Editing Biosecurity (section)

==Challenges==
Diseases caused by [[emerging virus]]es are a major threat to global [[public health]].<ref>{{cite journal|title=Laboratory biosafety for handling emerging viruses|first1=I. Made|last1= Artika|first2=Chairin Nisa|last2= Ma'roef|journal=Asian Pacific Journal of Tropical Biomedicine|doi=10.1016/j.apjtb.2017.01.020|volume =7|issue= 5| date=May 2017|pages=483–491|pmid=32289025|pmc=7103938|doi-access=free}}</ref> The proliferation of high biosafety level laboratories around the world has resulted in concern about the availability of targets for those that might be interested in stealing dangerous pathogens. The growth in containment laboratories is often in response to emerging diseases, and many new containment labs' main focus is to find ways to control these diseases. By strengthening national disease surveillance, prevention, control and response systems, the labs have improved international public health.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1145442|title=Biosecurity and Biosafety—A Growing Concern|first=Jennifer|last= Gaudioso|date=28 March 2008|publisher=[[Sandia National Laboratories|Sandia Corporation]]|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref>

One of the major challenges of biosecurity is that harmful technology has become more available and accessible.<ref>{{cite web |last=McClellan |first=Paul  |title=Designer Plague |publisher=EDA Graffiti |date=27 March 2009 |url=http://www.edn.com/blog/920000692/post/620041462.html  |archive-url=http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20100512095059/http://www.edn.com/blog/920000692/post/620041462.html  |url-status=dead |archive-date=12 May 2010 |access-date=23 April 2009}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Biomedical advances and the globalisation of scientific and technical expertise have made it possible to greatly improve public health; however, there is also the risk that these advances can make it easier for terrorists to produce biological weapons.<ref>{{cite book |doi=10.17226/11567 |title=Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences |doi-access=free |author=Institute of Medicine |date=31 January 2006  |publisher=National Academies Press |author-link=Institute of Medicine|isbn=978-0-309-10032-8 }}</ref>

Communication between the citizen and law enforcement officials is important. Indicators of [[agro-terrorism]] at a food processing plant may include persons taking notes or photos of a business, theft of employee uniforms, employees changing working hours, or persons attempting to gain information about security measures and personnel. Unusual activity is best handled if reported to law enforcement personnel promptly.<ref>Criminal Investigation Handbook for Agroterrorism|2008|U.S. Government Printing Office|Washington, D.C.|pages=34-36</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf |title=Bio-Response Report Card |author=The Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center |date=October 2011 |access-date=2011-11-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111225054617/http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf |archive-date=2011-12-25 }}</ref> Communication between [[policymaker]]s and [[life sciences]] scientists is also important.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Benson|first1=David|first2=Roger K. |last2=Kjelgren|title=Tacit Diplomacy in Life Sciences A Foundation for Science Diplomacy|journal=Science & Diplomacy|date=2014-01-13|volume=3|issue=1|url=http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/tacit-diplomacy-in-life-sciences |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231205161607/https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/tacit-diplomacy-in-life-sciences |archive-date= Dec 5, 2023 }}</ref>

The [[MENA]] ([[Middle East]] and [[North Africa]]) region, with its socio-political unrest, diverse cultures and societies, and recent biological weapons programs, faces particular challenges.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Nasim|first=Anwar|title=Paths to Biosafety and Biosecurity Sustainability|journal=Science & Diplomacy|date=2013-11-26|volume=2|issue=4|url=http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/paths-biosafety-and-biosecurity-sustainability|display-authors=etal |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230128093943/https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/paths-biosafety-and-biosecurity-sustainability |archive-date= Jan 28, 2023 }}</ref>

===Future===
{{See also|Pandemic prevention#Biosafety technologies and biotechnology regulation}}
Biosecurity requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers, and [[law enforcement]] officials.<ref name=labbio>{{cite book|title=Laboratory Biosecurity Handbook|first1=Reynolds M. |last1=Salerno|first2= Jennifer|last2= Gaudioso|first3=Benjamin H.|last3= Brodsky|edition=Illustrated|publisher=CRC Press|date=2007|isbn=9781420006209|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V7XwtVhtr1oC&pg=PR11|page=xi|chapter=Preface|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Piper |first=Kelsey |date=2022-04-05 |title=Why experts are terrified of a human-made pandemic — and what we can do to stop it |url=https://www.vox.com/22937531/virus-lab-safety-pandemic-prevention |access-date=2022-04-08 |website=Vox |language=en}}</ref>

The emerging nature of newer biosecurity threats means that small-scale risks can blow up rapidly, which makes the development of an effective policy challenging owing to the limitations on time and resources available for analysing threats and estimating the likelihood of their occurrence.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Del Rio Vilas|first1= Alberto|last2=Voller|first2= Fay |last3=Montibeller|first3= Gilberto|last4=Franco |first4= L. Alberto | last5=Sribhashyam |first5=Sumitra| last6=Watson|first6=Eamon |last7=Hartley|first7=Matt| last8=Gibbens|first8=Jane C.|display-authors=3|date=2013-02-01|title=An integrated process and management tools for ranking multiple emerging threats to animal health|url=https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/25118 |s2cid-access=free |journal=Preventive Veterinary Medicine|volume=108|issue=2–3|pages=94–102|doi=10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.08.007|pmid=22954461|s2cid= 23937402 |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231106191721/https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/journal_contribution/An_integrated_process_and_management_tools_for_ranking_multiple_emerging_threats_to_animal_health/9500423 |archive-date= Nov 6, 2023 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jaspersen|first1=Johannes G.|last2=Montibeller|first2=Gilberto|date=2015-07-01|title=Probability Elicitation Under Severe Time Pressure: A Rank-Based Method|journal=Risk Analysis|volume=35 |issue=7|pages=1317–1335|doi=10.1111/risa.12357|issn=1539-6924|pmid=25850859|bibcode=2015RiskA..35.1317J |s2cid=30118666 |url=https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/21596 }}</ref> It is likely that further synergies with other disciplines, such as [[virology]] or the detection of [[chemical contaminant]]s, will develop over time.<ref name=infosan/>

