Editing Anti-Comintern Pact (section)

=== Ideological similarities and contradictions between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan ===
{{See also|Nazism|Statism in Shōwa Japan|Honorary Aryan|Germany–Japan relations}}
The Anti-Comintern Pact was more of a statement than an actual political commitment, and the statement was one of mutual ideological alignment and diplomatic attachment to one another.<ref name="Schroeder-1958">{{Cite book |last=Schroeder |first=Paul W. |url=https://archive.org/details/axisalliancejapa00paul |title=The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941 |publisher=Cornell University Press |year=1958 |isbn=0801403715 |author-link=Paul W. Schroeder |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{Rp|7}}<ref name="Kershaw-2000">{{Cite book |last=Kershaw |first=Ian |url=https://archive.org/details/hitler193645neme00kers |title=Hitler: 1936-45 - Nemesis |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |year=2000 |isbn=0393049949 |location=New York City |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{Rp|27}} Both countries shared examples of very politically significant racial ideologies, with [[Alfred Rosenberg]] in Germany and [[Shūmei Ōkawa]] in Japan becoming the leading racialist ideologues. Whereas Rosenberg enjoyed government backing and was a central party figure after the Nazis' rise to power in 1933, Ōkawa's audience was more limited. Ōkawa found his main support base with young nationalistic military officers, particularly those in the Kwantung Army, the military unit that instigated Japan's initial invasion of North East China in 1931.<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|608}} Ōkawa's work was in late 1936 furthered by [[Nimiya Takeo|Takeo Nimiya's]] influential foreign policy pamphlet "The Unique Principles Guiding Japanese Diplomacy", in which Takeo laid out a vision of a long-term orientation of Japanese diplomacy around a racially justified expansionist policy based on traditional Japanese spiritual values rather than western-style imperialism. Nimiya's pamphlet was especially popular with young bureaucrats and students who were about to enter Japanese state politics in the late 1930s and early 1940s.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|16}}{{Quote box
| quote = The Soviet Union's revolutionary pressure on Asia increases as it continues to strengthen its national defense and international position through a huge rearmament program. Its goal, a Red penetration of many areas, interferes with Japan's East Asia policy and poses a grave threat to our empire's defense. Thwarting the Soviet Union's aggressive intention therefore has become the most crucial element in our diplomacy. This goal must be achieved by diplomatic means and by completion of a defense buildup.

[...]

Germany has interests that closely parallels ours vis-a-vis the Soviet Union because of the special arrangement that exists between Russia and France. Hence, it is in Germany's interest to cooperate with us; and we in turn should promote close relations with Germany, leading to alliance between Japan and Germany. This relationship must be expanded to include Poland and other friendly European countries near the Soviet Union as well as other Asian and Islamic countries, as a further restraint on the Soviet Union.
| source = Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William (ed.). "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 31. {{ISBN|9780231089692}}.
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}}The two countries shared a common ideological antagonist in the communism, which was extensively covered in the German and Japanese media and perceived as a real threat of subversion among German and Japanese political elites.<ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|143}} As a result of Japanese reservations about an outright military alliance, the Anti-Comintern Pact was conceptualized as an anti-communist agreement rather than an outright military alliance.<ref name="Boyd-1977" />{{Rp|53}} However, the Japanese military establishment was concerned about the growth of Soviet military strength, and Japanese military attachés in Europe had held conferences about the potential threat coming specifically from the USSR as early as 1929 to discuss potential countermeasures.<ref name="Boyd-1981" />{{Rp|314–315}} The Japanese government on 8 August 1936 issued an internal document that specifically justified the German–Japanese alliance as a response to the growing threat that the Soviet Union posed in Asia and the close parallels between Japanese and German interests regarding the USSR. This document also revealed intentions to include other European, Islamic and Asian countries in the anti-Soviet pact and specifically named [[Second Polish Republic|Poland]] as a potential candidate for pact membership.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|31}}

Both the Japanese and German movements shared an aversion towards the League of Nations, and both countries left the League during the year 1933.<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|609}} The two countries shared a similar list of diplomatic adversaries: The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|1}}

While the German and Japanese racial ideologies of the supposed superiority of the [[Aryan race]] and the [[Yamato race]], respectively, showed parallels, these parallels should logically have made the alliance less likely, as the two countries' fascisms viewed each other as racially inferior. In fact, Hitler's ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' specifically names the Japanese as an example of a racial grouping on the second out of three cultural tiers, a step down from the Aryan race on the top.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hitler |first=Adolf |title=Mein Kampf |date=1943 |publisher=August Pries GmbH |location=Leipzig |language=de |orig-year=1925}}</ref>{{Rp|317–323}} To prevent diplomatic complications as a result of German racial thought, German racist propaganda in the state-controlled press was directed away from the topic of the Japanese people so as to not irritate Japan.<ref name="Stratman-1970" />{{Rp|4}}