Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Reflective equilibrium ===
[[Reflective equilibrium]] is a state in which a thinker has the impression that they have considered all the relevant evidence for and against a theory and have made up their mind on this issue.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="StanfordEquilibrium">{{cite web |last1=Daniels |first1=Norman |title=Reflective Equilibrium |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 February 2022 |date=2020}}</ref> It is a state of coherent balance among one's beliefs.<ref name="Little">{{cite journal |last1=Little |first1=Daniel |title=Reflective Equilibrium and Justification |journal=Southern Journal of Philosophy |date=1984 |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=373–387 |doi=10.1111/j.2041-6962.1984.tb00354.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LITREA-2}}</ref> This does not imply that all the evidence has really been considered, but it is tied to the impression that engaging in further inquiry is unlikely to make one change one's mind, i.e. that one has reached a stable ''equilibrium''. In this sense, it is the endpoint of the deliberative process on the issue in question.<ref name="StanfordEquilibrium"/><ref name="Little"/> The philosophical method of reflective equilibrium aims at reaching this type of state by mentally going back and forth between all relevant beliefs and intuitions. In this process, the thinker may have to let go of some beliefs or deemphasize certain intuitions that do not fit into the overall picture in order to progress.<ref name="StanfordEquilibrium"/><ref name="Little"/>

In this wide sense, reflective equilibrium is connected to a form of [[coherentism]] about [[epistemological justification]] and is thereby opposed to [[foundationalist]] attempts at finding a small set of fixed and unrevisable beliefs from which to build one's philosophical theory.<ref name="StanfordEquilibrium"/><ref name="de Maagt"/> One problem with this wide conception of the reflective equilibrium is that it seems trivial: it is a truism that the [[rational]] thing to do is to consider all the evidence before making up one's mind and to strive towards building a coherent perspective. But as a method to guide philosophizing, this is usually too vague to provide specific guidance.

When understood in a more narrow sense, the method aims at finding an equilibrium between particular intuitions and general principles.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="StanfordEquilibrium"/> On this view, the thinker starts with intuitions about particular cases and formulates general principles that roughly reflect these intuitions. The next step is to deal with the conflicts between the two by adjusting both the intuitions and the principles to reconcile them until an equilibrium is reached.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="StanfordEquilibrium"/> One problem with this narrow interpretation is that it depends very much on the intuitions one started with. This means that different philosophers may start with very different intuitions and may therefore be unable to find a shared equilibrium.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="de Maagt">{{cite journal |last1=de Maagt |first1=Sem |title=Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity |journal=Inquiry |date=4 July 2017 |volume=60 |issue=5 |pages=443–465 |doi=10.1080/0020174X.2016.1175377 |s2cid=214652789 |issn=0020-174X|doi-access=free |hdl=11250/2468145 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> For example, the narrow method of reflective equilibrium may lead some moral philosophers towards [[utilitarianism]] and others towards [[Kantianism]].<ref name="StanfordEquilibrium"/>