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Hard problem of consciousness
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==== Explanatory gap ==== {{Main|Explanatory gap}} {{see also|Reductionism}} In 1983, the philosopher [[Joseph Levine (philosopher)|Joseph Levine]] proposed that there is an ''explanatory gap'' between our understanding of the physical world and our understanding of consciousness.<ref name=Levine1983>Levine, J. 1983. “Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap”. ''Pacific Philosophical Quarterly'', 64: 354–361.</ref> Levine's disputes that conscious states are reducible to neuronal or brain states. He uses the example of pain (as an example of a conscious state) and its reduction to the firing of [[Group C nerve fiber|c-fibers]] (a kind of nerve cell). The difficulty is as follows: even if consciousness is physical, it is not clear which physical states correspond to which conscious states. The bridges between the two levels of description will be [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]], rather than [[Necessity and sufficiency|necessary]]. This is significant because in most contexts, relating two scientific levels of descriptions (such as physics and chemistry) is done with the assurance of necessary connections between the two theories (for example, chemistry follows with necessity from physics).<ref name="jw-iep">{{cite web|last1=Weisberg|first1=Josh|title=The Hard Problem of Consciousness|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> Levine illustrates this with a thought experiment: Suppose that humanity were to encounter an alien species, and suppose it is known that the aliens do not have any c-fiber. Even if one knows this, it is not obvious that the aliens do not feel pain: that would remain an open question. This is because the fact that aliens do not have c-fibers does not entail that they do not feel pain (in other words, feelings of pain do not follow with logical necessity from the firing of c-fibers). Levine thinks such thought experiments demonstrate an explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical world: even if consciousness is reducible to physical things, consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physical things, because the link between physical things and consciousness is a contingent link.<ref name="jw-iep" /> Levine does not think that the explanatory gap means that consciousness is not physical; he is open to the idea that the explanatory gap is only an [[Epistemology|epistemological]] problem for physicalism.<ref name="jw-iep" /> In contrast, Chalmers thinks that the hard problem of consciousness does show that consciousness is not physical.<ref name=":0" />
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