Editing Lockheed U-2 (section)

==Operational history==

===United States===
[[File:USS America (CV-66) with a U-2.jpg|thumb|U-2 testing aboard {{USS|America|CV-66}} (1984)]]

====Pilot selection and training====
Though the USAF and the Navy would eventually fly the U-2, the CIA had majority control over the project, code-named Project DRAGON LADY.<!-- NOTE: DRAGON LADY is all-caps here, in CIA codeword context; elsewhere, it is used as the name of the aircraft, which is written about in mixed case in sources. (AlanM1) -->{{sfn|Pocock|2005|p=404}} Despite SAC chief LeMay's early dismissal of the CL-282, the USAF in 1955 sought to take over the project and put it under SAC until Eisenhower repeated his opposition to military personnel flying the aircraft. Nonetheless, the USAF substantially participated in the project; Bissell described it as a "49 percent" partner. The USAF agreed to select and train pilots and plot missions, while the CIA would handle cameras and project security, process film, and arrange foreign bases.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=60–61}}

Beyond not using American military personnel to fly the U-2, Eisenhower preferred to use non-U.S. citizens. Seven Greek pilots and a Polish expatriate were added to the U-2 trainees although only two of the Greek pilots were subsequently allowed to fly the aircraft. Their flight proficiency was poor. The language barrier and a lack of appropriate flying experience proved problematic; by late 1955, foreign pilots had been dropped from the program.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=73–74}}{{sfn|Brugioni|2010|p=106}} USAF pilots had to resign their military commissions before joining the agency as civilians, a process referred to as "sheep dipping",<ref name="I&T"/> and were always called "drivers", not pilots. The program only recruited fighter pilots with reserve USAF commissions, as regular commissions complicated the resignation process. The program offered high salaries and the USAF promised that pilots could return at the same rank as their peers. The CIA's standards for selection were higher than the USAF's once the latter began its own U-2 flights; although more candidates were rejected, the CIA's program had a much lower accident rate. Test pilot [[Tony LeVier]] trained other Lockheed pilots to fly the U-2. By September 1955 he had trained six USAF pilots, who in turn trained other "sheep-dipped" pilots. As no two-seat trainer model was available for the program's first 15 years, training was done before the trainee's first solo flight and via radio. Pilots had to adjust to the U-2's unusual combination of jet engines and enormous, high-lift glider wings; because of the "coffin corner" they learned of the need to pay complete attention to flying when not using the autopilot.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=59,74–76}}

====Test flights====
[[File:Lockheed U-2 aircrew.jpg|thumb|Pilot in U-2 spacesuit (2010)]]
After AQUATONE was funded and security handled by the CIA, the agency referred to all its high altitude aircraft as "articles". This was intended to reduce the chances of a security breach as part of a compartmented security system. These three-digit "article" numbers were factory assigned. Article 341 was the original U-2 prototype, and it never received a USAF serial.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|p=59}} The first flight took place at Groom Lake on 1 August 1955, during what was intended to be only a high-speed taxi test. The sailplane-like wings were so efficient that the aircraft jumped into the air at {{convert|70|kn|mph km/h|sigfig=2|sp=us}},<ref name="I&T">Huntington, Tom. "U-2." ''Invention & Technology Magazine'', Vol. 22, No. 3.</ref> amazing LeVier who, as he later said, "had no intentions whatsoever of flying". The lake bed had no markings, making it difficult for LeVier to judge the distance to the ground, and the brakes proved too weak; he bounced the U-2 once before it stopped rolling, but the aircraft suffered only minor damage. LeVier again found landing the U-2 difficult during the first intentional test flight three days later. On his sixth try, he found that landing the aircraft by touching down on the rear wheel first was better than making the initial touchdown with the front wheel. Pilots continued to have difficulty during landing because the ground effect held the aircraft off the runway for long distances. On a test flight on 8 August, the U-2 reached {{convert|32000|ft|m|-2}}, proving that Johnson had met his promised specifications and deadline. By 16 August, the prototype flew at {{convert|52000|ft|m|-2}}, an altitude never before reached in sustained flight; by 8 September, it reached {{convert|65000|ft|m|-2}}.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=68–71}}

By January 1956, the U-2 had so impressed the USAF that it decided to obtain its own aircraft. The USAF purchased a total of 31 U-2s through the CIA; the transaction's code name, Project DRAGON LADY,<!-- NOTE: DRAGON LADY is all-caps here, in CIA codeword context; elsewhere, it is used as the name of the aircraft, which is written about in mixed case in sources. (AlanM1) --> was the origin of the aircraft's nickname. Meanwhile, U-2s conducted eight overflights of the U.S. in April 1956, convincing project overseers that the aircraft was ready for deployment. As often happens with new aircraft designs, there were several operational accidents. One occurred during these test flights when a U-2 suffered a [[flameout]] over Tennessee{{Dubious|Test flights|date=February 2023}}; the pilot calculated that he could reach New Mexico. Every air base in the continental U.S. had sealed orders to carry out if a U-2 landed. The commander of [[Kirtland Air Force Base]] near [[Albuquerque, New Mexico]], was told to open his orders, prepare for the arrival of an unusual aircraft making a [[deadstick landing]], and get it inside a hangar as soon as possible. The U-2 successfully landed after gliding for more than {{convert|300|mi|km}}, and its strange, glider-like appearance and the space-suited pilot startled the base commander and other witnesses.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=76–79}}

[[File:Christopher_Michel_in_a_U-2_Dragon_Lady.jpg|thumb|A pilot in a U-2 cockpit in 2010 at 70,000 ft wearing a pressure suit similar to that used in the [[Lockheed SR-71]].]]
Not all U-2 incidents were so benign, with three fatal accidents in 1956 alone. The first was on 15 May 1956, when the pilot stalled the aircraft during a post-takeoff maneuver that was intended to drop off the wingtip outrigger wheels. The second occurred on 31 August, when the pilot stalled the aircraft immediately after takeoff. On 17 September, a third aircraft disintegrated during ascent in Germany, also killing the pilot.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=79–80}} There were other non-fatal incidents, including at least one that resulted in the loss of the aircraft.

====Cover story====
A committee of Army, Navy, USAF, CIA, [[National Security Agency|NSA]], and [[United States State Department|State Department]] representatives created lists of priority targets for U-2 and other intelligence-gathering methods. The U-2 project received the list and drew up flight plans, and the committee provided a detailed rationale for each plan for the president to consider as he decided whether to approve it. The CIA's Photo Intelligence Division grew in size to prepare for the expected flood of U-2 photographs. Before the aircraft became operational, however, USAF's [[Project Genetrix]], which used high-altitude balloons to photograph the Soviet Union, China, and eastern Europe, led to many [[diplomatic protest]]s from those countries and for a while, CIA officials feared that the U-2 project was at risk. While Genetrix was also a technical failure—only 34 of the 516 balloons returned usable photographs—the balloon flights gave the United States many clues on how the Communist countries used radar to track overflights, which benefited the U-2 program.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=80–88}}

With approval from the [[National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics]] (NACA)'s director [[Hugh Dryden]], Bissell's team at the CIA developed a cover story for the U-2 that described the aircraft as used by NACA for high-altitude weather research; the cover story would be used if the aircraft were lost over hostile territory. U-2s flew some real weather-related missions, taking photographs that appeared in the press,{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=89–90,156–157,216}}{{r|afmag-richelson}} and sometimes had civilian government decals,<ref name="michael20120902">{{Cite web |last=Michael |first=Tal |date=2012-09-02 |title=The Israeli Air Force : Mysterious Spyplane Revealed |url=https://www.iaf.org.il/4385-39415-en/IAF.aspx |access-date=2020-06-06 |website=Israeli Air Force}}</ref> but few believed in the cover story; in May 1957 the UK's ''[[Daily Express]]'' newspaper reported the U-2 operating east of the [[Iron Curtain]].{{r|afmag-richelson}}

The civilian advisers Land and Killian disagreed with the cover story, advising that in case of an aircraft loss, the United States forthrightly acknowledge its use of U-2 overflights "to guard against surprise attack". Their advice was not followed, and the weather cover story led to the disaster that followed the May 1960 U-2 loss.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=89–90,156–157,216}}

