Editing Counterintelligence (section)

==== Motivations for information and operations disclosure ====

To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of an individual likely to commit espionage against the United States.
It "examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage."<ref name=Slammer1990>{{Cite web
 | title = Project Slammer Interim Progress Report
 | last = Intelligence Community Staff
 | date = 12 April 1990
 | url =http://antipolygraph.org/documents/slammer-12-04-1990.shtml
 | access-date = 2007-11-04
 }}</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
<caption>How an espionage subject sees himself (at the time of espionage)</caption>
|-
! Attitude
! Manifestations
|-
| Basic belief structure
|– Special, even unique.
– Deserving.

– The individual's situation is not satisfactory.

– No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).

– Doing only what others frequently do.

– Not a bad person.

– Performance in a government job (if presently employed) is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount contribution in the workplace.

– Security procedures do not (really) apply to the individual.

– Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for the individual unless they connect with something with which they can personally identify.
|-
| Feels isolated from the consequences of his actions:
| – The individual sees their situation in a context in which they face continually narrowing options until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime.

– They see espionage as a "Victimless" crime.

– Once they consider espionage, they figure out how it might be done. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.

– Subject finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards (or is able to solve that problem). They belittle the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do (the information would really be better protected). This "Ease of accomplishment" further reinforces resolve.
|-
| Attempts to cope with espionage activity
|– Anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact (some also feel thrill and excitement).

– After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues  (even flourishes).

– In the course of long-term activity, subjects may reconsider their involvement.

– Some consider breaking their role to become an operative for the government. This occurs when access to classified information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves or both.

– Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides. They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact.

– Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have done. Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing, they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.
|}

According to a press report about Project Slammer and Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly basic function is observing one's own personnel for behavior that either suggests that they could be targets for foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted. News reports indicate that in hindsight, red flags were flying but not noticed.<ref name=Stein>{{Cite journal
 | title = The Mole's Manual
 | last = Stein
 | first = Jeff
 | date = July 5, 1994
 | journal = New York Times
 | url =https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/05/opinion/the-mole-s-manual.html
 | access-date = 2007-11-04
 }}</ref> In several major penetrations of US services, such as [[Aldrich Ames]], the Walker ring or [[Robert Hanssen]], the individual showed patterns of spending inconsistent with their salary. Some people with changed spending may have a perfectly good reason, such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not be ignored.

Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach based on ego. [[William Kampiles]], a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations manual on the [[KH-11]] reconnaissance satellite. To an interviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted his "problem"—constant conflicts with supervisors and co-workers—and brought in outside counseling, he might not have stolen the KH-11 manual.<ref name="Stein"/>

By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meetings of the Security Policy Advisory Board.<ref name=SPAB1997>{{Cite web
 | title = Security Policy Advisory Board Meeting: Draft Minutes
 | publisher = Federation of American Scientists 
 | date = 12 December 1997
 | url =https://fas.org/sgp/spb/spab1297.html
 | access-date = 2007-11-04
 }}</ref> While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in the mid-nineties, there are research data used throughout the security community. They emphasize the {{blockquote|essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trend toward economic espionage.}}