Editing Marian reforms (section)

== Historiography ==

Modern historiography has regularly cast Marius as abolishing the propertied militia and replacing it with landless soldiers motivated largely by pay. This belief emerges from the ancient literary sources, but rests on a relatively weak basis.{{sfn|Taylor|2023|p=161}}

Most scholars have now abandoned the belief that Marius was responsible for any proletarianisation of the Roman legions in the early 1st century&nbsp;BC and that such proletarianisation occurred at all,{{sfnm|Rafferty|2021|Cadiou|2018|2pp=40, 78 et seq |Probst|2008|Keaveney|2007|4pp=93–94}} concluding that the reforms attributed to Marius are largely figments of modern historiography.{{sfn|Taylor|2019|p=79}}

=== Ancient and 19th century views ===
[[File:Theodor Mommsen by Ludwig Knaus (1881).jpg|thumb|upright|1881 painting of [[Theodor Mommsen]], who spread the idea of Marian reforms, especially in terms of cohortal legions, state-purchased equipment, and volunteer enlistment]]

Ancient narratives on the Marian reforms largely discussed them in service of the respective narrative's themes. Sallust, the closest source to 107&nbsp;BC, wrote a narrative lamenting moral decline among the citizenry. To that end, he portrayed Marius' enrolment in 107 in terms of his alleged ambition and disregard for ancestral customs:{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=81–83}}

{{quote|[Marius] enrolled soldiers, not according to the [[Centuriate Assembly|classes]] in the manner of our forefathers, but allowing anyone to volunteer, for the most part the [[proletariat]]. Some say that he did this through lack of good men, others because of a desire to curry favour, since that class had given him honour and rank. As a matter of fact, to one who aspires to power the poorest man is the most helpful, since he has no regard for his property, having none, and considers anything honourable for which he receives pay.{{sfn|Sall. ''Iug.''|loc=86.2–3}} }}

Marius' open recruitment, as documented in Sallust, may also be explained not in terms of ambition but also by his desire to recruit as large an army as possible to send to Africa,<ref>{{harvnb|Sall. ''Iug.''|loc=86.4}}, states Marius arrived in Africa with more men than the senate had authorised.</ref> to do so quickly,{{sfn|Evans|1995|pp=92–93}} or to do so without harming his popularity.{{sfn|Lintott|1994|pp=91–92}} One of the other main sources is Valerius Maximus; he wrote, in a longer passage on the customs of the Roman army, that Marius disregarded its traditional recruitment practices due to his status as a {{lang|la|[[novus homo]]}}, an aetiology which historians have dismissed as "puerile, naïve, and fanciful".<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=85}}, citing, among others, {{harvnb|Rich|1983|p=325}}.</ref> Valerius Maximus' narrative is largely in the interest of creating {{lang|la|exempla}} (moral parables) of traditions broken rather than conveying historical events.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|p=88}}

Other sources, largely far later and dating from the [[Antonine period]] (2nd century&nbsp;AD), also associate Marius with allowing the {{lang|la|capite censi}} to join in 107&nbsp;BC: [[Plutarch]], [[Florus]], and [[Aulus Gellius]].<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=37 nn. 7–9|ps=. Cadiou cites {{harvnb|Plut. ''Mar.''|loc=9.1}}; Flor. 1.36.13; Gell. 16.10.14.}}</ref> Plutarch's ''Life'' of Marius, depending on emendation, may claim that Marius enrolled slaves, which would be a profound exaggeration.<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=90}}, citing {{harvnb|Plut. ''Mar.''|loc=9.1|ps=; the specific emendation is δοῦλον (referring to slaves) for φαῦλον (merely the poor)}}.</ref> Gellius' discussion indicates that there was some disagreement in the sources before him as to the year (during the Cimbric War in 104 or the Jugurthine War in 107&nbsp;BC) in which Marius recruited the {{lang|la|capite censi}}.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=37–38}} However, other sources are entirely silent: for example, the [[Periochae|abridgement]] of [[Livy]]'s history entirely passes over the events from Marius' first consulship and Numidian command (108 – 105&nbsp;BC), noting only that he was victor over Jugurtha, indicating that Livy or his epitomiser thought Marius' irregular levy unimportant.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=79–80}} It is likely, however, that most of the ancient narratives which connected the collapse of the free state to the self-serving armed proletarian did so in the context of civil war.<ref>{{harvnb|Keaveney|2007|pp=6 (Plutarch discussing Sulla), 7 (Appian discussing the [[Second Triumvirate]])}}.</ref> As literary themes, they were then retrojected into the time of Marius and the Jugurthine War, more than two generations earlier.{{sfn|Keaveney|2007|pp=6–7}}

