Editing Liberal paradox (section)

===Minimal liberalism===
Most commentators on Sen's paradox have argued that Sen's minimal liberalism condition does not adequately capture the notion of individual rights.<ref name="Gibbard" /><ref name="Nozick">{{cite book|last=Nozick|first=Robert|year=1974|title=Anarchy, State, and Utopia|publisher=Basic books}}</ref><ref name="Gardenfors">{{cite journal|last=Gärdenfors |first=Peter|year=1981|title=Rights, games and social choice|journal=Noûs|volume=15|number=3|pages=341–356 |jstor=2215437|doi=10.2307/2215437}}</ref><ref name="Sugden">{{cite journal|last=Sugden|first=Robert|year=1985|title=Why be consistent? A critical analysis of consistency requirements in choice theory|journal=Economica|volume=52|number=206 |pages=167–183 |jstor=2554418|doi=10.2307/2554418}}</ref> Essentially what is excluded from Sen's characterization of individual rights is the ability to voluntarily form contracts that lay down one's claim to a right.

For example, in the example of Lewd and Prude, although each has a right to refuse to read the book, Prude would voluntarily sign a contract with Lewd promising to read the book on condition that Lewd refrain from doing so. In such a circumstance there was no violation of Prude's or Lewd's rights because each entered the contract willingly. Similarly, Alice and Bob might sign a contract to each paint their houses their dispreferred color on condition that the other does the same.

In this vein, Gibbard provides a weaker version of the minimal liberalism claim which he argues is consistent with the possibility of contracts and which is also consistent with the Pareto principle given any possible preferences of the individuals.<ref name="Gibbard" />