Editing No first use (section)

==Rationale==
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Debates in the [[international community]] on strategic no-first-use of nuclear weapons include legal, [[nuclear ethics|ethical]], moral and political arguments from [[international organization|intergovernmental organizations]], regional blocs, [[non-governmental organization]]s and [[civil society]] actors as well as countries.<ref name=":1" /><ref name="SIPRI 1984">{{cite book |date=1984 |editor1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-link1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-last2=Blackaby |editor-first2=Frank Thomas |editor-last3=Goldblat |editor-first3=Jozef |editor-last4=Lodgaard |editor-first4=Sverre |editor-link4=Sverre Lodgaard |title=No-first-use |location=London and Philadelphia |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=0850662605 |ol=OL2840610M}}</ref>{{rp|3–26}} In 2023, former [[International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War|IPPNW]] program director John Loretz wrote: "With the risk of nuclear war greater than at any time since the [[Cold War#New Cold War (1979–1985)|Cold War of the 1980s]] ([[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] 2023)—exacerbated even further by the [[Russian Invasion of Ukraine|prolonged war in Ukraine]]—it comes as no surprise that academics, diplomats, and nuclear strategists are focusing anew on risk reduction proposals. One idea that has been in circulation for some time is a global-no-first-use agreement (GNFU), with unilateral or bilateral NFUs as another option."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Loretz |first=John |date=March 6, 2023 |title=Book Review: The Sheathed Sword: From Nuclear Brink to No First Use |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13623699.2023.2186769?journalCode=fmcs20 |journal=Medicine, Conflict and Survival |volume=38 |doi=10.1080/13623699.2023.2186769 |access-date=May 18, 2023|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

According to [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute|SIPRI]]'s 1984 analysis, first use of nuclear weapons as a right of self-defense in warfare is the "most controversial" under international law—a right, in their view, not unlimited. Highlighted also were the views of "religious, political and military authorities" who questioned a first-use doctrine. SIPRI concluded that a meaningful no-first-use declaration "would have to be accompanied—or preferably preceded—by changes in the deployment of both nuclear and conventional forces".<ref name="SIPRI 1984" />{{rp|6, 23–24}}

Sparking debate with their 1982 ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' article, former [[National Security Advisor (United States)|US national security advisor]] [[McGeorge Bundy]], US [[diplomat]] [[George F. Kennan]], former [[United States Secretary of Defense|US Secretary of Defense]] [[Robert McNamara]] and US lead negotiator for the [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]] [[Gerard C. Smith]] challenged the US and the [[NATO|Atlantic Alliance]] "to consider the possibilities, the requirements, the difficulties, and the advantages of a policy of no-first-use" and urged that citizens, too, consider these policy questions. The authors believed that fully exploring NFU as a strategy and policy would reveal greater advantages than costs and "help the peoples and governments of the [[NATO|Alliance]] to find the political will to move in this direction". They called "both fear and mistrust&nbsp;... the most immediate enemies", arguing that: "The Soviet government has repeatedly offered to join the West in declaring such a policy, and while such declarations may have only limited reliability, it would be wrong to disregard the real value to both sides of a jointly declared adherence to this policy." They also maintained that an NFU posture and policy "could help to open the path toward serious reduction of nuclear armaments on both sides", cautioning that "[a]s long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of use will remain."<ref name="Bundy et al ForAff1982">{{cite book |last1=Bundy |first1=McGeorge |author-link1=McGeorge Bundy |last2=Kennan |first2=George F|author-link2=George F. Kennan |last3=McNamara |first3=Robert S |author-link3=Robert McNamara |last4=Smith |first4=Gerard C |author-link4=Gerard C. Smith |date=1984 |editor1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-link1=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |editor-last2=Blackaby |editor-first2=Frank Thomas |editor-last3=Goldblat |editor-first3=Jozef |editor-last4=Lodgaard |editor-first4=Sverre |editor-link4=Sverre Lodgaard |title=No-first-use |location=London and Philadelphia |publisher=Taylor & Francis |pages=29–41 |chapter=Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance (rept) |isbn=0850662605 |ol=OL2840610M}}</ref>{{rp|32, 35, 37, 39–40}}

