Editing Intuition (section)

====Early modern philosophy====
In his book ''[[Meditations on First Philosophy]]'', [[René Descartes|Descartes]] refers to an "intuition" (from the [[Latin]] verb {{lang|la|intueor}}, which means "to see") as a pre-existing knowledge gained through rational reasoning or discovering truth through contemplation. This definition states that "whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is true";<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite encyclopedia|title=Descartes' Epistemology|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#CaDRuleRoadPerfKnow|chapter=5. C&D Rule and the Road to Perfect Knowledge|year=2019}}
|2={{cite web|title=Descartes' Truth Rule: Clarity and Distinctness|url=https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil100/descartes.html|access-date=June 11, 2021}} }}</ref> this is commonly referred to as [[logical intuition|rational intuition]]<ref name="Descartes">{{cite book|last1=L. Mursell|first1=James|title=The Philosophical Review|publisher=Duke University Press|series=4|volume=28|location=USA|pages=391–401|chapter=The Function of Intuition in Descartes' Philosophy of Science}}</ref> It is a component of a potential logical mistake called the [[Cartesian circle]]. Intuition and [[Natural deduction#Judgments and propositions|deduction]], says Descartes, are the unique possible sources of knowledge of the human intellect;<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Murray|last1=Miles|last2=Nolan|first2=Lawrence|editor1-first=Lawrence|editor1-last=Nolan|title=Deduction|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-descartes-lexicon/deduction/69C8310B58F3DFDEE90316F20FA7A3D0|journal=The Cambridge Companion to Descartes|year=2015|pages=183–186|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511894695.075|isbn=9780511894695|s2cid=243420925 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> the latter is a "connected sequence of intuitions",<ref>{{cite book|last1=Cottingham|first1=John|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Prhr9FBdQ_MC|title=The Cambridge Companion to Descartes|date=September 25, 1992|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9780521366960|series=Cambridge Companions to Philosophy|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Prhr9FBdQ_MC&pg=PA206 206]|oclc=24698917|access-date=June 11, 2021|authorlink=John Cottingham}}</ref> each of which is ''[[a priori]]'' a [[self-evidence|self-evident]], clear and distinct idea, before it is connected with the other ideas within a logical demonstration.

[[David Hume|Hume]] has a more ambiguous interpretation of intuition. Hume claims intuition is a recognition of relationships (relation of time, place, and causation). He states that "the resemblance" (recognition of relations) "will strike the eye" (which would not require further examination) but goes on to state, "or rather in mind"—attributing intuition to power of mind, contradicting the theory of [[empiricism]].<ref>{{multiref2
|1= {{cite book|last1=Hume|first1=David|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3RIusIRd2q8C|title=A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects|date=May 2009|publisher=The Floating Press|isbn=9781775410676|page=105|access-date=23 December 2014}}
|2={{cite book|last1=A. Johnson|first1=Oliver|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fMjhcXhrv48C&q=intuition&pg=PA121|title=The Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature|publisher=The Floating Press|year=1995|isbn=0-252-02156-8|page=123|access-date=23 December 2014}} }}</ref>