Editing Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (section)

=== ''Discourse on Metaphysics'' ===
For Leibniz, "God is an absolutely perfect being". He describes this perfection later in section VI as the simplest form of something with the most substantial outcome (VI). Along these lines, he declares that every type of perfection "pertains to him (God) in the highest degree" (I). Even though his types of perfections are not specifically drawn out, Leibniz highlights the one thing that, to him, does certify imperfections and proves that God is perfect: "that one acts imperfectly if he acts with less perfection than he is capable of", and since God is a perfect being, he cannot act imperfectly (III). Because God cannot act imperfectly, the decisions he makes pertaining to the world must be perfect. Leibniz also comforts readers, stating that because he has done everything to the most perfect degree; those who love him cannot be injured. However, to love God is a subject of difficulty as Leibniz believes that we are "not disposed to wish for that which God desires" because we have the ability to alter our disposition (IV). In accordance with this, many act as rebels, but Leibniz says that the only way we can truly love God is by being content "with all that comes to us according to his will" (IV).

Because God is "an absolutely perfect being" (I), Leibniz argues that God would be acting imperfectly if he acted with any less perfection than what he is able of (III). His syllogism then ends with the statement that God has made the world perfectly in all ways. This also affects how we should view God and his will. Leibniz states that, in lieu of God's will, we have to understand that God "is the best of all masters" and he will know when his good succeeds, so we, therefore, must act in conformity to his good will—or as much of it as we understand (IV). In our view of God, Leibniz declares that we cannot admire the work solely because of the maker, lest we mar the glory and love God in doing so. Instead, we must admire the maker for the work he has done (II). Effectively, Leibniz states that if we say the earth is good because of the will of God, and not good according to some standards of goodness, then how can we praise God for what he has done if contrary actions are also praiseworthy by this definition (II). Leibniz then asserts that different principles and geometry cannot simply be from the will of God, but must follow from his understanding.<ref>Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. ''Discourse on Metaphysics. The Rationalists: Rene Descartes – Discourse on Method, Meditations''. N.Y.: Dolphin., n.d., n.p.,</ref>

Leibniz wrote: "[[Problem of why there is anything at all|Why is there something rather than nothing?]] The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."<ref>''[[Monadology|Monadologie]]'' (1714). [[Nicholas Rescher]], trans., 1991. ''The Monadology: An Edition for Students''. Uni. of Pittsburgh Press, p. 135.</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] called this question "the fundamental question of metaphysics".<!--"Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?"--><ref>{{cite web|title=The Fundamental Question|url=https://www.hedweb.com/witherall/existence.htm|publisher=hedweb.com|access-date=26 April 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Geier|first1=Manfred|title=Wittgenstein und Heidegger: Die letzten Philosophen|publisher=Rowohlt Verlag|isbn=978-3-644-04511-8|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JUiFDQAAQBAJ&pg=PP166|access-date=26 April 2017|language=de|date=2017-02-17}}</ref>