====Initial overflights of Communist territory====
The British government in January 1956 approved the U-2's deployment from [[RAF Lakenheath]]. NACA announced that the USAF [[Air Weather Service]] would use a Lockheed-developed aircraft to study the weather and cosmic rays at altitudes up to 55,000&nbsp;feet; accordingly, the first CIA detachment of U-2s ("Detachment A") was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The death in April 1956, however, of British agent [[Lionel Crabb]] while examining Soviet ships in [[Portsmouth]] harbor embarrassed the British government, which asked the United States to postpone the Lakenheath flights. To avoid delays, in June 1956, Detachment A moved to [[Wiesbaden]], Germany, without approval from the [[West Germany|German government]], while [[Giebelstadt Army Airfield]] was prepared as a more permanent base.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=93–95}}

Eisenhower remained concerned that despite their great intelligence value, overflights of the Soviet Union might cause a war. While the U-2 was under development, at the [[Geneva Summit (1955)|1955 Geneva Summit]] he proposed to [[Nikita Khrushchev]] that the Soviet Union and the United States would each grant the other country airfields to use to photograph military installations. Khrushchev rejected the "Open Skies" proposal.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Eisenhower |title=Mandate for Change, 1953–56. |date=1963 |publisher=Heinemann |isbn=978-0434225804 |page=521}}</ref>

The CIA told the president that the Soviets could not track high-altitude U-2 flights; this belief was based on studies using old Soviet radar systems and American systems that were not as effective at high altitudes as current Soviet systems, of which the U.S. was not aware. Knutson later said that "the U-2 was really quite invisible to American radar, but Russian radar were a little different—better, you might say". Although the Office of Scientific Intelligence issued a more cautious report in May 1956 that stated that detection was possible, it believed that the Soviets could not consistently track the aircraft. Dulles further told Eisenhower, according to presidential aide [[Andrew Goodpaster]], that in any aircraft loss the pilot would almost certainly not survive. With such assurances and the growing demand for accurate intelligence regarding the alleged "[[bomber gap]]" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in June 1956 Eisenhower approved 10 days of overflights.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=96–100}}{{r|cnncoldwarknutson}}

The first U-2 overflight had already occurred, using the existing authorization of air force overflights over Eastern Europe. On 20 June 1956, a U-2 flew over Poland and East Germany, with more flights on 2 July. When Eisenhower refused to approve the U-2's flight over Soviet airspace, the CIA turned to a foreign power, [[MI6]], the British Secret Intelligence Service, to request authorization from [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom]] [[Harold Macmillan]], who approved the flights.<ref>Stephen Dorril, "MI6, Inside The Secret World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service" (New York: Free Press, 2000), pp. 659–660</ref> The fact that radar had—contrary to the CIA's expectations—successfully tracked the aircraft worried Eisenhower, but he approved the first Soviet overflight, Mission 2013 on 4 July. U-2 Article 347's main targets were the Soviet submarine construction program in [[Leningrad]], and counting the numbers of the new [[Myasishchev M-4]] "Bison" bomber.

Soviet radar monitored the U-2 incursion into Soviet airspace in real-time, with radar tracking starting from the time the aircraft crossed into East German airspace. Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] was informed immediately.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}. While contemplating appropriate retaliatory steps, he ordered Soviet Ambassador to Washington, [[Georgy Zarubin]], to protest vehemently to the U.S. State Department that very day, explaining that the recent trust-building to ease tensions between the two countries was undermined by the overflight provocations.<ref>Monte Reel, "A Brotherhood of Spies: The U2 and the CIA's Secret War," (New York: Anchor Books, 2019), pp. 118–122</ref>

A second flight on 5 July continued searching for Bisons, took photographs of Moscow (the only ones taken by the program), and flew over cloud-covered<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gruntman |first1=Mike |title=Intercept 1961: the birth of Soviet missile defense |year=2015 |location=Figs 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 |isbn=978-1624103490 |pages=73–78 |edition=First}}</ref> rocket factories at Kaliningrad and Khimki. Eisenhower knew from the earlier overflights that his hope of no Soviet detection was unrealistic, but ordered that the overflights stop if the aircraft could be tracked. The CIA found that the Soviets could not consistently track the U-2s and therefore did not know that Moscow and Leningrad had been overflown. The aircraft's photographs showed tiny images of MiG-15s and MiG-17s attempting and failing to intercept the aircraft, proving that the Soviets could not shoot down an operational U-2.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=100–108}} Knutson recalled that the "constant stream of Russian fighters" trying to shoot down the U-2 during overflights was sometimes "so thick" that they interfered with photographs. Repeatedly failing for years to stop the aircraft embarrassed the USSR, which made diplomatic protests against the flights but did not publicize the penetration of Soviet territory.{{r|cnncoldwarknutson}}

U-2 missions from Wiesbaden would depart westward in order to gain altitude over friendly territory before turning eastward at operational altitudes. The NATO Air Defence mission in that area included [[No. 1 Air Division RCAF (Europe)]], which operated the [[Canadair Sabre]] Mark 6 from bases in northeastern France. This aircraft had a service ceiling of 54,000&nbsp;feet and numerous encounters between the U-2 and RCAF 'ZULU' alert flights have been recorded for posterity.<ref>Gummeson, Ray. [https://web.archive.org/web/20090929093601/http://www.pinetreeline.org/metz/other/otherm9d-1.html "RCAF F-86 and U-2 Encounters."] (archived) ''Pinetree Line Website'', March 2004. Retrieved: 25 October 2012.</ref>

===="Bomber gap" disproven====
{{main|Bomber gap}}

On 10 July, the Soviets protested what they described as overflights by a USAF "twin-engine medium bomber", apparently believing that it was a [[Martin B-57 Canberra|B-57 Canberra]]. The U.S. replied on 19 July that no American "military planes" had overflown the Soviet Union, but the fact that the Soviets' report showed that they could track the U-2s for extended periods caused Eisenhower to immediately halt overflights over eastern Europe. Beyond the Soviet protests, the president was concerned about the American public's reaction to the news that the U.S. had violated international law. To avoid project cancellation, the CIA began [[Project Rainbow]] to make the U-2 less detectable. The eight overflights over communist territory, however, had already shown that the bomber gap did not exist; the U-2s had not found any [[Myasishchev M-4]] Bison bombers at the nine bases they had visited. Because the Eisenhower administration could not disclose the source of its intelligence, however, Congressional and public debate over the bomber gap continued.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=100–112}}

====Suez Crisis and aftermath====
The presidential order did not restrict U-2 flights outside eastern Europe. In May 1956, Turkey approved the deployment of Detachment B at [[Incirlik Air Base]], near [[Adana, Turkey]]. Before the new detachment was ready, however, Detachment A in late August used Adana as a refueling base to photograph the Mediterranean. The aircraft found evidence of many British troops on [[Malta]] and [[Cyprus]] as the United Kingdom prepared for its forthcoming [[Suez Crisis|intervention in Suez]]. The U.S. released some of the photographs to the British government. As the crisis grew in seriousness, the project converted from a source of strategic reconnaissance, which prioritized high quality over speed (the film was processed by its maker, then analyzed in Washington), to a tactical reconnaissance unit that provided immediate analysis. The Photo Intelligence Division set up a lab at Wiesbaden; as Detachment B took over from A and flew over targets that remain classified {{as of|2013|07|lc=y}}, the Wiesbaden lab's rapid reports helped the U.S. government to predict the Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt three days before it began on 29 October. On 1 November a flight flew over the Egyptian air base at Almaza twice, 10 minutes apart; in between the British and French attacked the base, and the visible results of the attack in the "10-minute reconnaissance" impressed Eisenhower. Beginning on 5 November, flights over Syria showed that the Soviets had not sent aircraft there despite their threats against the British, French and Israelis, a cause of worry for the U.S.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=113–120}}

