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Common good
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===Public choice theory=== [[Public choice theory]] (sometimes called "positive political theory") applies microeconomic methodology to the study of political science in order to explain how private interests inform political activities. Whereas welfare economics, in line with classical political economy, typically assumes a public-interest perspective on policymaking, public choice analysis adopts a private-interest perspective in order to identify how the objectives of policymakers affect policy outcomes. Public choice analysis thus diagnoses deviations from the common good resulting from activities such as [[rent-seeking]]. In ''The Logic of Collective Action'', [[Mancur Olson]] argues that public goods will tend to be underprovided due to individuals' incentives to [[free-rider problem|free-ride]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Olson|first1=Mancur|title=The Logic of Collective Action|date=1965|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge}}</ref> [[Anthony Downs]] provided an application of this logic to the theory of voting, identifying the [[paradox of voting]] whereby rational individuals prefer to abstain from voting, because the marginal cost exceeds the private marginal benefit.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Downs|first1=Anthony|title=An Economic Theory of Democracy|date=1957|publisher=Harper and Row|location=New York}}</ref> Downs argues further that voters generally prefer to remain uninformed due to "[[rational ignorance]]". Public choice scholarship can have more constructive applications. For instance, [[Elinor Ostrom]]'s study of schemes for the regulation of common property resources resulted in the discovery of mechanisms for overcoming the [[tragedy of the commons]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ostrom|first1=Elinor|title=Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action|date=1990|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge}}</ref> In many countries of the [[Commonwealth of Nations|Commonwealth]], [[charitable organizations]] must demonstrate that they provide a [[public benefit]].<ref>Jonathan Garton (2013), ''Public Benefit in Charity Law'', OUP Oxford.</ref>
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