Editing Fallacy (section)

== Informal fallacy ==
{{main|Informal fallacy}}
In contrast to a formal fallacy, an informal fallacy originates from a reasoning error other than a flaw in the logical form of the argument.<ref name="garns" /> A [[deductive argument]] containing an informal fallacy may be formally [[Validity (logic)|valid]],<ref name="Downden" /> but still remain rationally unpersuasive. Nevertheless, informal fallacies apply to both deductive and non-deductive arguments.

Though the form of the argument may be relevant, fallacies of this type are "types of mistakes in reasoning that arise from the mishandling of the ''content'' of the propositions constituting the argument".<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Copi |first1=Irving M. |title=Introduction to Logic |last2=Cohen |first2=Carl |publisher=Pearson Education, Inc. |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-13-189834-9 |edition=12th|page=125}}</ref>

=== Faulty generalization ===
A special subclass of the informal fallacies is the set of [[faulty generalization]]s, also known as inductive fallacies. Here, the most important issue concerns inductive strength or methodology (for example, [[statistical inference]]). In the absence of sufficient evidence, drawing conclusions based on induction is [[Warrant (rhetoric)|unwarranted]] and fallacious. With the backing of sufficient amounts of the right type of [[empirical evidence]], however, the conclusions may become warranted and convincing (at which point the arguments are no longer considered fallacious).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Neyman |first=J. |date=1937-08-30 |title=Outline of a Theory of Statistical Estimation Based on the Classical Theory of Probability |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences |language=en |volume=236 |issue=767 |pages=333–380 |bibcode=1937RSPTA.236..333N |doi=10.1098/rsta.1937.0005 |issn=0080-4614 |s2cid=19584450 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

==== Hasty generalization ====
[[Hasty generalization]] is described as making assumptions about a whole group or range of cases based on a [[Sample (statistics)|sample]] that is inadequate (usually because it is atypical or just too small).
Stereotypes about people ("frat boys are drunkards", "grad students are nerdy", "women don't enjoy sports", etc.) are common examples of the principle.

Hasty generalization often follows a pattern such as:

:X is true for A.
:X is true for B.
:Therefore, X is true for C, D, etc.

While never a valid logical deduction, if such an inference can be made on statistical grounds, it may nonetheless be convincing. This is because with enough empirical evidence, the generalization is no longer a hasty one.

=== Relevance fallacy ===
The [[fallacy of relevance|fallacies of relevance]] are a broad class of informal fallacies, generically represented by [[missing the point]]: presenting an argument that may be [[soundness|sound]] but fails to address the issue in question.

==== Argument from silence ====
An [[argument from silence]] is a faulty conclusion that is drawn based on the absence of evidence rather than on the presence of evidence.

=== Examples of informal fallacies ===
{{Main|List of fallacies#Informal fallacies}}

==== ''Post hoc'' (false cause) ====
The post hoc fallacy assumes that because B comes after A, A caused B. It gets its name from the Latin phrase "''post hoc, ergo propter hoc''", which translates as "after this, therefore because of this". 

Sometimes one event really does cause another one that comes later—for example, if one registers for a class and their name later appears on the roll, it's true that the first event caused the one that came later. But sometimes two events that seem related in time are not really related as cause and event. That is, [[Correlation does not imply causation|temporal correlation does not necessarily entail causation]]. For example, if one eats a sandwich and then gets food poisoning, that does not necessarily mean the sandwich caused the food poisoning. Something else eaten earlier might have caused the food poisoning.

==== Slippery slope ====
For an argument to be a [[slippery slope]] type of argument, it must meet the requirements of that [[argumentation scheme]]. A slippery slope argument originates from a conversation or debate in which two actors take turns. It usually originates from one actor giving advice on a decision or act. Along the way, the actor must make additional choices on similar matters through which the actor enters the ‘grey area’ of the slippery slope. At this point, the actor potentially loses control over the direction of the arguments, thus leading to a ‘fatal’ outcome.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas |date=2015-09-02 |title=The Basic Slippery Slope Argument |url=https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4286 |journal=Informal Logic |language=en |volume=35 |issue=3 |pages=273–311 |doi=10.22329/il.v35i3.4286 |issn=2293-734X |doi-access=free}}</ref>

Such an argument is built up according to the following argumentation scheme: initial premise, sequential premise, indeterminacy premise, control premise, loss of control premise, catastrophic outcome premise, and conclusion. Slippery slope arguments may be defeated by asking critical questions or giving counterarguments.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Walton |first=Douglas |title=Slippery Slope Arguments. |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1992 |isbn=978-0198239253 |location=Oxford |language=EN}}</ref>

There are several reasons for a slippery slope to be fallacious: for example, the argument is going too far into the future, it is a too complex argument whose structure is hard to identify, or the argument makes emotional appeals.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Govier |first=Trudy |date=June 1982 |title=What's Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments? |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0045509100009796/type/journal_article |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |language=en |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=303–316 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1982.10715799 |issn=0045-5091 |s2cid=170107849|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

It may be that a slippery slope is not necessarily fallacious if context is taken into account and there is an effort to assess plausibility.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Dwyer |first=Christopher |date=September 13, 2019 |title=Critically Thinking About the Slippery Slope "Fallacy" |url=https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/thoughts-thinking/201909/critically-thinking-about-the-slippery-slope-fallacy |website=Psychology Today}}</ref>

==== False analogy ====
Informally known as the "[[apples and oranges]]" fallacy, a [[false analogy]] uses unsound comparisons.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kornprobst |first=Markus |year=2007 |title=Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies |journal=Millennium&nbsp;— Journal of International Studies |volume=36 |pages=29–49 |doi=10.1177/03058298070360010301 |s2cid=145785208}}</ref>

==== Straw man fallacy ====
The [[straw man]] fallacy refers to the refutation of a standpoint in an argument that was never proposed. The fallacy usually occurs in the presentation of an opponent's standpoint as more extreme, distorted, or simplistic than it actually is. Compared to criticizing the opponent's actual standpoint, this allows the arguer to offer a seeming refutation of what is, however, not the actual standpoint.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lewiński |first1=Marcin |last2=Oswald |first2=Steve |date=2013-12-01 |title=When and how do we deal with straw men? A normative and cognitive pragmatic account |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378216613001227 |journal=Journal of Pragmatics |series=Biases and constraints in communication: Argumentation, persuasion and manipulation |language=en |volume=59 |pages=164–177 |doi=10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.001 |issn=0378-2166|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Such an argument involves two arguers, with one criticizing the other's perspective.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Aikin |first1=Scott F. |last2=Casey |first2=John P. |date=2016-10-01 |title=Straw Men, Iron Men, and Argumentative Virtue |url=https://www.academia.edu/107692810 |url-access=registration |journal=Topoi |language=en |volume=35 |issue=2 |pages=431–440 |doi=10.1007/s11245-015-9308-5 |issn=1572-8749 |s2cid=145321942}}</ref> The reason for the straw man argument to be fallacious originates from the problem of how to deal with natural discourse. The opponent's argument is not reflected by the arguments that are proposed by the speaker.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Talisse |first1=Robert |last2=Aikin |first2=Scott F. |date=2006-09-01 |title=Two Forms of the Straw Man |journal=Argumentation |language=en |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=345–352 |url=https://www.academia.edu/48271903 |url-access=registration |doi=10.1007/s10503-006-9017-8 |issn=1572-8374 |s2cid=15523437}}</ref>