In the four years following the Suez Crisis, repeated U-2 missions over the Middle East were launched, particularly in times of tension. The end of the [[1958 Lebanon crisis]] saw a decline in U-2 operations, although Detachment B U-2s operating from Turkey still sometimes overflew the Middle East along with occasional missions over Albania to check for Soviet missile activity. Israel was a major target of U-2 missions during this period, with U-2 missions detecting the construction of the [[Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center|Negev Nuclear Research Center]] in 1958, first bringing [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|Israel's nuclear program]] to the attention of the US. The overflights drew the attention of the [[Israeli Air Force]]. Its radars detected and tracked the overflights, and on numerous occasions, Israeli fighter aircraft were scrambled to intercept them but were unable to reach their altitude. The Israeli government was baffled by the overflights. However, Israeli fighter pilots were twice able to spot the intruding aircraft. On 11 March 1959, two Israeli [[Dassault Super Mystère|Super Mystère]] fighters were directed to intercept a U-2 detected over Israel by Israeli ground-based radar. Although the aircraft were unable to make an intercept, the formation leader, Major [[Yosef Alon]], managed to get a good look at the aircraft. He subsequently identified it out of a book as a U-2, registered as a weather reconnaissance aircraft to the US Weather Service. On 22 July 1959, after an overflight was detected, an Israeli Air Force [[Sud Aviation Vautour|Vautour]] jet was deployed to photograph the mysterious aircraft. The Vautour came within visual range and the U-2 was successfully photographed. In spite of this, it was not until the 1960 shootdown of a U-2 over the Soviet Union and its subsequent public exposure as a spy plane that the Israeli government understood the identity of the mystery aircraft.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-u-2-planes-flew-over-israel-in-1950s-1.5293435|title=U.S. Espionage Planes Violated Israeli Airspace in the 1950s, IAF Archives Reveal|date=2012-08-30|work=Haaretz|access-date=2019-12-18|language=en|archive-date=18 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191218155122/https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-u-2-planes-flew-over-israel-in-1950s-1.5293435|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780679415633|url-access=registration|quote=Ehud Yonay.|title=No Margin for Error: The Making of the Israeli Air Force|last=Yonay|first=Ehud|date=1993|publisher=Pantheon Books|isbn=978-0-679-41563-3|language=en}}</ref>{{r|michael20120902}}

====Renewal of Eastern Bloc overflights====
Eisenhower refused CIA pleas in September 1956 to reauthorize overflights of Eastern Europe but the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|Hungarian Revolution]] in November, and [[1956 United States presidential election|his reelection that month]], caused the president to permit flights over border areas. Soviet interceptors could still not reach the U-2s but, after the Soviets protested a December overflight of Vladivostok by RB-57Ds, Eisenhower again forbade communist overflights. Flights close to the border continued, now including the first [[ELINT]]-equipped U-2s. In May 1957, Eisenhower again authorized overflights over certain important Soviet missile and atomic facilities. He continued to personally authorize each flight, closely examining maps and sometimes making changes to the flight plan.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=122–124, 126–128}} By 1957, one of the European units was based at Giebelstadt, and the far eastern unit was based at the [[Naval Air Facility Atsugi]], Japan.<ref name="CIA0000743239">[http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000743239.pdf "Future Plans for Project AQUATONE/OILSTONE."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140201191253/http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000743239.pdf |date=1 February 2014 }} ''Central Intelligence Agency'', 29 July 1957, p. 2. Retrieved: 12 June 2010.</ref>

Part of the reason for the May reauthorization was that the CIA promised that improvements from Project RAINBOW would make the majority of U-2 flights undetected. On 2 April 1957, a RAINBOW test flight crashed in Nevada, killing the pilot. The U-2's large wingspan slowed its descent during crashes, often leaving its remains salvageable; Lockheed was able to rebuild the wreckage from the incident into a flyable airframe, but that it could do so should have been evidence to the CIA that its cover story might not be viable after a crash in hostile territory. The RAINBOW anti-radar modifications were not very successful, and their use ended in 1958.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=128–133}}

Soviet overflights resumed in June 1957 from [[Eielson Air Force Base]] in Alaska to the [[Russian Far East]], which had less effective radar systems. Others originated from [[Lahore, Pakistan]]. A Lahore flight on 5 August provided the first photographs<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gruntman |first1=Mike |title=From Tyuratam Missile Range to Baikonur Cosmodrome |journal=Acta Astronautica |date=1 February 2019 |volume=155 |pages=350–366 |doi=10.1016/j.actaastro.2018.12.021 |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S009457651831751X |location=Fig.7 |bibcode=2019AcAau.155..350G |s2cid=116406451 |language=en |issn=0094-5765 |access-date=22 February 2020 |archive-date=18 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211018220959/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S009457651831751X |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> of the [[Baikonur Cosmodrome]] near [[Tyuratam]]: the CIA had been unaware of its existence until then. Other flights examined the [[Semipalatinsk]] nuclear test site and the [[Saryshagan]] missile test site.{{sfn|Heppenheimer|1998|p=193}}{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=135–139}} After a few more overflights that year, only five more took place before the May 1960 incident because of Eisenhower's increasing caution. The president sought to avoid angering the Soviets as he worked to achieve a [[Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty|nuclear test ban]]; meanwhile, the Soviets began trying to shoot down U-2 flights that never entered Soviet airspace, and the details in their diplomatic protests showed that Soviet radar operators were able to effectively track the aircraft. To reduce visibility Lockheed [[military camouflage|painted the aircraft in a blue-black color]] that helped them blend in against the darkness of space, and the CIA aircraft received the more powerful [[Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13]] engine that increased maximum altitude by {{convert|2500|ft|m|-2}}, to {{convert|74600|ft|m|-2}}.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=143–144, 147–152}} In April 1958, CIA source [[Pyotr Semyonovich Popov]] told his handler [[George Kisevalter]] that a senior KGB official had boasted of having "full technical details" of the U-2, leading Bissell to conclude the project had a leak. The source of the leak was never identified, although there was speculation that it was [[Lee Harvey Oswald]], then a radar operator at a U-2 base in Japan.<ref>{{cite book|last=West|first=Nigel|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0eAHTaMMP6QC&pg=PA350|title=Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence|year=2007|publisher=[[Scarecrow Press]]|isbn=978-0-8108-6463-4|page=350}}</ref>

The Soviets developed their own overflight aircraft, variants of the [[Yakovlev Yak-25|Yak-25]], which in addition to photographing various parts of the world through the early 1960s acted as a target for the new [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19|MiG-19]] and [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]] interceptors to practice for the U-2.

====The "missile gap"====
{{main|Missile gap}}

The successful launch of [[Sputnik 1]] on 4 October 1957 gave credence to Soviet claims about the progress of its [[intercontinental ballistic missile]] program, and began the [[Sputnik crisis]] in the United States. The U-2 intelligence caused Eisenhower to state in a press conference on 9 October that the launch did "not raise my apprehensions, not one iota", but he refused to disclose the U-2's existence as he believed that the Soviets would demand the end of the flights.<ref name="smith2012">Smith 2012, pp. 731–732, 734.</ref> In December 1958 [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] boasted that a Soviet missile could deliver a 5-megaton warhead {{convert|8000|mi|km}}. Although the Soviets' [[SS-6 Sapwood]] missile program was actually stalled by technical failures, subsequent boasts—and U.S. secretary of defense [[Neil McElroy]]'s statement in February 1959 to Congress that the Soviets might have a three-to-one temporary advantage in ICBMs during the early 1960s—caused widespread concern in the U.S. about the existence of a "missile gap". The American intelligence community was divided, with the CIA suspecting technical delays but the USAF believing that the SS-6 was ready for deployment. Khrushchev continued to exaggerate the Soviet program's success; the missile gap concerns, and CIA and State Department support, caused Eisenhower to reauthorize one Communist territory overflight in July 1959 after 16 months, as well as many [[ELINT]] flights along the Soviet border. British U-2 overflights were made in December and February 1960. The first one targeted a large segment of the railways in the Tyuratam test range area as ballistic missiles were expected to be deployed close to rail lines, as well as nuclear complexes and missile test sites. No sites were found.{{sfn|Brugioni|2010|p=342}} Neither flight proved or disproved the existence of a "missile gap". The British flights' success contributed to Eisenhower's authorization of one overflight in April.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=159–168}}

By 1960 U-2 pilots were aware, Knutson recalled, that Soviet [[surface-to-air missile]]s (SAMs) had improved and that overflights had become much riskier, but did not worry because "dumb fighter pilots always think it's the other guy that's going to get hit".{{r|cnncoldwarknutson}} By this time the CIA had also concluded internally that Soviet SAMs had "a high probability of successful intercept at {{convert|70000|ft|m|-2}} providing that detection is made in sufficient time to alert the site". Despite the much-increased risk, the CIA did not stop the overflights as they were overconfident following the years of successful missions, and because of the strong demand for more missile-site photographs, the U-2 was the major source of covert intelligence on the Soviet Union and had photographed about 15% of the country, producing almost 5,500 intelligence reports. The April flight was indeed tracked quickly, and Khrushchev said in his memoir that it should have been shot down by new SAMs, but the missile crews were slow to react.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=157, 169–172, 316}}<ref name="cia1960summit">{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/8summit.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070613122103/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/8summit.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=13 June 2007|title=The Summit Conference of 1960: An Intelligence Officer's View – Central Intelligence Agency}}</ref>

====May 1960: U-2 shot down====
{{main|1960 U-2 incident}}
[[File:OperationGrandSlam1960.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|left|U-2 "GRAND SLAM" flight plan on 1 May 1960, from CIA publication 'The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 And Oxcart Programs, 1954–1974', declassified 25 June 2013.]]