The first time a modern historian posited and attributed to Marius a revolutionary and comprehensive reform was in an 1846 book by the German scholar [[Ludwig Lange (philologist)|Ludwig Lange]].<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=17}}, citing {{cite book |last=Lange |first=Christian Conrad Ludwig |title=Historia mutationum rei militaris Romanorum inde ab interitu rei publicae usque ad Constantinum Magnum |url=https://haab-digital.klassik-stiftung.de/viewer/image/4158548888/15/LOG_0000/ |volume=1 |year=1846 |publisher=Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht |location=Gottingen |pages=3–30 |language=la }} Lange admitted his theory was speculative and noted how it could be falsified.</ref><ref>No trace, for example, of the Marian reforms is found at {{cite encyclopedia |editor-last=Smith |editor-first=William |title=Marius |year=1848 |encyclopedia=Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology |url=https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dmarius-bio-1 |publisher=John Murray |location=London |via=Perseus }}</ref> The hypothesis rested on the assumption that any differences between the army of Marius' time and that of Polybius' time could be attributed to a single reform event of which Marius could have been the only progenitor.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|pp=18–19}}

The idea was spread by the influential 19th-century classicist [[Theodor Mommsen]] in the 1855 second volume of his ''[[History of Rome (Mommsen)|The History of Rome]]'', which served to bring the idea of the Marian reforms into the core of scholarship. It received more attention in the military historian [[Wilhelm Rüstow]]'s 1857 book {{Lang|de|Geschichte der Infanterie}} ('History of the Infantry') which presented the Marian reforms – here conceived as a full overhaul including the abolition of the citizen cavalry, institution of a single form of heavy infantry, uniform equipment, and introduction of the cohort – as an established fact.<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=21|ps=. Rüstow's book became the main progenitor of the comprehensive Marian reforms hypothesis, likely because it was written in German instead of Latin. {{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=22}}. }}</ref> However, he viewed it only as a step in the full professionalisation of the Roman army and believed that the putative reforms reflected real military needs.<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=21}}, citing {{Cite book |last=Mommsen |first=Theodor |title=The History of Rome |volume=2 |language=de |pages=194–197 |year=1855 |location=Berlin }}</ref>

Rüstow's views were largely repeated uncritically by authors including [[Joachim Marquardt]] and [[Theodore Ayrault Dodge]].<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|pp=22–23|ps=. Faszcza approvingly mentions a 1915 article by Theodor Steinwender which questioned whether Polybius' army description was accurate; it did not, however, challenge the belief in comprehensive reforms. See {{Cite journal |last=Steinwender |first=Theodor |date=1912 |title=Zum Polybianischen Feldlager |journal=[[Rheinisches Museum für Philologie]] |volume=67 |pages=48–66 |jstor=41247689 |issn=0035-449X |language=de }} }}</ref> By the early twentieth century, two major overviews in German played a substantial role in also spreading these views. The first was by [[Hans Delbrück]] in 1900; the second was by [[Johannes Kromayer]] and [[Georg Veith]] in 1928. While both noted that there were no ancient sources which described any putative large-scale reforms by Marius, they both largely repeated previous scholarship that accepted the Marian reforms as a revolutionary turning point for the Roman army.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|pp=24–27}} From there, this view moved into reference works like the [[Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft|''Realencyclopädie'']],<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=28}}, calling attention to two articles:
* {{cite encyclopedia |last=Kubitschek |first=Wilhelm |title=legio (republickanische Zeit) |encyclopedia=Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft |volume=12 |year=1924 |at=cols. 1201–2 |language=de |ref=none }}
* {{cite encyclopedia |last=Weynand |first=Rudolf |title=Marius (14) |encyclopedia=Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft |volume=Suppl. 6 |year=1935 |at=cols. 1420–22 |language=de |ref=none }}</ref> and then into Anglophone scholarship via the highly cited 1928 overview ''The Roman Legions'' by Henry Michael Denne Parker. Only after the [[Second World War]] were these views re-examined.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|pp=28–30}}

=== Post-war critiques ===

The view inherited from the 19th century sources was challenged in two articles published in 1949 and 1951 by [[Emilio Gabba]], an Italian historian, which held that instead of being a revolutionary change, Marius' decision to enrol the poor was the logical culmination of progressive reductions of the property qualifications in the face of chronic shortages of recruits. Marius' presumed reform then simply swept away the last vestige of a property qualification that by 107&nbsp;BC had largely ceased to be binding.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|p=43}}

In these terms, the abolition of the property qualification was just another stage in the evolution of the Roman army on the long journey to the professional army of the Augustan age. With no sources indicating that the social background of the legions had changed much, if at all, Gabba attributed the notability of the episode to Marius' political opponents' fear that voluntary service undermined traditional methods of gaining political support.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|p=30}}