Some uncertainties about the policy implementation for biosecurity remain for future. In order to carefully plan out preventive policies, policy makers need to be able to somewhat predict the probability and assess the risks; however, as the uncertain nature of the biosecurity issue goes it is largely difficult to predict and also involves a complex process as it requires a multidisciplinary approach. The policy choices they make to address an immediate threat could pose another threat in the future, facing an unintended trade-off.<ref name=koblentz2010/>

Philosopher [[Toby Ord]], in his 2020 book ''[[The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity]]'', puts into question whether the current international conventions regarding biotechnology research and development regulation, and self-regulation by biotechnology companies and the scientific community are adequate.<ref name=ord2020/><ref>{{Cite news|last=Ord|first=Toby|date=2021-03-23|title=Covid-19 has shown humanity how close we are to the edge|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/23/covid-19-humanity-resilience-climate-ai-pandemic|access-date=2021-03-26|issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

American scientists have proposed various [[policy]]-based measures to reduce the large risks from life sciences research – such as [[Pandemic prevention|pandemics through accident or misapplication]]. [[Risk management]] measures may include novel [[global governance|international guidelines]], effective oversight, improvement of US policies to influence policies globally, and identification of gaps in biosecurity policies along with potential approaches to address them.<ref>{{cite web |title=Forschung an Krankheitserregern soll sicherer werden |url=https://www.sciencemediacenter.de/alle-angebote/research-in-context/details/news/forschung-an-krankheitserregern-soll-sicherer-werden/ |website=Science Media Center Germany |date=2022 |access-date=17 January 2023 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pannu |first1=Jaspreet |last2=Palmer |first2=Megan J. |last3=Cicero |first3=Anita |last4=Relman |first4=David A. |last5=Lipsitch |first5=Marc |last6=Inglesby |first6=Tom |title=Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens |s2cid-access=free |url=https://www.science.org/cms/asset/f5fa7633-934b-402d-b23f-2661eacfdb36/science.adf6020.v1.pdf |journal=Science |date=16 December 2022 |volume=378 |issue=6625 |pages=1170–1172 |doi=10.1126/science.adf6020 |pmid=36480598 |bibcode=2022Sci...378.1170P |s2cid=254998228 |language=en |issn=0036-8075 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230523125753/https://www.science.org/cms/asset/f5fa7633-934b-402d-b23f-2661eacfdb36/science.adf6020.v1.pdf |archive-date= May 23, 2023 }}
* University press release: {{cite news |title=Stanford Researchers Recommend Stronger Oversight of Risky Research on Pathogens |url=https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-recommend-stronger-oversight-risky-research-pathogens |access-date=17 January 2023 |work=Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies |date= December 8, 2022 |first1=Ari |last1=Chasnoff |language=en}}</ref>

Researchers have also warned in 2024 of potential risks from [[mirror life]], a hypothetical form of life whose molecular building blocks have inverted [[chirality]]. If mirror bacteria were synthesized, they may be able to evade immune systems and spread in the environment without natural predators. They noted that the technology to create mirror bacteria was still probably more than a decade away, but called for a ban on research aiming to create them.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Adamala |first1=Katarzyna P. |last2=Agashe |first2=Deepa |last3=Belkaid |first3=Yasmine |last4=Bittencourt |first4=Daniela Matias de C. |last5=Cai |first5=Yizhi |last6=Chang |first6=Matthew W. |last7=Chen |first7=Irene A. |last8=Church |first8=George M. |last9=Cooper |first9=Vaughn S. |last10=Davis |first10=Mark M. |last11=Devaraj |first11=Neal K. |last12=Endy |first12=Drew |last13=Esvelt |first13=Kevin M. |last14=Glass |first14=John I. |last15=Hand |first15=Timothy W. |date=2024-12-12 |title=Confronting risks of mirror life |url=https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.ads9158 |journal=Science |volume=386 |issue=6728 |pages=1351–1353 |doi=10.1126/science.ads9158|pmid=39666824 |bibcode=2024Sci...386.1351A }}</ref>

=== Role of education ===
The advance of the life sciences and biotechnology has the potential to bring great benefits to humankind through responding to societal challenges. However, it is also possible that such advances could be exploited for hostile purposes, something evidenced in a small number of incidents of bioterrorism, particularly by the series of large-scale offensive [[biological warfare]] programs carried out by major states in the last century. Dealing with this challenge, which has been labelled the "dual-use dilemma", requires a number of different activities. However, one way of ensuring that the life sciences continue to generate significant benefits and do not become subject to misuse for hostile purposes is a process of engagement between scientists and the security community, and the development of strong ethical and normative frameworks to complement legal and regulatory measures that are developed by states.<ref name=handbook/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bradford.ac.uk/bioethics/Guide_complete.pdf|title=Preventing Biological Threats: What You Can Do |editor-first1=Simon |editor-last1=Whitby|editor-first2=Tatyana |editor-last2=Novossiolova |editor-first3=Gerald|editor-last3= Walther|editor-first4=Malcolm|editor-last4= Dando|date=Dec 2015|publisher=Bradford Disarmament Research Centre|access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>