Eisenhower authorized one more overflight, which was to be made no later than 1 May because the important Paris Summit of the [[Big Four Conference]] would begin on 16 May.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=157, 169–172, 316}}{{r|cia1960summit}} The CIA chose for the mission—the 24th deep-penetration Soviet overflight—Operation GRAND SLAM, an ambitious flight plan for the first crossing of the Soviet Union from [[Peshawar, Pakistan]] to [[Bodø]], [[Norway]]; previous flights had always exited in the direction from which they had entered. The route would permit visits to [[Baikonur Cosmodrome|Tyuratam]], [[Yekaterinberg|Sverdlovsk]], [[Kirov, Kirov Oblast|Kirov]], [[Kotlas]], [[Severodvinsk]], and [[Murmansk]]. It was expected, given good weather, to resolve missile, nuclear and nuclear submarine intelligence issues with one flight.{{sfn|Brugioni|2010|p=345}} [[Francis Gary Powers]], the most experienced pilot with 27 missions, was chosen for the flight. After delays, the flight began on [[International Workers' Day|May Day]], 1 May. This was a mistake because, as an important Soviet holiday, there was much less air traffic than usual. The Soviets began tracking the U-2 15&nbsp;miles outside the border, and over Sverdlovsk, four and a half hours into the flight, one of three [[S-75 Dvina|SA-2]] missiles detonated behind the aircraft at 70,500&nbsp;feet, near enough to cause it to crash; another hit a Soviet interceptor attempting to reach the American aircraft. Powers survived the near miss and was quickly captured; the crash did not destroy the U-2 and the Soviets were able to identify much of the equipment.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=170–177}}

[[File:KellyJohnsonandGaryPowers.jpg|thumb|right|Kelly Johnson and Gary Powers in front of a U-2]]
Bissell and other project officials believed that surviving a U-2 accident from above 70,000&nbsp;feet was impossible, so they used the pre-existing cover story. On 3 May, the [[National Aeronautics and Space Administration]] (NASA, the successor to NACA) announced that one of its aircraft, making a high-altitude research flight in Turkey, was missing; the government planned to say, if necessary, that the NASA aircraft had drifted with an incapacitated pilot across the Soviet border. By remaining silent, Khrushchev lured the Americans into reinforcing the cover story until he revealed on 7 May that Powers was alive and had confessed to spying on the Soviet Union. Eisenhower turned down Dulles' offer to resign and publicly took full responsibility for the incident on 11 May; by then all overflights had been canceled. The Paris Summit collapsed after Khrushchev, as the first speaker, demanded an apology from the U.S., which Eisenhower refused.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=177–181}}

U-2 pilots were told, Knutson later said, if captured "to tell them everything that they knew", because they were told little about their missions other than targets on maps.{{r|cnncoldwarknutson}} Otherwise, Powers had little instruction on what to do during an interrogation. Although he had been told that he could reveal everything about the aircraft since the Soviets could learn what they wanted from it, Powers did his best to conceal classified information while appearing to cooperate. His trial began on 17 August 1960. Powers—who apologized on the advice of his Soviet defense counsel—was sentenced to three years in prison, but on 10 February 1962 the USSR exchanged him and American student [[Frederic Pryor]] for [[Rudolf Abel]] at [[Glienicke Bridge]] between West Berlin and Potsdam, Germany. Two CIA investigations found that Powers had done well during the interrogation and had "complied with his obligations as an American citizen during this period". Although the government was reluctant to reinstate him to the USAF because of its statements that the U-2 program was civilian, it had promised to do so after CIA employment ended; Powers resolved the dilemma by choosing to work for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=181–186}}

The debris of Powers's aircraft was used to design a copy under the name [[Beriev S-13]]. That was then discarded in favor of the [[MiG-25]]R and reconnaissance satellites.<ref>Yefim Gordon, Sergey & Dmitri Komissarov: U.S. Aircraft in the Soviet Union and Russia. Midland Publishing, 2009, {{ISBN|978-1-85780-308-2}}, p. 245.</ref><ref>Yefim Gordon: Soviet X-Planes. Midland Publishing, 2000, {{ISBN|978-1-85780-099-9}}.</ref>

The search for operational ballistic missile sites continued focusing on the Soviet railway system using [[Corona (satellite)|Corona]] satellite images, with a resolution of twenty to thirty feet compared to two to three feet from U-2 cameras.{{sfn|Brugioni|2010|p=378}}

====Restructuring====
The U-2 shootdown in 1960 paralyzed the U.S. reconnaissance community and forced changes in policy, procedures, and security protocol. The United States also had to move swiftly to protect its allies: for example after the Soviets announced that Powers was alive, the CIA evacuated the British pilots from Detachment B as Turkey did not know of their presence in the country.<ref name="lashmar19970126">Lashmar, Paul. [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/revealed-the-rafs-secret-cold-war-heroes-1285189.html "Revealed: the RAF's secret Cold War heroes."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180206190256/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/revealed-the-rafs-secret-cold-war-heroes-1285189.html |date=6 February 2018 }} ''The Independent'', 26 January 1997. Retrieved: 17 August 2013.</ref> The end of Soviet overflights meant that Detachment B itself soon left Turkey, and in July Detachment C left Japan following a Japanese governmental request. Both detachments merged into Detachment G, under the command of Lt. Col. William Gregory, at [[Edwards Air Force Base]], California where the CIA had relocated the U-2 program after nuclear testing forced it to abandon Groom Lake in 1957.{{citation needed|date=April 2020}}

The CIA sought to determine if the U-2 could, from a fixed base at North Edwards, rapidly deploy to an advanced American base and complete reconnaissance flights on a largely self-sustaining basis. A proving exercise was arranged with Gregory and the new Detachment G unit to simulate deploying a U-2 unit overseas, taking two or three aircraft, and conducting three reconnaissance missions with no resupply. The exercise was critical to continued CIA operation of the U-2, since basing the aircraft in a foreign country was no longer an option. The exercise was completed with excellent results, and actual reconnaissance missions began to be scheduled immediately.<ref>Robert Richardson, Spying from the Sky, 2020, pp. 186–187.</ref>

On 4 January 1961, the CIA U-2 reconnaissance effort, which was formerly known as CHALICE, was redesignated IDEALIST.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070037-9.pdf|title=Redesignation of CIA Project for U-2 for Reconnaissance Purposes Aircraft PROJECT IDEALIST, January 4, 1961, CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070037-9, Central Intelligence Agency.|access-date=26 July 2022|archive-date=23 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170123141949/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600070037-9.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> This program codeword by the end of the decade was being used to describe the U.S. reconnaissance along the Chinese coastline, while Taiwanese missions into the Chinese country would be known as the IDEALIST program<ref name="cia1969"/>

By the next U-2 flight, in October 1960 over Cuba, the previously informal procedure in which the president personally approved or disapproved each flight after discussion with advisors was replaced by the [[National Security Council (United States)|National Security Council]] Special Group. The expansion of [[satellite intelligence]] partly compensated for the overflights' end but, because U-2 photographs remained superior to satellite imagery, future administrations considered resumption at times, such as during the [[Berlin Crisis of 1961]].{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=181–182, 187–188, 195–197}}

====Cuba====
[[File:U2 Cockpit 2.jpg|thumb|External view from cockpit of U-2 near maximum service ceiling (2017)]]

