Editing Classical liberalism (section)

== Political economy ==
Classical liberals following Mill saw utility as the foundation for public policies. This broke both with conservative "[[Traditionalist conservatism|tradition]]" and [[Natural rights#John Locke|Lockean "natural rights"]], which were seen as irrational. Utility, which emphasises the happiness of individuals, became the central ethical value of all Mill-style liberalism.{{sfn|Richardson|p=31}} Although utilitarianism inspired wide-ranging reforms, it became primarily a justification for ''laissez-faire'' economics. However, Mill adherents rejected Smith's belief that the "invisible hand" would lead to general benefits and embraced Malthus' view that population expansion would prevent any general benefit and Ricardo's view of the inevitability of class conflict. ''Laissez-faire'' was seen as the only possible economic approach and any government intervention was seen as useless and harmful. The [[Poor Law Amendment Act 1834]] was defended on "scientific or economic principles" while the authors of the [[Poor Relief Act 1601]] were seen as not having had the benefit of reading Malthus.{{sfn|Richardson|p=33}}

However, commitment to ''laissez-faire'' was not uniform and some economists advocated state support of public works and education. Classical liberals were also divided on [[free trade]] as Ricardo expressed doubt that the removal of grain tariffs advocated by [[Richard Cobden]] and the [[Anti-Corn Law League]] would have any general benefits. Most classical liberals also supported legislation to regulate the number of hours that children were allowed to work and usually did not oppose factory reform legislation.{{sfn|Richardson|p=33}}

Despite the pragmatism of classical economists, their views were expressed in dogmatic terms by such popular writers as [[Jane Marcet]] and [[Harriet Martineau]].{{sfn|Richardson|p=33}} The strongest defender of ''laissez-faire'' was ''The Economist'' founded by [[James Wilson (UK politician)|James Wilson]] in 1843. ''The Economist'' criticised Ricardo for his lack of support for free trade and expressed hostility to welfare, believing that the lower orders were responsible for their economic circumstances. ''The Economist'' took the position that regulation of factory hours was harmful to workers and also strongly opposed state support for education, health, the provision of water, and granting of patents and copyrights.{{sfn|Richardson|p=34}}

''The Economist'' also campaigned against the Corn Laws that protected landlords in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland against competition from less expensive foreign imports of cereal products. A rigid belief in ''laissez-faire'' guided the government response in 1846–1849 to the [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Famine]] in Ireland, during which an estimated 1.5 million people died. The minister responsible for economic and financial affairs, [[Charles Wood, 1st Viscount Halifax|Charles Wood]], expected that private enterprise and free trade, rather than government intervention, would alleviate the famine.{{sfn|Richardson|p=34}} The [[Corn Laws]] were finally repealed in 1846 by the removal of tariffs on grain which kept the price of bread artificially high,<ref>George Miller. ''On Fairness and Efficiency''. The Policy Press, 2000. {{ISBN|978-1861342218}} p. 344.</ref> but it came too late to stop the Irish famine, partly because it was done in stages over three years.<ref>Christine Kinealy. ''A Death-Dealing Famine:The Great Hunger in Ireland''. Pluto Press, 1997. {{ISBN|978-0745310749}}. p. 59.</ref><ref>Stephen J. Lee. ''Aspects of British Political History, 1815–1914''. Routledge, 1994. {{ISBN|978-0415090063}}. p. 83.</ref>

Many classical liberal theorists were skeptical of democracy, believing that poor, uneducated people were not capable of governing and they might vote against economically liberal principles.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mackert |first1=Jürgen  |title=The Condition of Democracy: Volume 3: Postcolonial and Settler Colonial Contexts |date=12 July 2021 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-40193-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=o0QvEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2013 |language=en |chapter=A ‘master-race democracy’: Myths and lies of Western liberal civilization|location=Liberalism as anti-democratic}}</ref> The skepticism about self-governance was even more pronounced when it came to "uncivilized", non-European societies, with many classical liberal thinkers providing intellectual justifications for [[white supremacy]], colonial rule, and the destruction of native societies via [[settler colonialism]].{{sfn|Mackert|2021|loc=Great liberal minds: the men who believed in barbarism}}

