Editing Electronic voting (section)

==Analysis==
[[Image:topvoter2.jpg|thumb|ISG TopVoter, a machine designed specifically to be used by voters with disabilities]]
Electronic voting systems may offer advantages compared to other voting techniques. An electronic voting system can be involved in any one of a number of steps in the setup, distributing, voting, collecting, and counting of ballots, and thus may or may not introduce advantages into any of these steps. Potential disadvantages exist as well including the potential for flaws or weakness in any electronic component.

Charles Stewart of the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] estimates that 1 million more ballots were counted in the 2004 US presidential election than in 2000 because electronic voting machines detected votes that paper-based machines would have missed.<ref>Friel, Brian (November 2006)[http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm Let The Recounts Begin], [[National Journal]] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050619003932/http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm |date=19 June 2005 }}</ref>

In May 2004 the U.S. [[Government Accountability Office]] released a report titled "Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges",<ref>Government Accountability Office (May 2004) "[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04766t.pdf Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172057/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04766t.pdf |date=2016-03-03 }}"</ref> analyzing both the benefits and concerns created by electronic voting. A second report was released in September 2005 detailing some of the concerns with electronic voting, and ongoing improvements, titled "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed".<ref>Government Accountability Office (September 2005) "[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209072826/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf |date=2016-02-09 }}"</ref>

===Electronic ballots===
Electronic voting systems may use ''electronic ballot'' to store votes in [[computer memory]]. Systems which use them exclusively are called DRE voting systems. When electronic ballots are used there is no risk of exhausting the supply of ballots.  Additionally, these electronic ballots remove the need for printing of paper ballots, a significant cost.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://electronicsewa.com/ |title=Home |access-date=2 June 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120222242/http://electronicsewa.com/ |archive-date=20 November 2015 }}</ref> When administering elections in which ballots are offered in multiple languages (in some areas of the United States, public elections are required by the [[Voting Rights Act|National Voting Rights Act of 1965]]), electronic ballots can be programmed to provide ballots in multiple languages for a single machine.  The advantage with respect to ballots in different languages appears to be unique to electronic voting. For example, [[King County, Washington]]'s demographics require them under U.S. federal election law to provide ballot access in Chinese (Mandarin?). With any type of paper ballot, the county has to decide how many Chinese-language ballots to print, how many to make available at each polling place, etc.  Any strategy that can assure that Chinese-language ballots will be available at all polling places is certain, at the very least, to result in a significant number of wasted ballots.{{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} (The situation with lever machines would be even worse than with paper: the only apparent way to reliably meet the need would be to set up a Chinese-language lever machine at each polling place, few of which would be used at all.)

Critics argue{{who|date=July 2016}} the need for extra ballots in any language can be mitigated by providing a process to print ballots at voting locations.  They argue further, the cost of software validation, compiler trust validation, installation validation, delivery validation and validation of other steps related to electronic voting is complex and expensive, thus electronic ballots are not guaranteed to be less costly than printed ballots.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}}

===Accessibility===
[[Image:Jellybuttons.jpg|thumb|A Hart eSlate DRE voting machine with jelly buttons for people with manual dexterity disabilities]]
Electronic voting machines can be made fully accessible for persons with disabilities. Punched card and optical scan machines are not fully accessible for the blind or visually impaired, and lever machines can be difficult for voters with limited mobility and strength.<ref>"[http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=14581 Protecting the Integrity and Accessibility of Voting in 2004 and Beyond]". ''[[People for the American Way]]'' {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041212172330/http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=14581 |date=12 December 2004 }}</ref> Electronic machines can use headphones, [[Sip-and-puff|sip and puff]], foot pedals, joy sticks and other [[adaptive technology]] to provide the necessary [[accessibility]].

Organizations such as the [[Verified Voting Foundation]] have criticized the accessibility of electronic voting machines<ref>[http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=1875] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070810071352/http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=1875|date=10 August 2007}}</ref> and advocate alternatives. Some disabled voters (including the visually impaired) could use a [[tactile ballot]], a ballot system using physical markers to indicate where a mark should be made, to vote a secret paper ballot. These ballots can be designed identically to those used by other voters.<ref>[http://www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Ballot_Templates.htm "Ballot Templates."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120829073345/http://www.electionaccess.org/Bp/Ballot_Templates.htm |date=29 August 2012 }} (tactile ballots) ''[[International Foundation for Election Systems]]''</ref> However, other disabled voters (including voters with dexterity disabilities) could be unable to use these ballots.

