Editing Franz Halder (section)

=== Myth of the clean ''Wehrmacht'' ===
[[File:Franz-Halder.jpg|thumb|upright|alt=Photograph of Halder sitting in a witness box looking to his right | Halder as a witness at the [[High Command Trial]], 1948]]
{{Main|Myth of the clean Wehrmacht}}

Halder played a key role in creating the [[Myth of the clean Wehrmacht|myth of the clean ''Wehrmacht'']]. It was a false, mythic view of the Nazi-Soviet war in which the German army fought a "noble war". It denies the existence of, or disregards, German war crimes.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=56}} The genesis for the myth was the "Generals' Memorandum" created in November 1945 and submitted to the [[International Military Tribunal]] in Nuremberg. The memorandum was titled "The German Army from 1920 to 1945". It was co-authored by Halder and former field marshals [[Walther von Brauchitsch]] and [[Erich von Manstein]] and other senior military figures. It aimed to portray the German armed forces as apolitical and largely innocent of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime.{{sfn|Hebert|2010|p=99–101}}{{sfn|Wette|2006|pp=206–207}} The strategy outlined in the memorandum was later adopted by [[Hans Laternser]], the lead counsel for the defence at the [[High Command Trial]] of senior ''Wehrmacht'' commanders.{{sfn|Hebert|2010|p=99–101}} The document was written at the suggestion of American General [[William J. Donovan]], who later founded the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), and viewed the Soviet Union as a global threat to world peace. Donovan served as a deputy prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal; he and some other US representatives did not believe the trials should proceed. He believed America should do everything it could to secure Germany as a military ally against the Soviet Union in the growing [[Cold War]].{{sfn|Wette|2006|pp=206–207}}

As the Cold War progressed, the military intelligence provided by the German section of the [[US Army Historical Division]] became increasingly important to the Americans.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=64}} Halder oversaw the German section of the research program which became known as the "Halder Group".{{sfn|Smelser |Davies|2008|p=56,65}} His group produced over 2,500 major historical manuscripts from over 700 distinct German authors detailing World War II.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=65}} Halder used the group to reinvent war-time history using truth, half-truth, distortion and lies.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=56}} He set up a "control group" of trusted former Nazi officers who vetted all the manuscripts and, if necessary, required authors to change their content.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=67}} Halder's deputy in the group was [[Adolf Heusinger]] who was also working for the [[Gehlen Organization]], the United States military intelligence organisation in Germany.{{sfn|Wette|2006|p=230}} Halder expected to be addressed as "General" by the writing teams and behaved as their commanding officer while dealing with their manuscripts.{{sfn|Wette|2006|p=231}} His aim was to exonerate German army personnel of the atrocities they had committed.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=66}}

Halder laid down a version of history that all the writers had to abide by. This version stated that the army was the victim of Hitler, and they had opposed him at every opportunity. The writers had to emphasise the "decent" form of war conducted by the army and blame the SS for the criminal operations.{{sfn|Wette|2006|p=231}} He enjoyed a privileged position, as the few historians working on World War II history in the 1950s had to obtain historical information from Halder and his group. His influence extended to newspaper editors and authors.{{sfn|Wette|2006|p=232}} Halder's instructions were sent down the chain of command and were recorded by former field marshal [[Georg von Küchler]]. They said: "It is German deeds, seen from the German standpoint, that are to be recorded; this will constitute a memorial to our troops", "no criticism of measures ordered by the leadership" is allowed and no one is to be "incriminated in any way," instead the achievements of the ''Wehrmacht'' were to be emphasised.{{sfn|Wette|2006|pp=232–233}} The military historian [[Bernd Wegner]], examining Halder's work, wrote: "The writing of German history on the Second World War, and in particular on the Russian front, was for over two decades, and in part up to the present day—and to a far greater extent than most people realize—the work of the defeated."{{sfn|Wette|2006|p=229}} [[Wolfram Wette]] wrote, "In the work of the Historical Division the traces of the war of annihilation for which the Wehrmacht leadership was responsible were covered up".{{sfn|Wette|2006|p=232}}

Halder sought to distance himself and the German army from Hitler, Nazism and war crimes. He claimed to have been against the Russian campaign and that he had warned Hitler against his "adventure" in the East.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=57}} He omitted any mention of the Barbarossa Decree that he had helped formulate or the Commissar Order which he had supported and disseminated.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=57}} Halder also claimed implausibly that the invasion of the Soviet Union was a defensive measure.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=59}}

The Americans were aware the manuscripts contained numerous [[apologia]]. However, they also contained intelligence that the Americans viewed as important in the event of a war between the US and the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Smelser |Davies|2008|p=66}} Halder had coached former Nazi officers on how to make incriminating evidence disappear.{{sfn|Smelser| Davies|2008|p=66–67}} Many of the officers he coached such as [[Heinz Guderian]] went on to write best-selling biographies that broadened the appeal of the apologia.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=67}} Halder succeeded in his aim of rehabilitating the German officer corps, first with the US military, then widening circles of politics and finally millions of Americans.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=71}}

In 1949 Halder wrote ''Hitler als Feldherr'' which was translated into English as ''Hitler as Commander'' and published in 1950. The work contains the central ideas behind the myth of the clean ''Wehrmacht'' that were subsequently reproduced in countless histories and memoirs. The book describes an idealised commander who is then compared to Hitler. The commander is noble, wise, against the war in the East and free of any guilt. Hitler alone is responsible for the evil committed; his complete immorality is contrasted with the moral behaviour of the commander who has done no wrong.{{sfn|Smelser| Davies|2008|pp=56–57}}

Halder's myth-making was not concentrated solely on absolving himself and the German army from war crimes; he also created two strategic and operational myths. The first is that Hitler alone was responsible for the military blunders during the invasion of the Soviet Union. The second myth is that the blitzkrieg campaign he so strongly advocated would have resulted in the capture of Moscow and won the war for Germany.{{sfn|Fugate|1984|pp=310–312}} The historians [[Ronald Smelser]] and [[Edward J. Davies]] writing in ''[[The Myth of the Eastern Front]]'' said "Franz Halder embodies better than any other high German officer the dramatic difference between myth and reality as it emerged after World War II".{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=63}}