Later historians also downplayed these reforms. The French historian {{Ill|Jacques Harmand|fr}}, writing in the 1960s, noted how the {{lang|la|dilectus}} ({{literally|selection}}) of conscripts continued through the 2nd century into the late republic; this undermined the previous assumption that volunteer service became dominant after 107&nbsp;BC.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|p=31}} The British classicist [[Peter Brunt]], in his 1971 book ''Italian Manpower'', also questioned the extent to which Polybius' descriptions reflected the army of the mid-second century, noting that many aspects therein were notably archaic and only could have been true in the early third century&nbsp;BC. Gabba's posited property level qualifications and Brunt's attacks on Polybius' credibility broke one of the main assumptions of the 19th century German scholars, namely that the Polybian army persisted largely unchanged until Marius' time.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|pp=31–32}} Brunt also found no evidence that volunteers took over the legions and instead concluded that the {{Lang|la|adsidui}} raised by the traditional levy still dominated.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|p=32}}

=== Contemporary historiography ===

The belief in the Marian reforms, by the late 20th century, largely rested on the argument that they reflected a manpower shortage.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|p=32}} [[William Vernon Harris]], an American classicist, showed in 1979 that complaints about conscription largely emerged only during campaigns which offered few prospects for plunder; this recast Marius' call in 107&nbsp;BC for volunteers as reflecting less a dearth of soldiers but rather the relatively little plunder expected for service in Numidia.<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=33}}, citing {{Cite book |last=Harris |first=William V |title=War and imperialism in republican Rome: 327-70 BC |date=1979 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-814866-1 |location=Oxford}}</ref> J&nbsp;W Rich then showed in a 1983 article in ''Historia'' that there was no general manpower shortage in Italy and that Marius' use of voluntary enlistment was in fact precedented, undermining the main proposed rationale for recruiting the {{lang|la|proletarii}}.{{sfnm|Cadiou|2018|1pp=49–50|Faszcza|2021|2p=34}} Further work on the demography of second-century Italy, especially by Nathan Rosenstein in the early 2000s, showed more definitively from the basis of archaeology there had been no population decline in the decades before Marius' first consulship, as had previously been believed.<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=400}}, citing, among others, {{Cite book |last=Rosenstein |first=Nathan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CGgwN9ZLaPYC |title=Rome at war: farms, families, and death in the middle republic |date=2004 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |isbn=978-0-8078-2839-7 }}</ref>

François Cadiou, in his 2018 book {{lang|fr|L'armée imaginaire}}, largely disproved the traditional narrative that Marius' volunteers had a substantial impact on the composition of the army, that the late republic's armies were made up largely of volunteers, and that those armies were largely drawn from the landless poor.{{sfnm|Gauthier|2020|1p=283|Rafferty|2021}} Cadiou, moreover, argued that historians' unwillingness to discard the theory that Marius decisively changed army recruitment, despite the limited evidence for it, emerged from the attractiveness of the theory as a simple explanation for the republic's collapse.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|p=117}}

The changes to the Roman army during the 1st century&nbsp;BC are now more attributed to the [[Social War (91–87 BC)|Social War]] and the civil wars from 49 to 31&nbsp;BC.<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2023|p=162}}; {{harvnb|Gauthier|2020|p=284|ps=. "I... instead look at the Social War, as well as the civil wars, as the periods of pivotal change".}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Probst|2008|ps=. "The first act that revolutionised the Roman army was Sulla’s march on Rome in 88".}}</ref> After the Social War, the state also started to keep men under arms for longer periods to maintain available experienced manpower, and coupled this with longer terms for commanders, particularly [[Julius Caesar|Caesar]] and [[Pompey]]. Client armies emerged not in the 100s&nbsp;BC but rather in the decades before [[Caesar's civil war]], which broke out in 49{{Nbsp}}BC.{{sfn|Taylor|2023|p=162}} The large-scale downsizing of Roman cavalry detachments likely emerged from the extension of citizenship to all of Italy. Because Italy's enfranchisement meant that Rome was now directly liable for the cavalry's upkeep rather than their local communities, Rome instead levied {{Lang|la|auxilia}} from allies who, by treaty, were responsible for their contingents' upkeep.{{sfn|Gauthier|2020|p=286}}

Contrary to the traditional story of quiescent client armies following their generals, contemporary historiography has established that Roman soldiers during the civil wars needed to be convinced of the legitimacy of their generals' causes.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=419–20}}<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=420 nn. 82–83}}, citing {{harvnb|Morstein-Marx|2011}}.</ref> For [[Sulla]] and [[Lucius Cornelius Cinna|Cinna]], such appeals were rooted in the consuls' legitimacy and prerogatives given as a gift of the people.{{sfn|Morstein-Marx|2011|pp=276–78}} Client armies, instead of being a consequence of putative changes in recruitment, emerged from the prolonged civil wars – themselves fought between armies which believed they were defending the republic{{sfn|Rosenstein|2022|pp=243–44}} – and generals' attempts to secure military loyalty with pay increases.{{sfn|Rosenstein|2022|p=245}}