Editing Resource curse (section)

=== Democracy and human rights ===
{{see also|Rentier state}}
{{too long|section|date=November 2022}}
Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule because political leaders in oil-rich countries refuse democratic development because they will have more to give up from losing power. Similarly, political leaders of oil-rich countries refuse democratic development because the political elite collects the revenues from the oil export and use the money for cementing its political, economic, and social power by controlling government and its bureaucracy,<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy |journal = Comparative Political Studies|date = 2007-08-01|issn = 0010-4140|pages = 995–1018|volume = 40|issue = 8|doi = 10.1177/0010414006287238|first = Jay|last = Ulfelder|s2cid = 154316752}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Andersen|first1=Jørgen J.|last2=Ross|first2=Michael L.|date=2014-06-01|title=The Big Oil Change A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis |journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=47|issue=7|pages=993–1021|doi=10.1177/0010414013488557|issn=0010-4140|url=https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723095213/https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|url-status=dead|archive-date=2018-07-23|hdl=11250/195819|s2cid=154653329}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Girod|first1=Desha M.|last2=Stewart|first2=Megan A.|last3=Walters|first3=Meir R.|date=2016-07-27|title=Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=35|issue=5|pages=503–522|doi=10.1177/0738894216651826|s2cid=157573005|issn=0738-8942}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cassidy|first=Traviss|title=The Long-Run Effects of Oil Wealth on Development: Evidence from Petroleum Geology|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129|issue=623|pages=2745–2778|doi=10.1093/ej/uez009|year=2019|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97778/1/MPRA_paper_97777.pdf}}</ref> Military spending generally increases with oil wealth and so a military coup, one of the strongest tools in toppling autocracies, is less likely in oil-rich countries since dictators can quell resistance through additional funding.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wright |first1=Joseph |last2=Frantz |first2=Erica |last3=Geddes |first3=Barbara |title=Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival |journal=British Journal of Political Science |date=April 2015 |volume=45 |issue=2 |pages=287–306 |doi=10.1017/S0007123413000252}}</ref> According to Michael Ross, "only one type of resource has been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions: petroleum, which is the key variable in the vast majority of the studies that identify some type of curse."<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal
| last = Ross
| first = Michael L.
| s2cid = 154308471
| date = May 2015
| title = What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
| journal = Annual Review of Political Science
| volume = 18
| pages = 239–259
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359
| doi-access=free
| url = https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8tp5x1hb
}}</ref> A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal
| last = Ahmadov
| first = Anar K.
| date = 2014-08-01
| title = Oil, Democracy, and Context A Meta-Analysis
| journal = Comparative Political Studies
| language = en
| volume = 47
| issue = 9
| pages = 1238–1267
| doi = 10.1177/0010414013495358
| s2cid = 154661151
| issn = 0010-4140
}}</ref> A 2016 study challenges the conventional academic wisdom on the relationship between oil and authoritarianism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brooks|first1=Sarah M.|last2=Kurtz|first2=Marcus J.|s2cid=58904661|title=Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political 'Resource Curse' |journal=International Organization|pages=1–33|doi=10.1017/s0020818316000072|volume=70|issue=2|year=2016}}</ref> A 2022 study found that the resource curse is tied only to easily-extractable oil, not to oil that requires complex extraction.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brooks|first1=Sarah M.|last2=Kurtz|first2=Marcus J.|date=2022|title=Oil "Rents" and Political Development: What Do We Really Know About the Curse of Natural Resources?|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211060281|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=55 |issue=10 |pages=1698–1731 |doi=10.1177/00104140211060281|s2cid=246560368 |issn=0010-4140}}</ref> Other forms of resource wealth have also been found to strengthen autocratic rule.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Krishnarajan|first=Suthan|title=Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=63|issue=3|pages=726–741|doi=10.1093/isq/sqz006|year=2019}}</ref> A 2016 study found that resource windfalls have no political impact on democracies and deeply entrenched authoritarian regimes, but significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of moderately authoritarian regimes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Caselli|last2=Tesei|first2=Andrea|s2cid=5181852|date=2015-08-12|title=Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability|journal=Review of Economics and Statistics|doi=10.1162/REST_a_00538|issn=0034-6535|volume=98|issue=3|pages=573–590|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64587/13/Casaelli_Resource%20windfalls_2016.pdf}}</ref> A third 2016 study finds that while it is accurate that resource richness has an adverse impact on the prospects of democracy, this relationship has held only since the 1970s.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lall|first=Ranjit|date=2016-09-08|title=The Missing Dimension of the Political Resource Curse Debate |journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=50|issue=10|pages=1291–1324|doi=10.1177/0010414016666861|s2cid=157376423|issn=0010-4140|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89178/1/CPS_Website_Version.pdf}}</ref> A 2017 study found that the presence of multinational oil companies increases the likelihood of state repression.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wegenast|first1=Tim|last2=Schneider|first2=Gerald|date=2017-11-01|title=Ownership matters: Natural resources property rights and social conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa |journal=Political Geography|volume=61|pages=110–122|doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.07.007|url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-415729}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/08/31/why-multinational-resource-owners-incite-social-dissent/|title=Why Multinational Resource Owners Incite Social Dissent|date=2017-08-31|website=Political Violence at a Glance|access-date=2017-08-31}}</ref> Another 2017 study found that the presence of oil reduced the likelihood that a democracy would be established after the breakdown of an authoritarian regime.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Houle|first=Christian|s2cid=149373007|date=2017-09-12|title=A two-step theory and test of the oil curse: the conditional effect of oil on democratization |journal=Democratization|volume=25|issue=3|pages=404–421|doi=10.1080/13510347.2017.1366449|url=https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/5398570}}</ref> A 2018 study found that the relationship between oil and authoritarianism primarily holds after the end of the [[Cold War]]. The study argues that without American or Soviet support, resource-poor authoritarian regimes had to democratize, but resource-rich authoritarian regimes resisted domestic pressures to democratize.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hendrix|first=Cullen S|date=2018-01-01|title=Cold War Geopolitics and the Making of the Oil Curse |journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|volume=3|issue=1|pages=2–22|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogx022|doi-access=free}}</ref> Prior to the 1970s, oil-producing countries did not have democratization levels that differed from other countries.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-043546|doi-access=free|title=Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers|year=2020|author1-link=Daniel Treisman|last1=Treisman|first1=Daniel|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=23|pages=241–257}}</ref> Oil-abundant authoritarian governments are suggested to earn high levels of income for oil but spend an extremely minimal amount on social expenditures for individuals being ruled and democracies are suggested to do the opposite.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hong |first1=Ji Yeon |title=Does Oil Hinder Social Spending? Evidence from Dictatorships, 1972–2008 |journal=Studies in Comparative International Development |date=December 2017 |volume=52 |issue=4 |pages=457–482 |doi=10.1007/s12116-017-9237-y|s2cid=157642196}}</ref>