===Cryptographic verification===
The concept of election verifiability through cryptographic solutions has emerged in the academic literature to introduce transparency and trust in electronic voting systems.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Juels|first=Ari|author2=Dario Catalano|author3=Markus Jakobsson|title=Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive|date=November 2002|issue=165|pages=61–70 |url=http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/165|access-date=2 May 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140407075829/http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/165|archive-date=7 April 2014|citeseerx=10.1.1.11.8779}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Chaum|first=David |author2=Peter Y. A. Ryan |author3=Steve Schneider|title=A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme|journal=ESORICS'05: 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security|year=2005|volume=3679|series=LNCS|pages=118–139|citeseerx=10.1.1.456.7748}}</ref> It allows voters and election observers to verify that votes have been recorded, tallied and declared correctly, in a manner independent from the hardware and software running the election. Three aspects of verifiability are considered:<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kremer|first=Steve |author2=Mark Ryan |author3=Ben Smyth|title=Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols|journal=ESORICS'10: 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security|year=2010|volume=6345|pages=389–404}}</ref> individual, universal, and eligibility. Individual verifiability allows a voter to check that her own vote is included in the election outcome, universal verifiability allows voters or election observers to check that the election outcome corresponds to the votes cast, and eligibility verifiability allows voters and observers to check that each vote in the election outcome was cast by a uniquely registered voter.

===Voter intent===
Electronic voting machines are able to provide immediate feedback to the voter detecting such possible problems as [[undervote|undervoting]] and [[overvote|overvoting]] which may result in a [[spoiled ballot]]. This immediate feedback can be helpful in successfully determining [[voter intent]].

===Transparency===
It has been alleged by groups such as the UK-based [[Open Rights Group]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2007/06/20/org-election-report-highlights-problems-with-voting-technology-used/ |title=ORG Election Report highlights problems with voting technology used |publisher=Openrightsgroup.org |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090224024126/http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2007/06/20/org-election-report-highlights-problems-with-voting-technology-used/ |archive-date=24 February 2009 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2008/07/02/org-verdict-on-london-elections-insufficient-evidence-to-declare-confidence-in-results/|title=Open Rights Group - ORG verdict on London Elections: "Insufficient evidence" to declare confidence in results|work=Open Rights Group|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422003623/http://www.openrightsgroup.org/2008/07/02/org-verdict-on-london-elections-insufficient-evidence-to-declare-confidence-in-results/|archive-date=22 April 2009|access-date=2 July 2008}}</ref> that a lack of testing, inadequate audit procedures, and insufficient attention given to system or process design with electronic voting leaves "elections open to error and [[electoral fraud|fraud]]".

In 2009, the [[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]] found that when using voting machines the "verification of the result must be possible by the citizen reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject." The [[DRE voting machine|DRE]] Nedap-computers used till then did not fulfill that requirement. The decision did not ban electronic voting as such, but requires all essential steps in elections to be subject to public examinability.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html |title=Ruling of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 3 March 2009 |publisher=Bundesverfassungsgericht.de |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110711062054/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20090303_2bvc000307en.html |archive-date=11 July 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html |title=German Federal Constitutional Court, Press release no. 19/2009 of 3 March 2009 |publisher=Bundesverfassungsgericht.de |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090404111620/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-019en.html |archive-date=4 April 2009 }}</ref>

In 2013, The [[California Association of Voting Officials]] was formed to maintain efforts toward publicly owned General Public License open source voting systems

===Coercion evidence===
In 2013, researchers from Europe proposed that the electronic voting systems should be coercion evident.<ref name=":1">Gurchetan S Grewal, Mark D Ryan, Sergiu Bursuc, Peter Y A Ryan. Caveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting. 34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013</ref> There should be a public evidence of the amount of coercion that took place in a particular elections. An internet voting system called "[[Caveat Coercitor]]"<ref>[http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a367.pdf Caveat Coercitor: coercion-evidence in electronic voting] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303233122/http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a367.pdf |date=3 March 2016 }}, 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</ref> shows how coercion evidence in voting systems can be achieved.<ref name=":1" />

===Audit trails===
{{Further|Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail|End-to-end auditable voting systems}}

A fundamental challenge with any [[voting machine]] is to produce evidence that the votes were recorded as cast and tabulated as recorded. Election results produced by voting systems that rely on voter-marked paper ballots can be verified with manual hand counts (either valid sampling or full recounts). [[Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Paperless]] ballot voting systems must support auditability in different ways. An independently auditable system, sometimes called an Independent Verification, can be used in recounts or audits. These systems can include the ability for voters to verify how their votes were cast or enable officials to verify that votes were tabulated correctly.

