Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
German reunification
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
== Domestic opposition == {{Undue weight|date=May 2024|reason=See talk page.}} Throughout the entire Cold War and until 1990, reunification did not appear likely, and the existence of two German countries was commonly regarded as an established, unalterable fact.<ref name=winkler>{{cite journal|last=Winkler|first=Heinrich August |author-link=Heinrich August Winkler |title=Rebuilding of a Nation: The Germans before and after Unification |journal=Daedalus|year=1994|volume=123|issue=1 |pages=107–127|jstor=20027216 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027216}}</ref> [[Helmut Kohl]] briefly addressed this issue during the [[1983 West German federal election]], stating that despite his belief in German national unity, it would not mean a "return to the nation-state of earlier times". In the 1980s, opposition to a united German country and support for lasting peaceful coexistence between the two German countries were very common amongst [[left-wing]] parties of West Germany, especially the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|SPD]] and [[Alliance 90/The Greens|Greens]]. The division of Germany was considered necessary to maintain [[peace]] in Europe, and the emergence of another German state was also seen as possibly dangerous to the West German democracy. A German publicist Peter Bender wrote in 1981: "Considering the role Germany played in the origins of both World Wars, Europe cannot, and the [[Germans]] should not, want a new German Reich, a sovereign nation-state. That is the logic of history which is, as [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]] noted, more exact than the [[Kingdom of Prussia|Prussia]]n government audit office."<ref name=winkler/> Opinion on reunification was not only highly partisan, but polarised along many social divides—Germans aged 35 or younger were opposed to unification, whereas older respondents were more supportive; likewise, low-income Germans tended to oppose reunification, whereas more affluent responders were likely to support it.<ref name=kuechler>{{cite journal |last=Kuechler |first=Manfred |title=The Road to German Unity: Mass Sentiment in East and West Germany |journal=The Public Opinion Quarterly |year=1992 |volume=56 |issue=1 |pages=53–76 |publisher=Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research |doi=10.1086/269295 |jstor=2749221 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2749221 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306220829/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2749221 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Ultimately, a poll in July 1990 found that the main motivation for reunification was economic concern rather than nationalism.<ref name=kuechler/><ref name=brockmann>{{cite journal |last=Brockmann |first=Stephen |title=Introduction: The Reunification Debate |journal=New German Critique |year=1991 |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=3–30 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/488182 |publisher=Duke University Press |doi=10.2307/488182 |jstor=488182 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306220835/https://www.jstor.org/stable/488182 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Opinion polls in the late 1980s showed that young East Germans and West Germans saw each other as foreign, and did not regard themselves as a single nation.<ref name=winkler/> [[Heinrich August Winkler]] observes that "an evaluation of the corresponding data in the Deutschland Archiv in 1989 showed that the GDR was perceived by a large portion of the younger generation as a foreign nation with a different social order which was no longer a part of Germany".<ref name=winkler/> Winkler argues that the reunification was not a product of popular opinion, but rather "crisis management on the highest level".<ref name=winkler/> Support for unified Germany fell once the prospect of it became a tangible reality in the fall of 1989.<ref name=kuechler/> A December 1989 poll by ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' indicated strong support for preserving East Germany as a separate state.<ref name=pond>{{cite journal|last=Pond|first=Elizabeth|title=A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR|journal=International Security|year=1990|volume=15|issue=2|pages=35–66|doi=10.2307/2538865|jstor=2538865|s2cid=153877446|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538865|access-date=6 March 2023|archive-date=6 March 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306222336/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538865|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> However, [[Socialist Unity Party of Germany|SED]] members were overrepresented amongst the responders, constituting 13% of the population, but 23% of those polled. Reporting on a student protest in [[East Berlin]] on 4 November 1989, {{ill|Elizabeth Pond|de|Elizabeth Pond}} noted that "virtually none of the demonstrators interviewed by Western reporters said they wanted unification with the Federal Republic".<ref name=pond/> In West Germany, once it became clear that a course of quick unification was negotiated, the public responded with concern.<ref name=kuechler/> In February 1990, two-thirds of West Germans considered the pace of unification as "too fast". West Germans were also hostile towards the newcomers from the East—according to an April 1990 poll, only 11% of West Germans welcomed the refugees from East Germany.