In the context of Japan's reliance on US extended [[Deterrence theory|deterrence]], former Japanese diplomat, director of [[Japan Institute of International Affairs|JIIA]]'s Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation (2008–2014) and commissioner of the [[Japanese Atomic Energy Commission]] (2014–2017) Nobuyasu Abe in 2018 called for re-examining the role of nuclear weapons alongside the non-nuclear military situation in the regional security environment to bridge the "great divide between idealists and realists" on adopting a no-first-use policy. He described the political divide in Japan as the skepticism of the [[Government of Japan|Japanese government]], the ruling [[Liberal Democratic Party of Japan|LDP]], and "center/right conservatives" on the one hand, and the support of the ruling coalition's junior partner [[Komeito]], opposition parties, and "left/center anti-nuclear idealists" on the other.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Abe |first=Nobuyasu |date=2018 |title=No First Use: How to Overcome Japan's Great Divide |journal=Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=137–151 |doi=10.1080/25751654.2018.1456042|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{rp|138, 144, 148}} In its analysis of [[Nuclear umbrella#South Korea|South Korea]]'s reliance on US extended deterrence, the [[Asan Institute for Policy Studies]] in January 2022 wrote that, were the US  to adopt an NFU position, the credibility of its extended deterrence would be diminished.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://en.asaninst.org/contents/the-troubled-rok-u-s-alliance/ |title=Issue Briefs: The Troubled ROK–US Alliance |date=January 21, 2022 |publisher=The [[Asan Institute for Policy Studies]] |access-date=June 2, 2023}}</ref> The institute's public attitudes survey findings, published in May 2023, include naming North Korea as the most pressing security concern, followed by China.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://theasanforum.org/country-report-south-korea-april-2023/ |title=Country Report: South Korea (April 2023) |date=May 2, 2023 |publisher=The [[Asan Institute for Policy Studies]] |access-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref> In its November 2017 policy brief, the [[European Council on Foreign Relations]] concluded that North Korea's posture is one of "nuclear pre-emption" and its government "concerned that a [[preemptive war|first strike]] could destroy it"; in contrast, China pursues "what Beijing calls 'nuclear counterstrike campaigns{{'"}}, having declared its NFU doctrine out of the belief "that neither its government nor its nuclear arsenal could be eliminated in a first strike by a hostile power".<ref>{{cite web |url= https://ecfr.eu/publication/pre_empting_defeat_in_search_of_north_koreas_nuclear_doctrine/ |last1=Allard |first1=Léonie |last2=Duchâtel |first2=Mathieu |last3=Godement |first3=François |title=Policy Brief. Pre-empting defeat: In search of North Korean's nuclear doctrine |date=November 22, 2017 |publisher=[[European Council on Foreign Relations]] |access-date=June 9, 2023}}</ref> And in the foreground of strained relations between South Korea and Japan, stemming from [[Korea under Japanese rule|Japan's 1910–1945 occupation of Korea]], the June 2023 trilateral meeting of the countries' military chiefs signaled closer nuclear strategy consultation at the urging of their US counterpart.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us-japan-skorea-hold-rare-military-meeting-nkorea-launches-missile-2023-07-12/ |last=Ali |first=Idrees |date=July 12, 2023 |title=US, Japan, South Korea hold rare military meeting as North Korea launches missile |website=Reuters |access-date=July 12, 2023}}</ref>

Nonresident Senior Fellows in [[Brookings Institution|Brookings]]'s Center for East Asia Policy Studies [[Richard C. Bush]] and Jonathan D. Pollack in 2016 noted that "non-nuclear states living in the shadow of nuclear-armed adversaries" are willing to forego developing their own nuclear arms because of US security guarantees, and that adopting an NFU doctrine "would represent a profound shift" in those guarantees.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/20/before-moving-to-no-first-use-think-about-northeast-asia/ |last1=Bush |first1=Richard C. |author-link1= Richard C. Bush |last2=Pollack |first2=Jonathan D. |title=Order from Chaos series. Before moving to 'no first use,' think about Northeast Asia |date=July 20, 2016 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] |access-date=June 12, 2023}}</ref> Co-founder Keith B. Payne and Research Scholar Michaela Dodge of the National Institute for Public Policy in 2023 noted that for decades "US allies" have continued to oppose such a shift, citing a reported survey by the [[Presidency of Joe Biden|Biden]] Administration as the most recent indicator, and called for, among other things, "a more informed public discourse" by strengthening and expanding participation in strategic deterrence dialogues.<ref name="NIPP 2023">{{cite web| url=https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-and-michaela-dodge-emerging-challenges-to-extended-deterrence-assurance-and-the-future-of-u-s-alliances-no-555-june-6-2023/ |last1=Payne |first1=Keith B. |last2=Dodge |first2=Michaela |title= Information Series, Issue No. 555. Emerging Challenges to Extended Deterrence, Assurance and the Future of US Alliances |date=June 6, 2023 |publisher=National Institute for Public Policy |access-date=June 6, 2023}}</ref> The authors also noted that further enlargement of "underlying 'anti-nuclear' sentiment among some allied governments and/or their publics&nbsp;... would essentially eliminate the existing US extended nuclear deterrence policy, particularly (but not only) undercutting NATO allied participation in NATO's nuclear deterrence policy."<ref name="NIPP 2023" /> Former chair of the [[Bundestag]] Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms Control [[Uta Zapf]] in 2021 characterized NFU policy adoption as "a first step and a door-opener for an urgently needed dialog on the role of [[nuclear weapon|NW]] in military doctrines and strategies".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://gsinstitute.org/uta-zapf-is-it-time-for-no-first-use-policies/ |last=Zapf |first=Uta |author-link=Uta Zapf |title=Nuclear Risk Reduction and Disarmament: Is it time for no-first-use policies in the USA and globally? |date=April 29, 2021 |website=[[Global Security Institute]] |access-date=June 14, 2023}}</ref> Dominic Tierney, political science professor at [[Swarthmore College]] and author of ''The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts'', in 2016 wrote: "Champions and critics of no-first-use often cast it as a principled policy and a revolutionary step, for good or for ill. But the idealistic symbolism of no-first-use betrays an underlying reality. Disavowing a first strike is a luxury afforded to the strong.&nbsp;... No-first-use is the policy of [[Goliath]], not [[Mahatma Gandhi|Gandhi]]."<ref name="Tierney 2016" />