Research by [[Stephen Haber]] and Victor Menaldo found that increases in natural resource reliance do not induce authoritarianism but may instead promote democratization.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal|last1=Haber|first1=Stephen|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor|s2cid=7789235|year=2011|title=Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=105|issue=1|page=1|doi=10.1017/s0003055410000584}}</ref><ref>{{citation|last1=Haber|first1=Stephen|title=Lifting the Resource Curse|url=http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/49806|journal=Hoover Digest|year=2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101028175200/http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/49806|archive-date=2010-10-28|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{citation|last1=Haber|first1=Stephen|title=Natural Resources in Latin America: Neither Curse Nor Blessing|date=2010-06-15|ssrn=1625504|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor}}</ref> The authors say that their method rectifies the methodological biases of earlier studies which revolve around [[random effects]]: "Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results [of earlier studies on the resource curse], the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity."<ref name=":0" /> In other words, this means that countries might have specific, enduring traits that get left out of the model, which could increase the explanation power of the argument. The authors claim that the chances of this happening are larger when assuming random effects, an assumption that does not allow for what the authors call "unobserved country-specific heterogeneity".<ref name=":0" /> The criticisms have themselves been subject to criticism. One study reexamined the Haber-Menaldo analysis by using Haber and Menaldo's own data and statistical models. It reported that their conclusions were only valid for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. Authors Andersen and Ross suggest that oil wealth became a hindrance to democratic transitions only after the transformative events of the 1970s, which enabled the governments of developing countries to capture the oil rents that were previously siphoned off by foreign-owned firms.

