Editing Reductionism (section)

=== Causation ===
Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name=Carroll>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0199279739 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=[[Helen Beebee]] |editor2=[[Christopher Hitchcock]] |editor3=[[Peter Menzies (philosopher)|Peter Menzies]] }}</ref>

[[Alfred North Whitehead]]'s metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "[[Reification (fallacy)|fallacy of the misplaced concreteness]]". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.