Editing Environmental determinism (section)

== Effects of geography on political regimes ==

Numerous scholars have argued that geographic and environmental factors affect the types of [[political regime]] that societies develop, and shape paths towards [[democracy]] versus [[dictatorship]].

=== The disease environment ===
{{Main|Why Nations Fail}}

[[Daron Acemoglu]], [[Simon Johnson (economist)|Simon Johnson]], and [[James A. Robinson (Harvard University)|James A. Robinson]] have achieved notoriety for demonstrating that diseases and terrain have helped shape tendencies towards democracy versus dictatorship, and through these economic growth and development. In their book ''[[Why Nations Fail]]'', as well as a paper titled ''The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation'',<ref>{{cite journal | last=Acemoglu | first=Daron | last2=Johnson | first2=Simon | last3=Robinson | first3=James A. | title=The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation | journal=American Economic Review | volume=91 | issue=5 | date=1 December 2001 | issn=0002-8282 | pages=1369–1401 | doi=10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 | doi-access=free}}</ref> the authors show that the colonial disease environment shaped the tendency for Europeans to settle the territory or not, and whether they developed systems of agriculture and labor markets that were free and egalitarian versus exploitative and unequal. These choices of political and economic institutions, they argue, shaped tendencies to democracy or dictatorship over the following centuries.

=== Factor endowments ===
{{Main|Factor endowment}}

In order to understand the impact and creation of institutions during early state formation, economic historians [[Stanley Engerman]] and [[Kenneth Sokoloff]] examined the economic development of the Americas during colonization.<ref name="Engerman Sokoloff 2011">{{cite book | title=Economic development in the Americas since 1500: Endowments and institutions | last1=Engerman | first1=Stanley L. | last2=Sokoloff | first2=Kenneth L. | publisher=Cambridge University Press | date=2011-11-14 | isbn=978-0-521-25137-2 | location=United States}}</ref> They found that the beginnings of the success or failure of American colonies were based on the specific [[factor endowments]] available to each colony. These endowments included the climate, soil profitability, crop potential, and even native population density. Institutions formed to take advantage of these factor endowments. Those that were most successful developed an ability to change and adapt to new circumstances over time. For example, the development of economic institutions, such as [[plantation]]s, was caused by the need for a large property and labor force to harvest sugar and tobacco, while [[smallholding|smallholder]] farms thrived in areas where scale economies were absent. Though initially profitable, plantation colonies also suffered from large dependent populations over time as slaves and natives were given few rights, limiting the population available to drive future economic progress and technological development.<ref name="Engerman Sokoloff 2011" />

Factor endowments also influenced political institutions. This is demonstrated by the plantation owning elite using their power to secure long lasting government institutions and pass legislation that leads to the persistence of inequality in society. Engerman and Sokoloff found smallholder economies to be more equitable since they discouraged an elite class from forming, and distributed political power democratically to most land-owning males. These differences in political institutions were also highly influential in the development of schools, as more equitable societies demanded an educated population to make political decisions. Over time these institutional advantages had exponential effects, as colonies with educated and free populations were better suited to take advantage of technological change during the industrial revolution, granting country wide participation into the booming free-market economy.<ref name="Engerman Sokoloff 2011" />

Engerman and Sokoloff conclude that while institutions heavily influenced the success of each colony, no individual type of institution is the source of economic and state growth. Other variables such as factor endowments, technologies, and the creation of property rights are just as crucial in societal development. To encourage state success an institution must be adaptable and suited to find the most economical source of growth. The authors also argue that while not the only means for success, institutional development has long lasting-economic and social effects on the state.<ref name="Engerman Sokoloff 2011" />

Other prominent scholars contest the extent to which [[factor endowments]] determine economic and political institutions.<ref name="Easterly Levine 2003">{{cite journal | last1=Easterly | first1=William | last2=Levine | first2=Ross | date=January 2003 | title=Tropics, germs, and crops: How endowments influence economic development | journal=Journal of Monetary Economics | volume=50 | pages=3–39 | doi=10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00200-3 | citeseerx=10.1.1.628.7392 | s2cid=24361048}}</ref><ref name="Nugent 2010">{{cite journal | last1=Nugent | first1=Jeffrey B. | last2=Robinson | first2=James A. | date=March 2010 | title=Are factor endowments fate? | journal=Revista de Historia Económica | volume=28 | issue=1 | pages=45–82 | doi=10.1017/s0212610909990048 | hdl=10016/20210 | s2cid=53869605 | hdl-access=free}}</ref>

American economists [[William Easterly]] and [[Ross Levine]] argue that economic development does not solely depend on geographic endowments—like temperate climates, disease-resistant climates, or soil favorable to [[cash crops]]. They stress that there is no evidence that geographic endowments influence country incomes other than through institutions.<ref name="Easterly Levine 2003" /> They observe that states like [[Burundi]] are poor—despite favorable environmental conditions like abundant rainfall and fertile soil—because of the damage wrought by colonialism. Other states like [[Canada]] with fewer endowments are more stable and have higher per capita incomes.{{sfn|Easterly|Levine|2003|pp=3–5}}

Easterly and Levine further observe that studies of how the environment directly influences land and labor were tarred by racist theories of underdevelopment, but that does not mean that such theories can be automatically discredited. They argue that Diamond correctly stresses the importance of germs and crops in the very long-run of societal technological development.{{sfn|Easterly|Levine|2003|p=6}} They find that regression results support the findings of [[Jared Diamond]] and [[David Landes]] that factor endowments influence GDP per capita. However, Easterly and Levine's findings most support the view that long-lasting institutions most shape economic development outcomes. Relevant institutions include private property rights and the rule of law.{{sfn|Easterly|Levine|2003|p=27}}

Jeffrey B. Nugent and [[James A. Robinson (Harvard University)|James A. Robinson]] similarly challenge scholars like [[Barrington Moore, Jr.|Barrington Moore]] who hold that certain factor endowments and [[agricultural]] preconditions necessarily lead to particular political and economic organizations.{{sfn|Nugent|Robinson|2010|p=47}} Nugent and Robinson show that [[Economics of coffee|coffee economies]] in [[South America]] pursued radically different paths of political and economic development during the nineteenth century.<ref name="Nugent 2010" />

Some coffee states, like [[Costa Rica]] and [[Colombia]], passed laws like the [[Homestead Act of 1862]]. They favored smallholders, held elections, maintained small militaries, and fought fewer wars.{{sfn|Nugent|Robinson|2010|p=50}} Smallholder arrangements prompted widespread government investment in education. Other states like [[El Salvador]] and [[Guatemala]] produced coffee on plantations, where individuals were more disenfranchised. Whether a state became a smallholder or plantation state depended not on factor endowments but on norms established under [[colonialism]]—namely, legal statutes determining access to land, the background of the governing elites, and the degree of permitted political competition.{{sfn|Nugent|Robinson|2010|p=45}} Nugent and Robinson thereby conclude that factor endowments alone do not determine economic or political institutions.