=====Bay of Pigs Invasion=====
As many as 15 U-2 [[sorties]] provided support for the April 1961 [[Bay of Pigs Invasion]] of Cuba by the United States. Scientists such as [[Edwin H. Land]] and [[James Rhyne Killian]], who had originally conceived the U-2 and had advocated for its development and deployment as a tool of scientific reconnaissance, felt betrayed by the use of the U-2 for "dirty tricks" covert operations, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion. Richard M. Bissel, the CIA official in charge of both the U-2 program and CIA covert operations, including the Bay of Pigs Invasion, had been a good friend of Land and Killian, but such use of the U-2s strained their friendship.<ref>Monte Reel, ''A Brotherhood of Spies: The U2 and the CIA's Secret War'', (New York: Anchor Books, 2019), p. 246 {{ISBN?}}</ref>

From October 1960, Detachment G made many overflights of Cuba from [[Laughlin Air Force Base]], Texas. Although Lockheed modified six CIA aircraft into the [[aerial refueling]]-capable U-2F model in 1961, permitting some Cuba missions to originate from Edwards, pilot fatigue limited flights to about 10 hours. An August 1962 flight showed Soviet SA-2 SAM sites on the island; later overflights found more sites and MiG-21 interceptors. The increasing number of SAMs caused the United States to more cautiously plan Cuban overflights. USAF U-2s did not conduct overflights, but officials believed that it would be better for a military officer to be the pilot in case he was shot down. Following one last Cuba overflight that originated from Edwards and ended at [[McCoy Air Force Base]], Florida, on 14 October 1962, all further U-2 operations over Cuba originated from a detachment operating location that was established at McCoy.<ref>[http://www.blackbirds.net/u2/u2-timeline/u2tl60.html "U-2 Timeline of Events, 1960s."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150829204851/http://www.blackbirds.net/u2/u2-timeline/u2tl60.html |date=29 August 2015 }} ''Blackbirds.net'', 7 August 1997. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref>

=====Cuban Missile Crisis=====
After receiving hasty training on the more powerful U-2F under the cognizance of the Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional (WRSP-4) at Edwards AFB, Major [[Richard S. Heyser]] flew over western Cuba on 14 October 1962 in a U-2F; his aircraft was the first to photograph Soviet [[medium-range ballistic missile]]s (MRBM) in [[San Cristóbal, Cuba|San Cristóbal]] before returning to [[McCoy AFB]], Florida. Prior to the launch of all Cuban sorties, the two U-2F aircraft possessed by WSRP-4 and flown by 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing personnel had USAF insignia and tail numbers.<ref>History of the 4080th Strategic Wing (SAC) Special Operations 10–31 October 1962, pp. 1-5, declassified 24 Nov 1982/Restriction Removed by SAFEPAPER No. 61, Air Force Historical Research Agency archives, Maxwell AFB, AL</ref>

SAC received permission to fly as many Cuban overflights as necessary for the duration of the resulting [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. On a 27 October sortie from McCoy AFB, one of the U-2Fs was shot down over Cuba by an [[SA-2 Guideline]] surface-to-air missile, killing the pilot, Major [[Rudolf Anderson]]; he posthumously received the first [[Air Force Cross (United States)|Air Force Cross]].{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=197–210}}<ref name="afmag-anderson">Correll, John T. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20101212234749/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2005/August%202005/0805u2.aspx "Airpower and the Cuban Missile Crisis."]}} ''Air Force Magazine'', August 2005. Retrieved: 27 June 2009.</ref>

Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] was dismayed, warning President [[John F. Kennedy]] in a private message that U-2 overflights could inadvertently cause [[WWIII]]: "Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step?"<ref>Monte Reel, ''A Brotherhood of Spies: The U2 and the CIA's Secret War'', (New York: Anchor Books, 2019), p. 286 {{ISBN?}}</ref>

Fulfilling CIA officials' fears of a USAF takeover, CIA pilots never again flew over Cuba; SAC retained control over Cuban overflights,{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=197–210}}<ref name="afmag-anderson"/> which continued until the 1970s under the code name ''OLYMPIC FIRE''.<ref name="NRO_NRP1972"/>

At the same time as the Cuban crisis, [[Royal Air Force]] (RAF) [[English Electric Lightning]]s of the [[Air Fighting Development Unit|Air Fighting Development Squadron]] made several practice interceptions against U-2s; guided by ground controllers and using energy climb profiles, the Lightning could intercept the U-2 at up to 65,000&nbsp;ft.<ref>Black, I. "Chasing the Dragon Lady". ''Classic Aircraft'' Vol. 45, No. 8</ref>

=====Hickman incident=====
On 28 July 1966, a U-2 piloted by USAF Captain Robert Hickman departed from [[Barksdale Air Force Base]] to conduct a reconnaissance mission; Hickman's orders included the requirement that he not enter Cuban airspace. As determined later by USAF investigators, trouble with the aircraft's oxygen system caused Hickman to lose consciousness. U.S. Navy pilot John Newlin, flying an [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II|F-4B]] assigned to VF-74, was scrambled from [[Naval Air Station Key West]], ordered to intercept Hickman before he violated Cuban airspace, and, if necessary, shoot him down. Newlin could not reach the U-2 before flying closer than 12&nbsp;miles from the Cuban coastline and so had to turn back. Hickman probably was dead from oxygen deprivation before the intercept was attempted.{{sfn|Newlin|2016}} Hickman's U-2 flew across Cuba, ran out of fuel and crashed into a mountainside near Llanquera, Bolivia. The Bolivian military gave his remains an [[Guard of honour|honor guard]] at a nearby chapel. The US embassy to Bolivia sent a team to investigate the crash site.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=Desert Sun 30 July 1966 – California Digital Newspaper Collection|url=https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=DS19660730.2.4&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN--------1|access-date=2021-01-25|website=cdnc.ucr.edu|archive-date=5 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405200704/https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=DS19660730.2.4&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN--------1|url-status=live}}</ref>

From 1960 to 1965, U-2 flights originated or terminated on a nearly daily basis at [[Albrook Air Force Station|Albrook USAF base]]. In 1966, elements of the USAF's [[4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing]] flew U-2s from Albrook to perform atmospheric sampling as the French detonated a nuclear device in the South Pacific.{{citation needed|date=December 2019}}

====Asia====
CIA overflights of Asian targets began in spring 1958 when Detachment C moved from Japan to [[Naval Air Station Cubi Point]] in the Philippines to overfly Indonesia during an uprising against [[Sukarno]]'s "[[Guided Democracy in Indonesia|Guided Democracy]]" government. The CIA's [[Civil Air Transport]], aiding the rebels, so badly needed pilots that it borrowed two CIA U-2 pilots despite the high risk to the U-2 program if one were captured. The Indonesian government soon defeated the rebels, however, and the U-2s returned to Japan. That year, Detachment C also flew over the Chinese coast near [[Quemoy]] during the [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] to see if Communist Chinese forces were preparing to invade, and in 1959 aided CIA operations during the [[1959 Tibetan uprising|Tibetan uprising]]. The unit was collecting high-altitude air samples to look for evidence of Soviet nuclear tests when it was withdrawn from Asia after the May 1960 U-2 incident.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=211–220}}

On 24 September 1959, an unmarked U-2, Article 360, crash landed to {{ill|Fujisawa Airfield |jp|藤沢飛行場}} of Japan. Armed American security forces in plainclothes soon arrived and moved away locals at gunpoint, increasing public interest in the crash.<ref name="afmag-richelson">{{cite magazine|author=Jeffrey T. Richelson|url=http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2001/July%202001/0701crash.aspx|title=When Secrets Crash|magazine=Air Force Magazine|date=July 2001|access-date=1 November 2019|archive-date=2 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191102051828/http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2001/July%25202001/0701crash.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref> The unlawfulness of the {{ill|Black Jet Incident|jp|黒いジェット機事件}} was criticized in Japan's House of Representatives.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/033/0512/03312010512014c.html |language=ja |work=Japan's House of Representatives 033rd assembly minutes No.14 |title=Urgent inquiry concerning unidentified aircraft flying over Japanese territory |date=1 December 1959 |access-date=2 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180502140523/http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/033/0512/03312010512014c.html |archive-date=2 May 2018 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The same Article 360 was later shot down in the May 1960 U-2 incident. A month before the incident, another U-2 crash landed in rural Thailand. Locals helped the US remove the aircraft without publicity.<ref name="afmag-richelson"/>

