Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

==== Philosophical zombies ====
{{Main|Philosophical zombie}}
Philosophical zombies are a thought experiment commonly used in discussions of the hard problem.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Seager|first=William|title=Are Zombies Logically Possible?|url=https://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/zombie.html|access-date=2020-09-03|website=www.utsc.utoronto.ca}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kaszniak|first1=Alfred W.|last2=Scott|first2=Andrew C.|date=2007|title=Zombie Killer|s2cid=14891432|journal=Association of Scientific Studies of Consciousness}}</ref> They are hypothetical beings physically identical to humans but that lack conscious experience.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Polger|first=Tom|title=Zombies: Entry|url=https://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/zombies.htm|access-date=2020-09-03|website=host.uniroma3.it|archive-date=2020-06-15|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200615155145/http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/zombies.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> Philosophers such as Chalmers, Joseph Levine, and Francis Kripke take zombies as impossible within the bounds of nature but possible within the bounds of logic.<ref>{{Citation|last=Kirk|first=Robert|title=Zombies|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/zombies/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-09-03}}</ref> This would imply that facts about experience are not logically entailed by the "physical" facts. Therefore, consciousness is irreducible. In Chalmers' words, "after God (hypothetically) created the world, he had more work to do."<ref name=":3">[[David Chalmers]] (1996) ''The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory'', pp. 153–56. Oxford University Press, New York, {{ISBN|0-19-511789-1}} (Pbk.)</ref> Daniel Dennett, a philosopher of mind, criticised the field's use of "the zombie hunch" which he deems an "embarrassment"<ref>Dennett, Daniel (1999), [https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/DD-zombie.html "The Zombie Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?"],{{dead link|date=January 2025}} ''Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture''</ref> that ought to "be dropped like a hot potato".<ref name=":1">Dennett, Daniel; commentary on T. Moody, O. Flanagan and T. Polger. "[https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/unzombie.htm The Unimagined Preposterous of Zombies]", ''Journal of Consciousness Studies'' vol. 2, no. 4, 1995, pp. 322–326.</ref>