A discussion draft argued by researchers at the [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]] (NIST) states, "Simply put, the DRE architecture’s inability to provide for independent audits of its electronic records makes it a poor choice for an environment in which detecting errors and fraud is important."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf |title=Draft white paper on VVPR |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091128025506/http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf |archive-date=28 November 2009 }}</ref> The report does not represent the official position of NIST, and misinterpretations of the report has led NIST to explain that "Some statements in the report have been misinterpreted. The draft report includes statements from election officials, voting system vendors, computer scientists and other experts in the field about what is potentially possible in terms of attacks on DREs. However, these statements are not report conclusions."<ref>[https://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/draftvotingreport.htm] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070202222414/https://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/draftvotingreport.htm|date=2 February 2007}}</ref>

[[Image:Desi accuvote-tsx vvpat.jpg|thumb|A Diebold Election Systems, Inc. model AccuVote-TSx DRE voting machine with VVPAT attachment]]

Various technologies can be used to assure DRE voters that their votes were cast correctly, and allow officials to detect possible fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the tabulated results. Some systems include technologies such as cryptography (visual or mathematical), paper (kept by the voter or verified and left with election officials), audio verification, and dual recording or witness systems (other than with paper).

Dr. [[Rebecca Mercuri]], the creator of the [[Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail]] (VVPAT) concept (as described in her Ph.D. dissertation in October 2000 on the basic voter verifiable ballot system), proposes to answer the auditability question by having the voting machine print a paper ballot or other paper facsimile that can be visually verified by the voter before being entered into a secure location. Subsequently, this is sometimes referred to as the "[[Mercuri method]]." To be truly ''voter''-verified, the record itself must be verified by the voter and able to be done without assistance, such as visually or audibly.  If the voter must use a bar-code scanner or other electronic device to verify, then the record is not truly voter-verifiable, since it is actually the electronic device that is verifying the record for the voter. VVPAT is the form of Independent Verification most commonly found in [[elections in the United States]] and other countries such as Venezuela.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/e-voting-audits-venezuela|title=E-voting Audits in Venezuela|last=apleasant|date=25 November 2013|website=www.ndi.org|language=en|access-date=13 February 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170214003900/https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/e-voting-audits-venezuela|archive-date=14 February 2017}}</ref>

[[End-to-end auditable voting systems]] can provide the voter with a receipt that can be taken home. This receipt does not allow voters to prove to others how they voted, but it does allow them to verify that the system detected their vote correctly. End-to-end (E2E) systems include [[Punchscan]], [[ThreeBallot]] and [[Prêt à Voter]]. [[Scantegrity]] is an add-on that extends current optical scan voting systems with an E2E layer. The city of [[Takoma Park, Maryland]] used [[Scantegrity II]] for its November 2009 election.<ref>{{cite web|title=Pilot Study of the Scantegrity II Voting System Planned for the 2009 Takoma Park City Election |url=http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_(02-19-09).pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110719064407/http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_%2802-19-09%29.pdf |archive-date=19 July 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web
 |last        = Hardesty
 |first       = Larry
 |title       = Cryptographic voting debuts
 |work        = MIT news
 |date = 13 November 2009
 |access-date  = 30 November 2009
 |url         = http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2009/rivest-voting.html
 |url-status     = live
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20110719064407/http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/committees/boe/documents/flyer_workshop_I_(02-19-09).pdf
 |archive-date = 19 July 2011
}}</ref>

Systems that allow the voter to prove how they voted are never used in U.S. public elections, and are outlawed by most state constitutions. The primary concerns with this solution are [[voter intimidation]] and [[vote selling]].

An audit system can be used in measured random recounts to detect possible malfunction or fraud. With the VVPAT method, the paper ballot is often treated as the official ballot of record. In this scenario, the ballot is primary and the electronic records are used only for an initial count. In any subsequent recounts or challenges, the paper, not the electronic ballot, would be used for tabulation. Whenever a paper record serves as the legal ballot, that system will be subject to the same benefits and concerns as any paper ballot system.

To successfully audit any voting machine, a strict [[chain of custody]] is required.