Detachment G pilots began using the [[#China|unmarked Taiwanese "Detachment H" U-2]] for North Vietnam overflights in February 1962, but as tactical intelligence became more important, after the [[Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]] of August 1964 SAC took over all U-2 missions in Indochina. In late November 1962, Detachment G was deployed to [[Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base]], Thailand, to carry out overflights of the Chinese-Indian border area after Indian prime minister [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] requested military aid following the [[Sino-Indian War]] in October–November 1962. In 1963, India agreed to an American request for a permanent U-2 base for Soviet and Chinese targets, offering [[Charbatia Air Base|Charbatia]], although it was only briefly used and Takhli remained Department G's main Asian base.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=230–234}}<ref>Raj, Yashwant. [http://in.news.yahoo.com/india-used-us-spy-planes-map-chinese-incursion-183000364.html "India used US spy planes to map Chinese incursion in Sino-Indian war."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130820103028/http://in.news.yahoo.com/india-used-us-spy-planes-map-chinese-incursion-183000364.html |date=20 August 2013 }}''Hindustan Times'', 16 August 2013. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> After the Vietnamese ceasefire in January 1973 prohibited American military flights, CIA pilots again used the unmarked Detachment H U-2 over North Vietnam during 1973 and 1974.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=246–247}} Several U-2s were lost over China.{{sfn|Robarge|2012|p=32}}

In 1963, the CIA started project Whale Tale to develop carrier-based U-2Gs to overcome range limitations. During the development of the capability, CIA pilots took off and landed U-2Gs on the aircraft carrier {{USS|Ranger|CV-61|2}} and other ships. The U-2G was used only twice operationally. Both flights from ''Ranger'' occurred in May 1964 to observe France's development of an [[atomic bomb]] test range at [[Moruroa]] in [[French Polynesia]].<ref name="Carriers">Scott, Jeff. [http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0050.shtml "U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operations."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240820210749/https://aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0050.shtml |date=20 August 2024 }} ''aerospaceweb.org'', 28 October 2001. Retrieved: 8 March 2009.</ref><ref>Richelson 2006, pp. 212–213.</ref>

=====Vietnam War=====
In early 1964, SAC sent a detachment of U-2s from the 4080th to [[South Vietnam]] for high altitude reconnaissance missions over [[North Vietnam]]. On 5 April 1965, U-2s from the 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS) took photos of SAM-2 sites near [[Hanoi]] and [[Haiphong]] harbor. On 11 February 1966, the 4080th Wing was redesignated the [[100th Air Refueling Wing|100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing]] (100 SRW) and moved to [[Davis-Monthan AFB]], [[Arizona]]. The detachment at [[Bien Hoa AB]], South Vietnam, was redesignated the 349th SRS.{{sfn|Hobson|2001|p={{page needed|date=August 2013}}}}

The only loss of a U-2 during combat operations occurred on 9 October 1966, when Major Leo Stewart, flying with the 349th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, developed mechanical problems high over North Vietnam. The U-2 managed to return to South Vietnam where Stewart ejected safely. The U-2 crashed approximately {{convert|65|mi}} east-northeast of [[Saigon]] in [[Viet Cong]] (VC) territory. A [[United States Army Special Forces|Special Forces]] team was later sent to destroy the wreckage.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP68B00724R000100080052-6.pdf|title=Loss of 'Trojan Horse' SAC U-2 Aircraft 9 October 1966|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|date=10 October 1966|accessdate=27 June 2021|archive-date=27 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210627095026/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP68B00724R000100080052-6.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> One member stated that they retrieved classified radar jammers from the wreckage before they could be captured by the VC and possibly transferred to the USSR.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Reyes |first1=Josh |title=Vietnam veteran uses experiences to help others |url=https://www.dailypress.com/military/dp-nws-vietnam-yedinak-profile-20160214-story.html |website=Daily Press |date=14 February 2016 |access-date=6 March 2021 |archive-date=20 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210920205724/https://www.dailypress.com/military/dp-nws-vietnam-yedinak-profile-20160214-story.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In July 1970, the 349th SRS at Bien Hoa moved to Thailand and was redesignated the [[99th Reconnaissance Squadron|99th SRS]] in November 1972, remaining there until March 1976.{{sfn|Hobson|2001|p=269}}

====U-2 carrier operations====
At one time, in an effort to extend the U-2's operating range and to eliminate the need for foreign government approval for U-2 operations from USAF bases in foreign countries, it was suggested that the U-2 be operated from aircraft carriers. Three aircraft were converted for carrier operations by the installation of arrester hooks, and carrier-qualified naval aviators were recruited to fly them.

It turned out to be possible to take off and land a U-2 from a carrier. Testing in 1964 with the [[USS Ranger (CV-61)|USS ''Ranger'']] and in 1969 with the [[USS America (CV-66)|USS ''America'']] proved the concept. The only operational carrier use occurred in May 1964 when a U-2, operating from USS ''Ranger'', was used to spy on a French atomic test in the Pacific.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kristinhillartist.com/FishHawk_article.html |title=Operation Fish Hawk – Secret CIA mission – U-2 reconnaissance flight – 1964 French nuclear test on Mururoa Atoll |website=kristinhillartist.com |author=Kristin Hill |date=2014 |access-date=4 November 2019 |archive-date=20 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240820210636/http://www.kristinhillartist.com/FishHawk_article.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url = https://theaviationist.com/2015/06/28/u-2-carrier-operations-story/|title = Project Whale Tale: The story of how the U-2 became an embarked reconnaissance aircraft|date = 28 June 2015|access-date = 21 May 2017|archive-date = 20 July 2017|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170720085120/https://theaviationist.com/2015/06/28/u-2-carrier-operations-story/|url-status = live}}</ref> The [[Lockheed C-130]] was also tested for carrier use to support U-2 sea deployments.<ref name="carroll20220203">{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1frJ2V8LTEs |title=Here's How a Fighter Pilot Landed a Cargo Plane on a Carrier |date=2022-02-03 |last=Carroll |first=Ward |type=video |language=en-US |publisher=YouTube |access-date=12 July 2022 |archive-date=12 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220712082158/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1frJ2V8LTEs&feature=youtu.be |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 1969, the larger U-2Rs were flown from the carrier {{USS|America|CV-66|2}}. The U-2 carrier program is believed to have been halted after 1969.<ref>{{YouTube|I_3WeYXDKQ0|"Video of U-2R landing on the USS ''America'' in 1969."}}. Retrieved: 26 December 2009</ref>

====1970–2000====
[[File:Lockheed ER-2 809 in flight.jpg|thumb|One of NASA's ER-2s in flight over the California desert. (2001) A NASA ER-2 set the world altitude record for its weight class.]]

In August 1970, two U-2Rs were deployed by the [[National Reconnaissance Office]] (NRO) to cover the Israeli-Egypt conflict under the code name ''EVEN STEVEN''.<ref name="NRO_NRP1972">McLucas, John L. [http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/gambhex/index.html "The Gambit and Hexagon Programs."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120915093330/http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/gambhex/index.html |date=15 September 2012 }} ''National Reconnaissance Office,'' 18 December 1972. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref>

In June 1976, the U-2s of the 100 SRW were transferred to the [[9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing]] (9 SRW) at [[Beale Air Force Base]], California, and merged with [[Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird|SR-71]] aircraft operations there. When the [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) was disbanded in 1992, the wing was transferred to the new [[Air Combat Command]] (ACC) and redesignated the [[9th Reconnaissance Wing]] (9 RW).

In 1977, a U-2R was retrofitted with an upward-looking window so that it could be used for high altitude astronomical observations of the [[cosmic microwave background]] (CMB). This experiment was the first to measure definitively the motion of the galaxy relative to the CMB and established an upper limit on the rotation of the universe as a whole.<ref>Smoot, G.F., M.V. Gorenstein, and R.A. Muller. "Detection of Anisotropy in the Cosmic Blackbody Radiation."''Physical Review Letters'' 39, pp. 898–901.</ref>

In 1984, during a major [[NATO]] exercise, RAF Flight Lieutenant Mike Hale intercepted a U-2 at a height of {{convert|66000|ft|m|-2}}, where the aircraft had previously been considered safe from interception. Hale climbed to {{convert|88000|ft|m|-2}} in his [[English Electric Lightning|Lightning F3]].<ref>Ross, Charles. [http://xr724.co.uk/oct04sotm.html "Lightning vs Concorde."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180907032331/http://xr724.co.uk/oct04sotm.html |date=7 September 2018 }} ''xr724.org.uk'', Lightning Association, 14 November 2004. Retrieved: 13 October 2018.</ref>

In 1989, a U-2R of 9th Reconnaissance Wing (RW), Detachment 5, flying from [[Patrick Air Force Base]], Florida successfully photographed a space shuttle launch for [[NASA]] to assist in identifying the cause of tile loss during launch, which had been discovered in the initial post-''Challenger'' missions.