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kuechler |first=Manfred |title=The Road to German Unity: Mass Sentiment in East and West Germany |journal=The Public Opinion Quarterly |year=1992 |volume=56 |issue=1 |pages=53–76 |publisher=Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research |doi=10.1086/269295 |jstor=2749221 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2749221 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306220829/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2749221 |url-status=live |quote=Throughout the fall, two-thirds of all respondents welcomed the GDR refugees; in December 1989, however, barely one-quarter expressed full understanding for people still emigrating, and the support quickly dwindled to just 11 percent by April 1990.|url-access=subscription }}</ref> After unification, the national divide persisted—a survey by the [[Allensbach Institute]] in April 1993 found that only 22% of West Germans and 11% of East Germans felt they were one nation.<ref name=winkler/> {{ill|Dolores L. Augustine|de|Dolores L. Augustine}} observed that "the sense of oneness felt by East Germans and West Germans in the euphoric period after the fall of the wall proved all too transitory", as the old divisions persisted and Germans not only still saw themselves as two separate people, but also acted in accordance with their separate, regional interests.<ref name=augustine>{{cite journal |last=Augustine |first=Dolores L. |title=The Impact of Two Reunification-Era Debates on the East German Sense of Identity |journal=German Studies Review |year=2004 |volume=27 |issue=3 |pages=563–578 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/4140983 |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of the German Studies Association |doi=10.2307/4140983 |jstor=4140983 |access-date=6 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306220830/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4140983 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> This state of mind became known as ''Mauer im Kopf'' ("wall in the head"), suggesting that despite the fall of the [[Berlin Wall]], a "psychological wall" still existed between East and West Germans. Augustine argues that despite resistance to the political regime of East Germany, it still represented the history and identity of East Germans. Unification caused backlash, and the [[Treuhandanstalt]], an agency created to carry out privatization, was blamed for creating mass unemployment and poverty in the East.<ref name=augustine/> ===Social groups and figures=== An influential part of the reunification opponents were the so-called [[Anti-Germans (political current)|Anti-Germans]].<ref name=erlanger>{{cite journal|last=Erlanger|first=Simon|title=At Issue: "The Anti-Germans" – The Pro-Israel German Left|journal=Jewish Political Studies Review|year=2009|volume=21|issue=1/2|pages=95–106|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/25834827|publisher=Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs|jstor=25834827|access-date=6 March 2023|archive-date=6 March 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306220830/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25834827|url-status=live}}</ref> Emerging from the student Left, Anti-Germans were supportive of [[Israel]] and strongly opposed [[German nationalism]], arguing that an emergence of a united German state would also result in a return of [[fascism]] ([[Nazism]]). They considered the social and political dynamics of 1980s and 1990s Germany to be comparable to those of the 1930s, denouncing the emerging [[anti-Zionism]], unification sentiments and reemergence of [[pan-Germanism]]. [[Hermann L. Gremliza]], who left the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|SPD]] in 1989 because of its support for German unification, was repulsed by the universal support for unification amongst most major parties, stating that it reminded him of "[[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democrats]] joining the [[Nazi Party|National Socialists]] (Nazis) in singing the [[German national anthem]] in 1933, following [[Hitler]]'s declaration of his foreign policy." Several thousand people joined the Anti-Germans' 1990 protests against German reunification.<ref name=erlanger/> According to Stephen Brockmann, German reunification was feared and opposed by ethnic minorities, particularly those of East Germany.<ref name=brockmann/> He observes that "right-wing violence was on the rise throughout 1990 in the GDR, with frequent instances of beatings, rapes, and fights connected with xenophobia", which led to a police lockdown in Leipzig on the night of reunification.<ref name=brockmann/> Tensions with Poland were high, and many internal ethnic minorities such as the [[Sorbs]] feared further displacement or assimilationist policies; the Sorbs had received legal protection in the GDR and feared that the rights granted to them in East Germany would not be included in the law of an eventual united Germany. Ultimately, no provision on the protection of ethnic minorities was included in the post-unification reform of the [[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|Basic Law]] in 1994.<ref name=foy1>{{cite journal |last1=Foy |first1=Todd |last2=Thiele |first2=Carmen |title=The Legal Status of the Sorbian Minority in the Federal Republic of Germany |journal=International Journal on Minority and Group Rights |year=1996 |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=41–77 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/24674577 |publisher=Brill |doi=10.1163/15718119620907094 |jstor=24674577 |access-date=24 June 2023 |archive-date=25 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230625025124/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24674577 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> While politicians called for acceptance of a new multiethnic society, many were unwilling to "give up its traditional racial definition of German nationality". Feminist groups also opposed the unification, as abortion laws were less restrictive in East Germany than in West Germany, and the progress that the GDR had made in regard to women's [[welfare spending|welfare]] such as [[legal equality]], child care and financial support were "all less impressive or non-existent in the West".