There are two ways that oil wealth might negatively affect democratization. The first is that oil strengthens authoritarian regimes, making transitions to democracy less likely.<ref name=":2" /> The second is that oil wealth weakens democracies.<ref name=":2" /> Research generally supports the first theory but is mixed on the second.<ref name=":2" /> A 2019 study found that oil wealth is associated with increases in the level of personalism in dictatorships.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fails|first=Matthew D.|date=2019|title=Oil income and the personalization of autocratic politics|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/oil-income-and-the-personalization-of-autocratic-politics/55DC4E21E3206EF09EEB69E63BF298D1|journal=Political Science Research and Methods|volume=8|issue=4|pages=772–779|doi=10.1017/psrm.2019.14|s2cid=159372031|issn=2049-8470}}</ref>

Both pathways might result from the ability of oil-rich states to provide citizens with a combination of generous benefits and low taxes. In many economies that are not resource-dependent, governments tax citizens, who demand efficient and responsive [[implied level of government service|government]] in return. This bargain establishes a political relationship between rulers and subjects. In countries whose economies are dominated by natural resources, however, rulers don't need to tax their citizens because they have a guaranteed source of income from natural resources.<ref>{{cite web |first=Deborah |last=Bräutigam |url=http://www.aei.org/publication/taxation-and-governance-in-africa/ |title=Taxation and Governance in Africa |work=AEI |publisher=American Enterprise Institute |date=11 April 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224757/http://www.aei.org/publication/taxation-and-governance-in-africa/|archive-date=2019-08-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Morrison|first1=Kevin M.|title=Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability|journal=International Organization|date=9 January 2009|volume=63|issue=1|pages=107–138|doi=10.1017/S0020818309090043|doi-access=free}}</ref> Because the country's citizens aren't being taxed, they have less incentive to be watchful with how government spends its money.<ref name="Ross 2004">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|title=Does Taxation Lead to Representation?|journal=British Journal of Political Science|date=April 2004|volume=34|issue=2|pages=229–249|doi=10.1017/S0007123404000031|citeseerx=10.1.1.471.6907|s2cid=59329781}}</ref> In addition, those benefiting from mineral resource wealth may perceive an effective and watchful civil service and civil society as a threat to the benefits that they enjoy, and they may take steps to thwart them.<ref name="Ross 2001">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|s2cid=18404|title=Does Oil Hinder Democracy?|journal=World Politics|date=13 June 2011|volume=53|issue=3|pages=325–361|doi=10.1353/wp.2001.0011}}</ref> As a result, citizens are often poorly served by their rulers,<ref>[http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/PB34.pdf Moore, Mick; Unsworth, Sue (2007). IDS Policy Briefing ''How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813080817/http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/pb34.pdf |date=2011-08-13 }}.</ref> and if the citizens complain, money from the natural resources enables governments to pay for armed forces to keep the citizens in check. It has been argued that rises and falls in the price of petroleum correlate with rises and falls in the implementation of [[human rights]] in major oil-producing countries.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Friedman |first=Thomas L. |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/16/the-first-law-of-petropolitics/ |title=The First Law of Petropolitics |journal=[[Foreign Policy]] |year=2006 |access-date=2016-04-25}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=DeMeritt|first1=Jacqueline H. R.|last2=Young|first2=Joseph K.|s2cid=73608254|date=2013-04-01|title=A political economy of human rights: Oil, natural gas, and state incentives to repress|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=30|issue=2|pages=99–120|doi=10.1177/0738894212473915|issn=0738-8942}}</ref>

Corrupt members of national governments may collude with resource extraction companies to override their own laws and ignore objections made by indigenous inhabitants.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldwatch.org/node/543 |title=The Hidden Shame of the Global Industrial Economy |publisher=Worldwatch.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190129103923/http://www.worldwatch.org/node/543 |access-date=2012-07-26|archive-date=2019-01-29}}</ref> The [[United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] report entitled "Petroleum and Poverty Paradox" states that "too often, oil money that should go to a nation's poor ends up in the pockets of the rich, or it may be squandered on grand palaces and massive showcase projects instead of being invested productively."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:44727.pdf |title=The Petroleum And Poverty Paradox - Assessing U.S. And International Community Efforts To Fight The Resource Curse |access-date=2012-06-21}}</ref> A 2016 study found that mining in Africa substantially increases corruption; an individual within {{convert|50|km||||}} of a recently opened mine is 33% more likely to have paid a bribe the past year than a person living within 50 km of mines that "will open" in the future.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last1=Knutsen|first1=Carl Henrik|last2=Kotsadam|first2=Andreas|last3=Olsen|first3=Eivind Hammersmark|last4=Wig|first4=Tore|date=2016|title=Mining and Local Corruption in Africa|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=61|issue=2|pages=320–334|doi=10.1111/ajps.12268|bibcode=2017AmJPS..61..320K |url=https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/119540/1/82678710X.pdf|hdl=10852/59624|hdl-access=free}} Summary available at:<br/>{{Cite web|url=https://ajps.org/2016/10/31/mining-increases-local-corruption/|title=Mining Increases Local Corruption|date=2016|website=American Journal of Political Science|access-date=2016-10-31}}</ref> The former also pay bribes for permits more frequently, and perceive their local councilors to be more corrupt.<ref name=":5" /> In a study examining the effects of mining on local communities in Africa, researchers concluded that active mining areas are associated with more bribe payments, particularly police bribes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Knutsen|first1=Carl Henrik|last2=Kotsadam|first2=Andreas|last3=Olsen|first3=Eivind Hammersmark|last4=Wig|first4=Tore|date=2017|title=Mining and Local Corruption in Africa|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26384734|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=61|issue=2|pages=320–334|doi=10.1111/ajps.12268|jstor=26384734|bibcode=2017AmJPS..61..320K |hdl=10852/59624|issn=0092-5853|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Their findings were consistent with the hypothesis that mining increases corruption.

