Editing Divine command theory (section)

===Euthyphro dilemma===
{{Main|Euthyphro dilemma}}
[[File:Plato Silanion Musei Capitolini MC1377.jpg|thumb|Plato presents the Euthyphro dilemma in one of his dialogues.]]

The [[Euthyphro dilemma]] was proposed in [[Plato|Plato's]] dialogue between [[Socrates]] and [[Euthyphro]]. In the scene, Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing the nature of [[piety]] when Socrates presents the dilemma, which can be presented as the question "Is X good because God commands it, or does God command X because it is good?".<ref name=austin/>

{{Quote|Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?|Plato|Euthyphro<ref name=austin/>}}

The Euthyphro dilemma can elicit the response that an action is good because God commands the action, or that God commands an action because it is good. If the first is chosen, it would imply that whatever God commands must be good: even if he commanded someone to inflict suffering, then inflicting suffering must be moral. If the latter is chosen, then morality is no longer dependent on God, defeating the divine command theory. Additionally, if God is subject to an external law, he is not sovereign or [[omnipotent]], which would challenge the orthodox conception of God. Proponents of the Euthyphro dilemma might claim that divine command theory is obviously wrong because either answer challenges the ability of God to give moral laws.<ref name=austin/>

[[William of Ockham]] responded to the Euthyphro Dilemma by '[[bite the bullet|biting the bullet]]'. He argued that, if God did command people to be cruel, then that would be morally obligatory, proposing that the only limitation to what God can make obligatory is the [[principle of non-contradiction]].<ref>{{cite book | title=Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas | publisher=Cambridge University Press | author=Dougherty, M. V. | year=2011 | pages=163–164 | isbn=978-1-107-00707-9}}</ref> [[Robert Merrihew Adams|Robert Adams]] defended Ockham's view, noting that it is only a logical possibility that God would command what mankind considers to be immoral, not an actuality. Even if God could logically command these actions, he would not because that is not his character.<ref name=austin/> Eleonore Stump and [[Norman Kretzmann]] have responded to the Euthyphro dilemma by appealing to the doctrine of [[divine simplicity]], a concept associated with Aquinas and [[Aristotle]] which suggests that the substance and attributes of God are identical. They propose that God and goodness are identical and that this is what makes his commands good.<ref>{{cite book | title=God, Goodness and Philosophy | publisher=Ashgate Publishing | author=Harris, Harriet | year=2011 | pages=101 | isbn=978-1-4094-2852-7}}</ref>

American philosopher [[William Alston]] responded to the [[Euthyphro dilemma]] by considering what it means for God to be morally good. If divine command theory is accepted, it implies that God is good because he obeys his own commands; Alston argued that this is not the case and that God's goodness is distinct from abiding by moral obligations. He suggested that a moral obligation implies that there is some possibility that the agent may not honour their obligation; Alston argued that this possibility does not exist for God, so his morality must be distinct from simply obeying his own commands. Alston contended that God is the supreme standard of morality and acts according to his character, which is necessarily good. There is no more arbitrariness in this view than accepting another moral standard.<ref name=austin/>