<ref name=brockmann/> Opposition was also prevalent amongst Jewish circles, who had special status and rights in East Germany. Some Jewish intellectuals such as [[Günter Kunert]] expressed concern of Jews being portrayed as part of the East German socialist elites, given that the Jews had unique rights, such as being allowed to travel west.<ref>{{cite journal |title=German Reunification and the Jews |first=Sander L. |last=Gilman |journal=New German Critique |year=1991 |issue=52 |department=Special Issue on German Unification |publisher=Duke University Press |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/488195 |pages=173–191|doi=10.2307/488195 |jstor=488195 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> There was also a significant opposition to the unification in intellectual circles. [[Christa Wolf]] and [[Manfred Stolpe]] stressed the need to forge an East German identity, while "citizens' initiatives, church groups, and intellectuals of the first hour began issuing dire warnings about a possible [[Anschluss]] of the GDR by the Federal Republic".<ref name=brockmann/><ref name=augustine/> Many East German oppositionists and reformers advocated for a "third path" of an independent, democratic socialist East Germany.<ref name=brockmann/> [[Stefan Heym]] argued that the preservation of the GDR was necessary to achieve the ideal of [[democratic socialism]], urging East Germans to oppose "capitalist annexation" in favour of a democratic socialist society.<ref name=brockmann/> In an attempt to preserve possibility for an independent socialist Germany, Wolf, Heym, and a union of left-wing writers of GDR issued the appeal [https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/a-new-germany-1990-2023/appeal-for-our-country-november-26-1989 "For Our Country"] on November 28, 1989, to try to convince East Germans a possible future of socialist Germany. The appeal managed to gather over 1 million approvals by January, 1990, which is unprecedented in the history of GDR.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Aufruf: Für unser Land |url=https://www.ddr89.de/texte/land.html |access-date=2024-12-10 |website=www.ddr89.de}}</ref> Writers in both East and West were concerned about the destruction of the East German or West German cultural identity respectively; in "Goodbye to the Literature of the Federal Republic", [[Frank Schirrmacher]] states that the literature of both states had been central to the consciousness and unique identity of both nations, with this newly developed culture being now endangered by looming reunification.<ref name=brockmann/> [[David Gress]] remarked that there was "an influential view found largely, but by no means only, on the German and international left" which saw "the drive for unification as either sinister, masking a revival of aggressive nationalist aspirations, or materialist".<ref name="gress">{{cite journal |title=The Politics of German Unification |first=David |last=Gress |author-link=David Gress |journal=Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science |volume=38 |issue=1 |year=1991 |pages=140–152 |publisher=The Academy of Political Science |doi=10.2307/1173819 |jstor=1173819 |department=The New Europe: Revolution in East-West Relations |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1173819|url-access=subscription }}</ref> [[Günter Grass]], who won the [[Nobel Prize in Literature]] in 1999, also expressed his vehement opposition to the unification of Germany, citing his tragic memories of World War II as the reason.<ref name=brockmann/> According to Grass, the emergence of [[National Socialism]] and the Holocaust had deprived Germany of its right to exist as a unified nation state: he wrote: "Historical responsibility dictates opposition to reunification, no matter how inevitable it may seem."<ref name=brockmann/> He also claimed that "national victory threatens a cultural defeat", as "blooming of [[German culture]] and [[German philosophy|philosophy]] is possible only at times of fruitful national disunity", and also cited [[Johann Wolfgang von Goethe]]'s opposition to the first unification of Germany in 1871:<ref name=brockmann/> Goethe wrote: "Frankfurt, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck are large and brilliant, and their impact on the prosperity of Germany is incalculable. Yet, would they remain what they are if they were to lose their independence and be incorporated as provincial cities into one great German Empire? I have reason to doubt this."<ref>{{cite web | url= https://mises.org/library/politics-johann-wolfgang-goethe | title= The Politics of Johann Wolfgang Goethe | publisher= Mises Institute | date= 1 February 2012 | author= Hans-Hermann Hoppe | access-date= 17 May 2019 | archive-date= 6 June 2022 | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220606032214/https://mises.org/library/politics-johann-wolfgang-goethe | url-status= live }}</ref> Grass also condemned the unification as [[Philistinism|philistinist]] and purely materialist, calling it "the monetary fetish, by now devoid of all joy." [[Heiner Müller]] supported Grass' criticism of the unification process, warning East Germans: "We will be a nation without dreams, we will lose our memories, our past, and therefore also our ability to hope."<ref name=brockmann/> British historian [[Richard J. Evans]] made a similar argument, criticizing the unification as driven solely by "consumerist appetites whetted by years of watching West German television advertisements".<ref name="gress"/>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)