The solution was first demonstrated (New York City, March 2001) and used (Sacramento, California 2002) by AVANTE International Technology, Inc.. In 2004 Nevada was the first state to successfully implement a DRE voting system that printed an electronic record. The $9.3 million voting system provided by [[Sequoia Voting Systems]] included more than 2,600 [[AVC EDGE]] touchscreen DREs equipped with the [[VeriVote VVPAT]] component.
<ref>[https://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115 ‘Paper trail’ voting system used in Nevada] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022031805/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5937115 |date=22 October 2020 }}, [[Associated Press]] 7 September 2004</ref> The new systems, implemented under the direction of then Secretary of State [[Dean Heller]] replaced largely punched card voting systems and were chosen after feedback was solicited from the community through town hall meetings and input solicited from the [[Nevada Gaming Control Board]].<ref>[http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/28/nevada.evote/index.html Nevada improves odds with e-vote] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303172108/http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/10/28/nevada.evote/index.html |date=3 March 2016 }}, [[CNN]] 29 October 2004</ref>

===Hardware===
[[File:Urnaeleições2006.jpg|thumb|right|Brazilian [[DRE voting machine]]]]
Inadequately secured hardware can be subject to [[Electoral fraud#Tampering with electronic voting systems|physical tampering]]. Some critics, such as the group "[[Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet]]" ("We do not trust voting machines"), charge that, for instance, foreign hardware could be inserted into the machine, or between the user and the central mechanism of the machine itself, using a [[man in the middle attack]] technique, and thus even sealing DRE machines may not be sufficient protection.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |title=Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer a security analysis (chapter 7.1) |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100107134107/http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |archive-date=7 January 2010 }}</ref> This claim is countered by the position that review and testing procedures can detect fraudulent code or hardware, if such things are present, and that a thorough, verifiable [[chain of custody]] would prevent the insertion of such hardware or software.{{Citation needed|date=August 2010}}  [[Security seal]]s are commonly employed in an attempt to detect tampering, but testing by [[Argonne National Laboratory]] and others demonstrates that existing seals can usually be quickly defeated by a trained person using low-tech methods.<ref>{{cite web|title=Defeating Existing Tamper-Indicating Seals |publisher=[[Argonne National Laboratory]] |url=http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/defeat.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081007232536/http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/defeat.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=7 October 2008 }}</ref>

===Software===
Security experts, such as [[Bruce Schneier]], have demanded that voting machine [[source code]] should be publicly available for inspection.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html |title=The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines |date=10 November 2004 |publisher=Schneier.com |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100208093414/http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html |archive-date=8 February 2010 }}</ref> Others have also suggested publishing voting machine software under a [[free software license]] as is done in Australia.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections/electronicvoting.html |title=The electronic voting and counting system |publisher=Elections.act.gov.au |access-date=24 May 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110218212750/http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections/electronicvoting.html |archive-date=18 February 2011 }}</ref>

===Testing and certification===
{{See also|Certification of voting machines}}

One method to detect errors with voting machines is [[parallel testing]], which are conducted on the Election Day with randomly picked machines. The [[Association for Computing Machinery|ACM]] published a study showing that, to change the outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential election, only 2 votes in each precinct would have needed to be changed.<ref>Di Franco, A., Petro, A., Shear, E., and Vladimirov, V. 2004. Small vote manipulations can swing elections. Commun. ACM 47, 10 (Oct. 2004), 43–45. DOI= http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1022594.1022621</ref>

===Cost===
Cost of having electronic machines receive the voter's choices, print a ballot and scan the ballots to tally results is higher than the cost of printing blank ballots, having voters mark them directly (with machine-marking only when voters want it) and scanning ballots to tally results, according to studies in Georgia,<ref name="oset-reality">{{Cite web |url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766827-OSET.html |title=Georgia State Election Technology Acquisition, A Reality Check |last=Perez |first=Edward, and Gregory Miller |date=March 2019 |website=OSET Institute |language=en |access-date=6 March 2020 |archive-date=30 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200730231209/https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766827-OSET.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="bmd-ga">{{Cite news |last=Fowler |first=Stephen |url=https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system |title=Here's What Vendors Say It Would Cost To Replace Georgia's Voting System |work=Georgia Public Broadcasting |access-date=28 February 2020 |language=en |archive-date=28 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200228224101/https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system |url-status=live }}</ref> New York<ref name="bmdny">{{Cite web |url=https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |title=NYVV - Paper Ballots Costs |website=www.nyvv.org |access-date=28 February 2020 |archive-date=28 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200228224035/https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |url-status=dead }}</ref> and Pennsylvania.<ref name="pitt cost">{{Cite web |url=https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager%20%282%29.pdf |title=Pennsylvania Counties' New Voting Systems Selections: An Analysis |last=Deluzio |first=Christopher, Kevin Skoglund |date=28 February 2020 |website=University of Pittsburgh |access-date=28 February 2020 |archive-date=26 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200626032838/https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager%20(2).pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>