Editing Divine command theory (section)

===Omnibenevolence===
[[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], and some more recent philosophers,{{who|date=April 2022}} challenged the theory of divine command because it seems to entail that God's goodness consists of his following his own commands. It is argued that, if divine command theory is accepted, God's obligations would be what he commanded himself to do; the concept of God commanding himself is seen as incoherent. Neither could God hold any virtues, as a virtue would be the disposition to follow his own commands – if he cannot logically command himself, then he cannot logically have any virtues. Edward Wierenga counters this by claiming that whatever God chooses to do is good, but that his nature means that his actions would always be praiseworthy. William Wainwright argues that, although God does not act because of his commands, it is still logical to say that God has reasons for his actions. He proposes that God is motivated by what is morally good and, when he commands what is morally good, it becomes morally obligatory.<ref name=austin>{{cite web | url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c | title=Divine Command Theory | publisher=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=21 August 2006 | access-date=18 August 2012 | last=Austin |first= Michael W.}}</ref>