Editing Operation Downfall (section)

===Ground forces===
The two defensive options against amphibious invasion are strong defense of the beaches and [[defense in depth]]. Early in the war (such as at [[Battle of Tarawa|Tarawa]]), the Japanese employed strong defenses on the beaches with little or no manpower in reserve, but this tactic proved vulnerable to pre-invasion [[Naval gunfire support|shore bombardment]]. Later at [[Battle of Peleliu|Peleliu]], [[Battle of Iwo Jima|Iwo Jima]], and Okinawa, they switched strategies and dug in their forces in the most defensible terrain.{{citation needed|date = July 2014}}

For the defense of Kyūshū, the Japanese took an intermediate posture, with the bulk of their defensive forces a few kilometers inland, back far enough to avoid complete exposure to naval bombardment, but close enough that the Americans could not establish a secure foothold before engaging them. The counteroffensive forces were still farther back, prepared to move against the largest landing.{{citation needed|date = July 2014}}

In March 1945, there was only one combat division in Kyūshū. Four veteran divisions were withdrawn from the [[Kwantung Army]] in [[Manchuria]] in March 1945 to strengthen the forces in Japan,{{sfn|Giangreco|2009|p=21}} and 45 new divisions were activated between February and May 1945. Most were immobile formations for coastal defense, but 16 were high quality mobile divisions.{{sfn|Giangreco|2009|pp=70–72}} By August, the formations, including three tank brigades, had a total of 900,000 men.{{sfn|Frank| p= 203}} Although the Japanese were able to muster new soldiers, equipping them was more difficult. By August, the Japanese Army had the equivalent of 65 divisions in the homeland but only enough equipment for 40 and ammunition for 30.{{sfn|Frank|p= 176}}

The Japanese did not formally decide to stake everything on the outcome of the Battle of Kyūshū, but they concentrated their assets to such a degree that there would be little left in reserve. By one estimate, the forces in Kyūshū had 40% of all the ammunition in the Home Islands.{{sfn|Frank|p= 177}}

In addition, the Japanese had organized the [[Volunteer Fighting Corps]], which included all healthy men aged 15 to 60 and women 17 to 40 for a total of 28 million people, for combat support and, later, combat jobs. Weapons, training and uniforms were generally lacking: many were armed with nothing better than antiquated firearms, [[molotov cocktail]]s, [[yumi|longbow]]s, swords, knives, bamboo or wooden spears, and even clubs and truncheons: they were expected to make do with what they had.{{sfn | Frank| pp =188–89}}{{Sfn | Bauer & Coox}} One mobilized high school girl, Yukiko Kasai, found herself issued an [[Scratch awl|awl]] and told, "Even killing one American soldier will do. ... You must aim for the [[abdomen]]."{{sfn|Frank|p= 189}} They were expected to serve as a "second defense line" during the Allied invasion, and to conduct [[guerrilla warfare]] in urban areas and mountains.

The Japanese command intended to organize its Army personnel according to the following plan:<ref>[http://www.k2x2.info/istorija/japonija_v_voine_1941_1945_gg/p10.php#metkadoc12 Hattori, "Japan at War: 1941–1945"] part 9 chapter 2. Retrieved April 6, 2018.</ref>

{| class="wikitable plainrowheaders"
|+ Mobilization plan
! scope="col" | Region
! scope="col" | Number mobilized
|-
| Kyushu
| 900,000
|-
| Kanto (Tokyo)
| 950,000
|-
| Korea
| 247,000
|-
| '''Total'''
| 3,150,000
|-
| colspan="2" | '''For the decisive battle'''
|-
|Kyushu
|990,000
|-
|Kanto
| 1,280,000
|-
|}