The [[Center for Global Development]] argues that governance in resource-rich states would be improved by the government making universal, transparent, and regular payments of oil revenues to citizens and then attempting to reclaim it through the tax system, which they argue will fuel public demand for the government to be transparent and accountable in its management of natural resource revenues and in the delivery of public services.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/revenues_distribution |title=Oil-to-Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers : Center for Global Development : Initiatives: Active |publisher=cgdev.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121211162105/http://cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/revenues_distribution|archive-date=2012-12-11}}</ref>

One study found that "oil producing states dependent on exports to the USA exhibit lower human rights performance than those exporting to China". The authors argue that this stems from the fact that US relationships with oil producers were formed decades ago, before human rights became part of its foreign policy agenda.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = A Chinese resource curse? The human rights effects of oil export dependence on China versus the United States|journal = Journal of Peace Research|date = 2015-10-09|issn = 0022-3433|pages = 774–790|doi = 10.1177/0022343315593332|first1 = Julia|last1 = Bader|first2 = Ursula|last2 = Daxecker|volume=52|issue = 6|s2cid = 112605648}}</ref>

One study found that resource wealth in authoritarian states lowers the probability of adopting [[freedom of information]] laws.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Vadlamannati|first1=Krishna C.|last2=Soysa|first2=Indra De|s2cid=151545694|date=2016-08-13|title=Do Resource-Wealthy Rulers Adopt Transparency-Promoting Laws?|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=60|issue=3|pages=457–474|doi=10.1093/isq/sqw026|issn=0020-8833|hdl=11250/2468349|hdl-access=free}}</ref> However, democracies that are resource-rich are more likely than resource-poor democracies to adopt such laws.<ref name=":4" />

One study looking at oil wealth in Colombia found "that when the [[price of oil]] rises, legislators affiliated with right-wing paramilitary groups win office more in oil-producing municipalities. Consistent with the use of force to gain power, positive price shocks also induce an increase in paramilitary violence and reduce electoral competition: fewer candidates run for office, and winners are elected with a wider vote margin. Ultimately, fewer centrist legislators are elected to office, and there is diminished representation at the center."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Carreri|first1=Maria|last2=Dube|first2=Oeindrila|s2cid=55566951|date=2017-01-10|title=Do Natural Resources Influence Who Comes to Power, and How?|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=79|issue=2|pages=000|doi=10.1086/688443|issn=0022-3816}}</ref>

A 2018 study in ''International Studies Quarterly'' found that oil wealth was associated with weaker private liberties (freedom of movement, freedom of religion, the right to property, and freedom from forced labor).<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |last=Wigley |first=Simon |date=December 2018 |title=Is There a Resource Curse for Private Liberties? |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=62 |issue=4 |pages=834–844 |doi=10.1093/isq/sqy031 |hdl-access=free |hdl=11693/48786}}</ref>

Research by Nathan Jensen indicates that countries that have resource wealth are considered to have a greater political risk for foreign direct investors. He argues that this is because leaders in resource-rich countries are less sensitive to being punished in elections if they take actions that adversely affect foreign investors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jensen|first=Nathan|date=2008|title=Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=70|issue=4|page=1047|doi=10.1017/s0022381608081048|jstor=10.1017/s0022381608081048|s2cid=155002838|issn=0022-3816}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jensen|first1=Nathan M.|last2=Johnston|first2=Noel P.|date=2011-05-16|title=Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en-US|volume=44|issue=6|pages=662–688|doi=10.1177/0010414011401208|s2cid=220992450|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> Countries with higher natural resource export share show a correlation between receiving [[Foreign direct investment]] and decreasing [[democracy index]], while this correlation is opposite for countries with low natural resource export share.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Asiedu |first1=Elizabeth |last2=Lien |first2=Donald |date=2011 |title=Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002219961000125X |journal=Journal of International Economics |language=en |volume=84 |issue=1 |pages=99–111 |doi=10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.12.001}}</ref>