=== Free trade and world peace ===
{{main|Capitalist peace}}
Several liberals, including Smith and Cobden, argued that the free exchange of goods between nations could lead to [[world peace]]. Erik Gartzke states: "Scholars like Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Richard Cobden, [[Norman Angell]], and [[Richard Rosecrance]] have long speculated that [[free market]]s have the potential to free states from the looming prospect of recurrent warfare".<ref>Erik Gartzke, "Economic Freedom and Peace," in ''Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report'' (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2005).</ref> American political scientists John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, well known for their work on the democratic peace theory, state:<ref>{{cite journal|first1=J. R.|first2=B. M.|title=The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=41|issue=2|pages=267–294|year=1997|last1=Oneal|doi=10.1111/1468-2478.00042|last2=Russet|doi-access=free}}</ref> {{blockquote|The classical liberals advocated policies to increase liberty and prosperity. They sought to empower the commercial class politically and to abolish royal charters, monopolies, and the protectionist policies of mercantilism so as to encourage entrepreneurship and increase productive efficiency. They also expected democracy and laissez-faire economics to diminish the frequency of war.}}

In ''[[The Wealth of Nations]]'', Smith argued that as societies progressed from hunter gatherers to industrial societies the spoils of war would rise, but that the costs of war would rise further and thus making war difficult and costly for industrialised nations:<ref>Michael Doyle, ''Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism'' (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 237. {{ISBN|0393969479}}.</ref> {{blockquote|[T]he honours, the fame, the emoluments of war, belong not to [the middle and industrial classes]; the battle-plain is the harvest field of the aristocracy, watered with the blood of the people. ... Whilst our trade rested upon our foreign dependencies, as was the case in the middle of the last century...force and violence, were necessary to command our customers for our manufacturers...But war, although the greatest of consumers, not only produces nothing in return, but, by abstracting labour from productive employment and interrupting the course of trade, it impedes, in a variety of indirect ways, the creation of wealth; and, should hostilities be continued for a series of years, each successive war-loan will be felt in our commercial and manufacturing districts with an augmented pressure|[[Richard Cobden]]<ref>Edward P. Stringham, [https://ssrn.com/abstract=1676244 "Commerce, Markets, and Peace: Richard Cobden's Enduring Lessons"], ''Independent Review'' 9, no. 1 (2004): 105, 110, 115.</ref>|source=}}
{{blockquote|[B]y virtue of their mutual interest does nature unite people against violence and war, for the concept of cosmopolitan right does not protect them from it. The spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates every people. For among all those powers (or means) that belong to a nation, financial power may be the most reliable in forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace (though not from moral motives); and wherever in the world war threatens to break out, they will try to head it off through mediation, just as if they were permanently leagued for this purpose.|[[Immanuel Kant]]<ref>[[Immanuel Kant]], ''The Perpetual Peace''.</ref>}}

Cobden believed that military expenditures worsened the welfare of the state and benefited a small, but concentrated elite minority, summing up British [[imperialism]], which he believed was the result of the economic restrictions of mercantilist policies. To Cobden and many classical liberals, those who advocated peace must also advocate free markets. The belief that free trade would promote peace was widely shared by English liberals of the 19th and early 20th century, leading the economist [[John Maynard Keynes]] (1883–1946), who was a classical liberal in his early life, to say that this was a doctrine on which he was "brought up" and which he held unquestioned only until the 1920s.<ref>[[Donald Markwell]], [http://global.oup.com/academic/product/john-maynard-keynes-and-international-relations-9780198292364;jsessionid=4B0FEAE67C6CC2944F0147AFD5045F62?cc=au&lang=en& ''John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170901225622/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/john-maynard-keynes-and-international-relations-9780198292364;jsessionid=4B0FEAE67C6CC2944F0147AFD5045F62?cc=au&lang=en& |date=1 September 2017}}, Oxford University Press, 2006, ch. 1.</ref> In his review of a book on Keynes, Michael S. Lawlor argues that it may be in large part due to Keynes' contributions in economics and politics, as in the implementation of the [[Marshall Plan]] and the way economies have been managed since his work, "that we have the luxury of not facing his unpalatable choice between free trade and full employment".<ref>[https://eh.net/book_reviews/john-maynard-keynes-and-international-relations-economic-paths-to-war-and-peace/ John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171005051008/https://eh.net/book_reviews/john-maynard-keynes-and-international-relations-economic-paths-to-war-and-peace/ |date=5 October 2017}} Donald Markwell (2006), reviewed by M S Lawlor (February 2008).</ref> A related manifestation of this idea was the argument of [[Norman Angell]] (1872–1967), most famously before World War I in ''[[The Great Illusion]]'' (1909), that the interdependence of the economies of the major powers was now so great that war between them was futile and irrational; and therefore unlikely.