Editing Value theory (section)

=== Monism and pluralism ===
[[Monism|Monist]] theories of value assert that there is only a single source of intrinsic value. They agree that various things have value but maintain that all fundamentally good things belong to the same type. For example, hedonists hold that nothing but pleasure has intrinsic value, while desire theorists argue that desire satisfaction is the only source of fundamental goodness. [[Pluralism (philosophy)|Pluralists]] reject this view, contending that a simple single-value system is too crude to capture the complexity of the sphere of values. They say that diverse sources of value exist independently of one another, each contributing to the overall value of the world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA136 136–137, 139–140]}} | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Monism/Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA358 358–359]}} }}</ref>

One motivation for value pluralism is the observation that people value diverse types of things, including happiness, friendship, success, and knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Monism/Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA145 145–146]}} }}</ref> This diversity becomes particularly prominent when people face difficult decisions between competing values, such as choosing between friendship and career success.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 2. The Attraction of Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Monism/Pluralism}} }}</ref> In such cases, value pluralists can argue that the different items have different types of values. Since monists accept only one source of intrinsic value, they may provide a different explanation by proposing that some of the valuable items only have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.<ref>{{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 2.2.2 Revisionary Commitments?}}</ref>

[[File:IsaiahBerlin1983.jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a man with glasses wearing a suit and a bow tie|[[Isaiah Berlin]] argued that conflicts between different types of values, like [[liberty]] and [[Social equality|equality]], cannot always be resolved.<ref>{{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4.4 Accepting Incomparability}}</ref>]]

Pluralists have proposed various accounts of how their view affects practical decisions. Rational decisions often rely on value comparisons to determine which course of action should be pursued.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4. Pluralism and Rational Choice}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=Lead section, § 4. Deliberation and Choice}} }}</ref> Some pluralists discuss a hierarchy of values reflecting the relative importance and weight of different value types to help people promote higher values when faced with difficult choices.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kinneging|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1Qya55bssVQC&pg=PA206 206–207]}} | {{harvnb|Perrin|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA69 69, 73–74, 76]}} }}</ref> For example, philosopher [[Max Scheler]] ranks values based on how enduring and fulfilling they are into the levels of pleasure, utility, vitality, culture, and holiness. He asserts that people should not promote lower values, like pleasure, if this comes at the expense of higher values.<ref name="auto13">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrin|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA69 69, 73–74, 76–80]}} | {{harvnb|Davis|Steinbock|2024|loc=§ 3. Value Personalism}} }}</ref>{{efn|In some places, Scheler talks about four levels instead of five: sensory, vital, spiritual, and holy.<ref>{{harvnb|Perrin|1991|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA76 76–80]}}</ref>}}

Radical pluralists reject this approach, putting more emphasis on diversity by holding that different types of values are not comparable with each other. This means that each value type is unique, making it impossible to determine which one is superior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–143]}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}} }}</ref>{{efn|More specifically, this implies that one value is not better than the other, not worse than the other, and not as good as the other.<ref>{{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}}</ref>}} Some value theorists use radical pluralism to argue that value conflicts are inevitable, that the gain of one value cannot always compensate for the loss of another, and that some [[ethical dilemmas]] are irresolvable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4.4 Accepting Incomparability}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 3.2 Moral Dilemmas?}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–143]}} }}</ref> For example, philosopher [[Isaiah Berlin]] applied this idea to the values of [[liberty]] and [[Social equality|equality]], arguing that a gain in one cannot make up for a loss in the other. Similarly, philosopher [[Joseph Raz]] said that it is often impossible to compare the values of career paths, like when choosing between becoming a [[lawyer]] or a [[clarinetist]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4.4 Accepting Incomparability}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}} | {{harvnb|Cherniss|Hardy|2023|loc=§ 4.1 Berlin’s Definition of Value Pluralism}} }}</ref> The terms ''incomparability'' and ''incommensurability'' are often used as synonyms in this context. However, philosophers like [[Ruth Chang]] distinguish them. According to this view, incommensurability means that there is no common measure to quantify values of different types. Incommensurable values may or may not be comparable. If they are, it is possible to say that one value is better than another, but it is not possible to quantify how much better it is.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 4. Pluralism and Rational Choice}} | {{harvnb|Hsieh|Andersson|2021|loc=§ 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?}} }}</ref>