Editing Hold-up problem (section)

== General and cited references ==
*Balkenborg, D., Kaplan, T.R., & Miller, T. (2010). A simple economic teaching experiment on the hold-up problem. ''MPRA Paper No. 24772''. 
*Che, Y.K., & Sákovics, J. (2008). ''H old-up Problem''. ''[[The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics]]'', 2nd Edition.  [http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_H000171&edition=current&q=Hold-up&topicid=&result_number=1 Abstract.]
*[[Aaron Edlin|Edlin, A.]] & Reichelstein, S. (1996). Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment. ''American Economic Review, 86''(3), pp.&nbsp;478–501. 
*Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart, 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. ''Journal of Political Economy, 94''(4), p.&nbsp;691-719. {{JSTOR|1833199}}.
*[[Ronald Coase|Coase, R.H.]] (2000). The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors. ''Journal of Law and Economics, 1''(43), 15-32. 
*Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2004). Is There a Hold-Up Problem? ''The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 3''(106), 475-494. 
*[[Oliver Hart (economist)|Hart, O.]] (1995). ''Firms, contracts, and financial structure.'' Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
*Hart, O., & [[John Hardman Moore|Moore, J.]] (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. ''Econometrica, 4''(56), 755-785. 
*[[Bengt R. Holmström|Holmström, B.]], & Roberts, J. (1998). The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited. ''The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4''(12), 73-94. 
*Hoppe, E. I., & Schmitz, P. W. (2011). Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence. ''Games and Economic Behavior'', ''73''(1), 186-199. 
*Klein, B. (1998). Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. ''Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1''(4), 199-213. 
*Nöldeke, G., & Schmidt, K. (1995). Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem. ''The RAND Journal of Economics, 2''(26), 163-179. 
*Rogerson, W.P. (1992). Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem. ''The Review of Economic Studies, 4''(59), 777-793. {{JSTOR|2297997}}
*Schmitz, P.W. (2001). The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory. ''Bulletin of Economic Research, 1''(53), 1-17. 
*Schmitz, P.W. (2006). Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach. ''American Economic Review'', 96(1): 422–434. 
*[[Jean Tirole|Tirole, J.]] (1988). ''The Theory of Industrial Organization.'' Massachusetts : Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
*[[Oliver E. Williamson|Williamson, O.E.]], 1979. Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. ''Journal of Law and Economics, 22''(2), pp.&nbsp;233–62.

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