Editing First day on the Somme (section)

====Artillery====
[[File:60PounderBatteryContalmaison.jpg|upright=1.25|thumb|{{centre|[[BL 60-pounder gun|60-pounder]] gun battery}}]]
The British had substantially increased the amount of artillery on the Western Front after the Battle of Loos in late 1915 but the length of front to be bombarded on the Somme led to the preparatory bombardment being planned to last for five days. There had been a debate about the merits of a short [[hurricane bombardment]] but there were insufficient guns quickly to destroy German field defences and be certain that barbed wire was cut, given the dependence of the artillery on air observation and the uncertain weather.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=122–124}}{{efn|In 1916, despite improvisation and inexperience, British industry produced {{nowrap|33,507 machine-guns,}} {{nowrap|5,192 trench}} mortars with {{nowrap|6,500,000 rounds,}} {{cvt|127,000|LT}} of explosives and {{cvt|84,000|LT}} of propellants. [[Mills bomb]] production rose to {{nowrap|1,400,000 per}} week and the output of shells rose from {{nowrap|4,336,800 in}} the first quarter of 1916 to {{nowrap|20,888,400 in}} the final quarter, for an annual total of more than fifty million. On the Somme, {{cvt|148,000|LT}} of ammunition were expended from {{nowrap|24 June – 23 July}} and {{cvt|101,771|LT}} were landed in France.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|p=124}} Some heavy guns and howitzers burst on firing, due to defective shells made from inferior steel with hairline cracks, through which the propellant discharge detonated the shell. The fuzes of [[BL 8-inch howitzer Mk VI – VIII|8-inch howitzers]] failed so often that the battlefield was littered with blinds (duds) and a remedy made the fuzes fall out. Many shells failed to explode due to deterioration of the explosive filling and many guns misfired due to poor quality barrels. The [[60-pounder]] guns averaged a premature explosion every {{nowrap|500 shrapnel}} rounds and [[4.5-inch howitzer]] shells exploded in the barrel or {{cvt|4|–|5|yd}} beyond the muzzle, the crews being nicknamed suicide clubs. Some propellants were not fully consumed on firing, requiring the barrel to be cleaned after each shot, which slowed the rate of fire. Some copper [[driving band]]s on [[18-pounder]] field gun shells were too hard, which reduced the accuracy of the gun; when high-explosive ammunition had been introduced late in 1915, premature detonations and bulges occurred, with a burst barrel every thousand shots. There was a shortage of buffer springs, replacements were sometimes worse than worn ones and spare parts for every mechanical device in the army were lacking. Some shells exuded explosive in the summer heat, flare fillings decomposed, phosphorus bombs went off spontaneously and the firing mechanism of the heavy trench mortars failed on 1 July. Stokes mortar ammunition was chronically unreliable until replaced by improved designs. Many Mills bombs and rifle grenades prematurely detonated or were duds and a make of rifle cartridge jammed in the breach after firing and had to be scrapped.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=122–124}}}}

The artillery had to cut barbed wire and neutralise German artillery with counter-battery fire. The British artillery fired more than {{nowrap|1.5 million}} shells during the preliminary bombardment, more than in the first year of the war. On 1 July, another {{nowrap|250,000 shells}} were fired; the guns could be heard on [[Hampstead Heath]], {{cvt|165|mi}} away. While this weight of bombardment was new for the British, it was common on the Western Front; at the [[Second Battle of Artois]] in May 1915, there had been a six-day preparatory bombardment with over {{nowrap|2.1 million}} shells. British shell production had increased since the [[shell scandal]] of 1915 but quality had been sacrificed for quantity.{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|2005|pp=62–63}} [[shrapnel shell|Shrapnel]] shells were virtually useless against entrenched positions and required accurate fuze settings to cut wire; very little high-explosive ammunition had been manufactured for field artillery.{{sfn|Farndale|1986|p=144}}{{efn|Field artillery: {{nowrap|808 [[Ordnance QF 18 pounder|18-pounder guns]]}} for wire-cutting with shrapnel and bombarding troops in the open, {{nowrap|202 [[QF 4.5 inch Howitzer|4.5-inch howitzers]]}}. Heavy artillery: {{nowrap|32 [[QF 4.7 inch Gun Mk I–IV|4.7-inch guns]]}} for counter-battery fire, {{nowrap|128 [[BL 60 pounder gun|60-pounder guns]]}} for counter-battery fire, {{nowrap|20 [[BL 6 inch Mk VII naval gun|6-inch guns]]}} for wire-cutting and counter-battery fire, {{nowrap|1 [[BL 9.2 inch Railway Gun|9.2-inch railway gun]]}}, {{nowrap|1 [[BL 12 inch Railway Gun|12-inch railway gun]]}}, {{nowrap|104 [[6 inch 26 cwt howitzer|6-inch howitzers]]}}, {{nowrap|64 [[BL 8-inch howitzer Mk I–V|8-inch howitzers]]}}, {{nowrap|60 [[BL 9.2 inch Howitzer|9.2-inch howitzers]]}}, {{nowrap|11 [[BL 12 inch Railway Howitzer|12-inch railway howitzers]]}}. Six [[BL 15 inch Howitzer|15-inch howitzers]], {{nowrap|288 [[2 inch Medium Mortar|2-inch medium mortars]]}} and {{nowrap|28 heavy}} trench mortars were reserved for wire cutting. The French supplied {{nowrap|60 [[Canon de 75 modèle 1897|75 mm guns]]}} (gas shell only), twenty-four 120 mm guns, sixteen 220 mm howitzers.{{sfn|Farndale|1986|p=144}}}} The French Sixth Army had {{nowrap|552 heavy}} guns and howitzers, with a much larger supply of high-explosive ammunition for field artillery and far more experienced personnel.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|p=292}}