_size=80 |position=right |marksize=6}}
}}
The first wave of {{nowrap|73 [[Avro Manchester]],}} Halifax and Stirling heavy bombers took off from {{nowrap|2:20 p.m.}} and most found the target area from {{nowrap|2:55 to 3:58 p.m.}} Thick low cloud and intermittent rain hid the view and only ten crews could see the German ships for long enough to bomb. The {{nowrap|134 bombers}} of the second wave took off from {{nowrap|2:37 p.m.}} and reached the vicinity of the ships from {{nowrap|4:00 to 5:06 p.m.}} and at least {{nowrap|20 bombed.}} The last wave of {{nowrap|35 aircraft}} began at {{nowrap|4:15 p.m.}} and reached the Brest Group from {{nowrap|5:50 to 6:15 p.m.}} and nine were able to drop their bombs. Only {{nowrap|39 of}} the aircraft that returned managed to attack the ships and {{nowrap|15 bombers}} were shot down by flak or lost after flying into the sea; twenty bombers were damaged and no hits were achieved.{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=371}}

The destroyers {{HMS|Campbell|D60|6}}, {{HMS|Vivacious|D36|2}} of the [[List of squadrons and flotillas of the Royal Navy|21st Flotilla]] and {{HMS|Mackay|D70|6}}, {{HMS|Whitshed|D77|2}}, {{HMS|Walpole|D41|2}} and {{HMS|Worcester|D96|2}} of the 16th Flotilla (Captain [[Charles Pizey]]), from Nore Command were First World War-vintage and usually escorted east coast convoys. The ships were practising gunnery off [[Orford Ness]] in the North Sea when alerted at {{nowrap|11:56 a.m.}} The destroyers sailed south to intercept the Brest Group but it steamed much faster than expected and to catch up, Pizey took the destroyers over a German minefield. At {{nowrap|2:31 p.m.,}} just before the destroyers attacked, north of the [[Scheldt]] Estuary, ''Scharnhorst'' had hit a mine and was stopped for a short time, before resuming at about {{cvt|25|kn|mph+km/h}}. At {{nowrap|3:17 p.m.}} the destroyers made radar contact at {{cvt|9|nmi|mi+km}} and visual contact at {{cvt|4|nmi|mi+km}} at {{nowrap|3:43 p.m.}} ''Walpole'' had already dropped out with engine trouble; as the other five emerged from the murk, they were immediately engaged by the German ships. The destroyers pressed on to {{cvt|3000|yd|nmi+mi+km}} and two destroyers fired torpedoes; ''Worcester'' closed further and was hit by return fire from ''Gneisenau'' and ''Prinz Eugen'', then the last two destroyers attacked but all their torpedoes missed.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|pp=157–158}}{{efn|Several salvoes from ''Gneisenau'' hit ''Worcester'', destroyed the starboard side of the bridge and No.1 and No.2 boiler rooms. ''Prinz Eugen'' hit the destroyer a four times, setting it on fire, then Captain Fein, aboard ''Gneisenau'', ordered firing to cease, believing the destroyer to be sinking; ''Worcester'' limped to Harwich at {{cvt|6.5|kn|mph+km/h}}.{{sfn|Macintyre|1971|pp=144–145}}{{sfn|DNC|1952|p=189}}}}

====Night 12/13 and 13 February====

[[File:Cruiser Prinz Eugen underway in May 1945.jpg|thumb|{{centre|''Prinz Eugen'' (May 1945)}}]]
''Scharnhorst'' had fallen behind after hitting a mine and at {{nowrap|7:55 p.m.}} ''Gneisenau'' hit a magnetic mine off [[Terschelling]]. The mine exploded some distance from the ship, making a small hole on the starboard side and temporarily knocking a turbine out of action.{{sfn| Macintyre|1971|pp=144–145}} After about thirty minutes, the ship continued at about {{cvt|25|kn|mph+km/h}} and as ''Scharnhorst'' sailed through the same area, it hit another mine at {{nowrap|9:34 p.m.,}} both main engines stopped, steering was lost and fire control was damaged. The ship got under way with the starboard engines at {{nowrap|10:23 p.m.,}} making {{cvt|12|kn|mph+km/h}} and carrying about {{cvt|1000|LT|t|0}} of seawater.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=158}}{{sfn|Richards|1974|p=373}} ''Scharnhorst'' arrived at [[Wilhelmshaven]] at {{nowrap|10:00 a.m.}} on 13 February, with damage that took three months to repair. ''Gneisenau'' and ''Prinz Eugen'' reached the [[Elbe]] at {{nowrap|7:00 a.m.}} and tied up at Brunsbüttel North Locks at {{nowrap|9:30 a.m.}}{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=158}} After receiving Ultra intelligence about German minesweeping in the [[German Bight]], Bomber Command had laid {{nowrap|69 magnetic}} mines along the swept channel on 6 February and {{nowrap|25 mines}} the next day. When the route of the channel was more accurately plotted on 11 February, four mines were laid, then more on 12 February when the Channel Dash was on. Enigma decrypts revealed the mining of the German ships but the news was kept secret by the British to protect the source.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|p=138}}