On 2 January 1993, an Iraqi [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25|MiG-25 Foxbat]] attempted to intercept a USAF U-2 taking part in UN operations over Iraq. The [[R-40 (missile)|R-40 (AA-6 Acrid)]] missile missed the U-2 and the MiG was 'chased off' by [[McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle|F-15 Eagles]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2006-09-25 |title=Gulf War Chronology: 1993 Operations after the war |url=http://www.sci.fi/~fta/1993-ops.htm |access-date=2023-02-23 |archive-date=25 September 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060925163624/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/1993-ops.htm |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Gellman |first1=Barton |last2=Devroy |first2=Ann |date=14 January 1993 |title=U.S. Delivers Limited Air Strike on Iraq  |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/01/14/us-delivers-limited-air-strike-on-iraq/1f0dad2d-dbf7-4452-84a6-24459c5e3923/ |access-date=22 February 2023}}</ref>

On 19 November 1998, a NASA ER-2 research aircraft set a world record for altitude of {{convert|20479|m|ft|sp=us|sigfig=4}} in horizontal flight in the {{convert|12000|to|16000|kg|lb|sp=us|abbr=on}} weight class.<ref name=sd1>[https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/11/981124064046.htm "NASA aircraft sets new world altitude record."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180323030724/https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/11/981124064046.htm |date=23 March 2018 }} ''Science Daily'', 24 October 1998. Retrieved: 8 March 2009.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://records.fai.org/general_aviation/aircraft.asp?id=2050 |title=List of records established by the 'Lockheed Martin ER-2': Database ID 5795 |access-date=12 September 2008 |url-status=bot: unknown |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090410053050/http://records.fai.org/general_aviation/aircraft.asp?id=2050 |archive-date=10 April 2009 }} ''General Aviation World Records'', ''Fédération Aéronautique Internationale'' (FAI), Lausanne, Switzerland. Retrieved: 30 June 2011.</ref>

====21st century====
The U-2 remains in front-line service more than 60 years after its first flight, with the current U-2 beginning service in 1980. This is due primarily to its ability to change surveillance objectives on short notice, something that surveillance satellites cannot do. In the mid-1990s, it was converted from the U-2R to the U-2S, receiving the [[General Electric F118|GE F118]] turbofan engine.<ref name="lockheedmartin.com">[http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2014/5-ways-u-2-goes-above-and-sees-beyond.html "Five ways the U-2 goes above and sees beyond."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240820210641/https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news.html |date=20 August 2024 }} ''Lockheed Martin'', 19 February 2014. Retrieved: 13 September 2014.</ref> The U-2 outlasted its Mach 3 replacement, the [[Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird|SR-71]], which was retired in 1998. A classified budget document approved by [[the Pentagon]] on 23 December 2005 called for the U-2's termination no earlier than 2012, with some aircraft being retired by 2007.<ref>Butler, Amy and David A Fulghum. [http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,174427,00.html "USAF not ready to retire the U-2."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121208145701/http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,174427,00.html |date=8 December 2012}}. ''[[Aviation Week]]'', 26 August 2008. Retrieved: 10 March 2009.</ref> In January 2006, Secretary of Defense [[Donald Rumsfeld]] announced the U-2's pending retirement as a cost-cutting measure during a larger reorganization and redefinition of the USAF's mission.<ref>Sherman, Jason and Daniel G Dupont. [http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,84991,00.html "DoD cuts Air Force aircraft fleet."] {{webarchive|url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20080224014956/http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,84991,00.html |date=24 February 2008}} ''Military.com'', 11 January 2006. Retrieved: 8 March 2009.</ref> Rumsfeld said that this would not impair the USAF's ability to gather intelligence, which would be done by satellites and a growing supply of unmanned [[Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk|RQ-4 Global Hawk]] reconnaissance aircraft.

[[File:USAF U-2S taxiing after landing at Al Dhafra Air Base.jpg|thumb|left|U-2S with the Senior Span/Spur communications suite at [[Al Dhafra Air Base]], [[United Arab Emirates]], ca. 2017]]
In 2009, the USAF stated that it planned to extend the U-2 retirement from 2012 until 2014 or later to allow more time to field the RQ-4.<ref>Tirpak, John A. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20110524154159/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/February%202009/0209course.aspx "12 Miles High, Changing Course."]}} Arlington, [[Virginia|VA]]: ''Air Force magazine'', Air Force Association, February 2009. Retrieved" 8 March 2009.</ref> Upgrades late in the War in Afghanistan gave the U-2 greater reconnaissance and threat-detection capability.<ref>Evans, Michael (Pentagon Correspondent). [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7073232.ece "U2 eye-in-the-sky spy plane wins new lease of life in Afghanistan."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100528050134/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7073232.ece |date=28 May 2010 }} ''The Times online'', 24 March 2010. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> By early 2010, U-2s from the [[380th Air Expeditionary Wing#Units|99th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron]] had flown over 200 missions in support of Operations [[Operation Iraqi Freedom|Iraqi Freedom]] and [[Operation Enduring Freedom|Enduring Freedom]], as well as [[Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa]].<ref>Sturkol, Scott. [http://www.dvidshub.net/news/48860/dragon-lady-fires-up-another-combat-mission-southwest-asia "Dragon Lady fires up for another combat mission in Southwest Asia."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120806211426/http://www.dvidshub.net/news/48860/dragon-lady-fires-up-another-combat-mission-southwest-asia |date=6 August 2012 }} ''380th Air Expeditionary Wing'', 29 April 2010. Retrieved: 1 June 2010.</ref>

A U-2 was stationed in Cyprus in March 2011 to help in the enforcement of the [[2011 military intervention in Libya|no-fly zone over Libya]],<ref>Grier, Peter. [http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2011/0321/Libya-intervention-What-s-the-endgame "Libya intervention: What's the endgame?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110323115629/http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2011/0321/Libya-intervention-What-s-the-endgame |date=23 March 2011 }} ''The Christian Science Monitor'', 21 March 2011. Retrieved: 21 March 2011.</ref> and a U-2 stationed at [[Osan Air Base]] in South Korea was used to provide imagery of the [[Fukushima I nuclear accidents|Japanese nuclear reactor]] damaged by the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.<ref>Eshel, Tamir. [http://defense-update.com/20110314_japan_disaster.html "Satellite imagery, U-2 chart Japan’s earthquake, tsunami devastation."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111212032626/http://defense-update.com/20110314_japan_disaster.html |date=12 December 2011 }} ''Defense Update'', 4 March 2011. Retrieved: 12 December 2011.</ref>