From the perspective of [[Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons|TPNW]] supporters, ambassador and director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation at the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Austria)|Austrian Foreign Ministry]] Alexander Kmentt in 2020 explained that nuclear risk reduction measures, including de-alerting and de-targeting as well as no-first-use declarations, are "assessed as having a negative impact on the credibility of nuclear deterrence" and "considered only insofar, as they do not impact the nuclear deterrence calculus, which in itself is the origin of nuclear risk".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/nuclear-deterrence-perpetuates-nuclear-risks-the-risk-reduction-perspective-of-tpnw-supporters/ |last=Kmentt |first=Alexander |title=Commentary. Nuclear deterrence perpetuates nuclear risks: the risk reduction perspective of TPNW supporters |publisher=[[European Leadership Network]] |date=December 4, 2020 |access-date=June 12, 2023}}</ref> In her 2018 view of narratives surrounding the TPNW, Heather Williams of [[King's College London]] acknowledged the importance of deterrence as a security tool to many states and proposed a "bridge-building framework" involving supporters and opponents finding common ground and working together, for example, on nuclear risk reduction.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Williams |first=Heather |date=2018 |title=A nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/98357442/A_nuclear_babel_Williams_Publishedonline5July2018_GREEN_AAM.pdf |journal=Nonproliferation Review |volume=25 |issue=1–2 |pages=51–63 |doi=10.1080/10736700.2018.1477453 |access-date=July 12, 2023}}</ref>

By 2020 new NFU commitments and ideas had stalled, according to Wilfred Wan, [[United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research|UNIDIR]] researcher on the global nonproliferation regime, because of the deep divide over whether they reduce risk or, for example, increase risk by undermining [[strategic stability]], while John Borrie, lead for UNIDIR's research program on [[weapon of mass destruction|WMD]]s, noted that even the definition of strategic stability was evolving due to the unpredictability of and increasing strategic concerns. In the same publication, Manpreet Sethi, lead researcher for the [[Centre for Air Power Studies (India)|Centre for Air Power Studies]], recommended that China's and India's unilateral NFU declarations be turned into a bilateral statement as a step towards nuclear risk reduction in South Asia, "since the risk of not taking any would be quite risky indeed".<ref>{{cite report |author1=John Borrie |author2=Hassan Elbahtimy |author3=Ulrich Kühn |author4=Tanya Ogilvie-White  |author5= Ankit Panda |author6=Manpreet Sethi |author7=Wilfred Wan |editor-last=Wan |editor-first=Wilfred |date=April 2020 |title=Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use |url=https://www.unidir.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/19%20Aug%202020%20%E2%80%94%20Nuclear%20Risk%20Reduction%20-%20Closing%20Pathways%20to%20Use.pdf |publisher=UNIDIR |access-date=July 13, 2023}}</ref>{{rp|10, 74, 154}} The following year, the India-based [[Observer Research Foundation]] co-authored an opinion piece with Manpreet Sethi, mentioning the reintroduction of the No First Use Act in both chambers of the US Congress as "hope rekindled" and noting that, given the reality of countries unwilling to give up their nuclear weapons, an NFU "allows nations to maintain a notional sense of security from their nuclear weapons, but significantly reduces possibilities of use".<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.eurasiareview.com/17052021-acceptance-of-no-first-use-nfu-by-usa-hope-redux-oped/ |title=Acceptance Of No First Use (NFU) By USA: Hope Redux? – OpEd |author1=Observer Research Foundation |author-link1=Observer Research Foundation |last2=Sethi |first2=Manpreet |date=May 17, 2021 |website=Eurasia Review |access-date=August 3, 2023}}</ref> And in its effort to shape proposals and ideas on nuclear risk reduction "into a pathway to achieve the treaty-mandated disarmament end state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," the Council on Strategic Risks places the universal adoption of NFU at "the starting gate for any process towards full nuclear disarmament."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/A-Practical-Strategy-for-Nuclear-Risk-Reduction-and-Disarmament_Fulfilling-the-Code-of-Nuclear-Responsibility_Briefer-17_2021_4_19.pdf |author1=Rear Admiral John Gower, CB OBE |author2=Christine Parthemore |title= Briefer No. 17. A Practical Strategy for Nuclear Risk Reduction and Disarmament: Fulfilling the Code of Nuclear Responsibility |date=April 19, 2021 |website=The Council on Strategic Risks |access-date=November 16, 2023}}</ref>{{rp|1, 10}}