[[File:U-2 new cockpit 2006-06-20 F-8409K-001.jpg|thumb|Cockpit of a U-2S Block 20, at [[Osan Air Base]], [[South Korea]], circa June 2006]]
In March 2011, it was projected that the fleet of 32 U-2s would be operated until 2015.<ref>Brook, Tom Vanden. [https://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-28-U228_ST_N.htm "After Five Decades, The U-2 Is Still Flying High."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120317122402/http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-28-U228_ST_N.htm |date=17 March 2012 }} ''[[USA Today]]'', 28 March 2011. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> In 2014, Lockheed Martin determined that the U-2S fleet had used only one-fifth of its design service life and was one of the youngest fleets within the USAF.<ref name="lockheedmartin.com"/> In 2011 the USAF intended to replace the U-2 with the RQ-4 before fiscal year 2015; proposed legislation required any replacement to have lower operating costs.<ref name="Retirement b4 FY 15">Majumdar, Dave. [http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/08/dn-global-hawk-to-replace-u2-spy-plane-081011/ "Global Hawk to replace U-2 spy plane in 2015."] {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20130116125100/http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/08/dn-global-hawk-to-replace-u2-spy-plane-081011/ |date=16 January 2013 }} ''Air Force Times,'' 10 August 2011. Retrieved: 22 August 2011.</ref> In January 2012 the USAF reportedly planned to end the RQ-4 Block 30 program and extend the U-2's service life until 2023.<ref>Shalal-Esa, Andrea. "U.S. Air Force to Kill Global Hawk UAV." ''Aviation Week,'' 24 January 2012. Retrieved: 24 January 2012.</ref><ref>Majumdar, Dave. [https://archive.today/20120903152033/http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120125/DEFREG02/301250010/Sources-USAF-Kill-Block-30-Global-Hawks?odyssey=tab |topnews|text|FRONTPAGE "Sources: USAF to kill block 30 Global Hawks."] ''Defense News'' 25 January 2012. Retrieved: 25 January 2012.</ref> The RQ-4 Block 30 was kept in service under political pressure despite USAF objections, stating that the U-2 cost $2,380 per flight hour compared to the RQ-4's $6,710 as of early 2014.<ref>[http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysts-predict-a-10-u-2-retirements-in-fy15-395693/ "Analysts predict A-10, U-2 retirements in FY15."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140209140008/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysts-predict-a-10-u-2-retirements-in-fy15-395693/ |date=9 February 2014 }} ''Flightglobal.com'', 7 February 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> Critics have pointed out that the RQ-4's cameras and sensors are less capable, and lack all-weather operating capability; however, some of the U-2's sensors may be installed on the RQ-4.<ref>Sisk, Richard. [http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/02/27/global-hawk-trails-u-2-despite-retirement-plans/ "Global Hawk trails U-2 despite retirement plans."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227211642/http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/02/27/global-hawk-trails-u-2-despite-retirement-plans/ |date=27 February 2014 }} ''DoDBuzz.com'', 27 February 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> The RQ-4 Block 30's capabilities were planned to match the U-2's by [[Fiscal Year|FY]] 2016, the replacement effort is motivated by decreases in the RQ-4's cost per flying hour.<ref>Mehta, Aaron. [http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20140302234746/http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140302/DEFREG02/303020018/Global%2DHawk%2DSaved%2D10%2Ds%2DChances%2DDim "Global Hawk saved, but A-10's chances are dim."] ''Defense News'', 2 March 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref>

The U-2's retirement was calculated to save $2.2 billion. $1.77 billion will have to be spent over 10 years to enhance the RQ-4, including $500 million on a universal payload adapter to attach one U-2 sensor onto the RQ-4. USAF officials fear that retiring the U-2 amid RQ-4 upgrades will create a capability gap<ref>Mehta, Aaron. [https://archive.today/20150217153723/http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140329/DEFREG02/303290022/Scrapping-U-2-Won-t-Save-Much-Touted "Scrapping U-2 won't save as much as touted."] ''Defense News'', 29 March 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> In the [[House Armed Services Committee]]'s markup of the FY 2015 budget, language was included prohibiting the use of funds to retire or store the U-2; it also requested a report outlining the transition capabilities from the U-2 to the RQ-4 Block 30 in light of capability gap concerns.<ref>Mehta, Aaron.[http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140505/NEWS05/305050039/HASC-markup-limits-Air-Force-options-10-U-2 "HASC markup limits Air Force options on A-10, U-2."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140506185340/http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140505/NEWS05/305050039/HASC-markup-limits-Air-Force-options-10-U-2 |date=6 May 2014 }} ''Military Times'', 5 May 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref>

In late 2014, Lockheed Martin proposed an unmanned U-2 version with greater payload capability,<ref name=amy1>Butler, Amy. [http://aviationweek.com/defense/lockheed-updates-unmanned-u-2-concept "Lockheed updates unmanned U-2 concept."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141124213231/http://aviationweek.com/defense/lockheed-updates-unmanned-u-2-concept |date=24 November 2014 }} ''Aviation Week'', 24 November 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> but the concept did not gain traction with the USAF.<ref name="flightglobal31july15">Drew, James. [http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/u-2-poised-to-receive-radar-upgrade-but-not-un-manned-415291/ "U-2 poised to receive radar upgrade, but not un-manned conversion."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240820211759/https://www.flightglobal.com/u-2-poised-to-receive-radar-upgrade-but-not-un-manned-conversion/117815.article |date=20 August 2024 }} ''Flightglobal.com'', 31 July 2015. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> In early 2015, the USAF was directed to restart modest funding for the U-2 for operations and research, development, and procurement through to FY 2018.<ref>Butler, Amy. [http://aviationweek.com/defense/2016-budget-bring-u-2-stay-execution "2016 budget to bring U-2 stay of execution."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150217183650/http://aviationweek.com/defense/2016-budget-bring-u-2-stay-execution |date=17 February 2015 }} ''Aviation Week'', 14 January 2015. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref> The former head of the USAF [[Air Combat Command]], Gen. Mike Hostage helped extend the U-2S to ensure commanders receive sufficient [[intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance]] (ISR) coverage; stating "it will take eight years before the RQ-4 Global Hawk fleet can support 90% of the coverage of the U-2 fleet."<ref>Clark, Colin. and Sydney J. Freedberg, ed. [http://breakingdefense.com/2015/02/air-force-riding-budget-boost-warns-on-sequester-u-2-is-back/ "Air Force, riding budget boost, warns on sequester; U-2 is BACK!"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150312172535/http://breakingdefense.com/2015/02/air-force-riding-budget-boost-warns-on-sequester-u-2-is-back/ |date=12 March 2015 }} ''Breakingdefense.com'', 2 February 2015. Retrieved: 25 February 2015.</ref> In 2015, the RQ-4 was planned to replace the U-2 by 2019, though Lockheed states the U-2 can remain viable until 2050.<ref name="flightglobal31july15"/> As of January 2018, the U.S. Air Force budget for 2018 had indefinitely postponed the retirement of the U-2.<ref>Insinna, Vallerie. [http://defensenews.va.newsmemory.com/ "With U-2 safe, operators vie for greater investment"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201123183242/http://defensenews.va.newsmemory.com/ |date=23 November 2020 }}. ''Defense News'', Vol. 33 No. 1 (p. 13), 8 January 2018.</ref> In February 2020, the U.S. Air Force submitted budget documents with confusing language suggesting that it could begin retiring U-2s in 2025 but clarified afterwards that no retirement is planned.<ref>Cohen, Rachel S. [https://www.airforcemag.com/budget-elicits-confusion-over-fate-of-u2/ "Budget Elicits Confusion Over Fate of U-2"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200212215308/https://www.airforcemag.com/budget-elicits-confusion-over-fate-of-u2/ |date=12 February 2020 }}. ''Airforce Magazine'', 11 February 2020.</ref>

On 20 September 2016, a TU-2S trainer crashed upon takeoff from Beale Air Force Base, killing one pilot and injuring the other.<ref>[https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/california-u-2-crash/index.html "U2 crash in California"] . ''[[CNN]]'', 20 September 2016. Retrieved: 20 September 2016.</ref>

In early August 2018, NASA flew two missions using infrared sensors to map the [[Mendocino Complex Fire]]. The flights used the [[Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer]] (MODIS) and [[Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer]] (ASTER) satellite instruments.<ref name="TD20180828">{{cite web |last1=Levine |first1=Jay |title=NASA assists in efforts to contain California wildfires |url=http://www.terradaily.com/reports/NASA_assists_in_efforts_to_contain_California_wildfires_999.html |website=TerraDaily |publisher=Space Media Network |access-date=31 October 2018 |location=[[Edwards Air Force Base|Edwards AFB CA (SPX)]] |date=28 August 2018 |archive-date=27 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181127030953/http://www.terradaily.com/reports/NASA_assists_in_efforts_to_contain_California_wildfires_999.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:U-2 Pilot over Central Continental United States (7644960).jpg|thumb|right|U-2 pilot takes a selfie with both the U-2 shadow and the balloon while surveilling the Chinese asset over the US during the [[2023 Chinese balloon incident]]]] 
In 2020, the U-2 made history as the first military aircraft to integrate [[Artificial intelligence|Artificial Intelligence]] on a mission.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gregg |first=Aaron |date=December 16, 2020 |title=In a first, Air Force uses AI on military jet |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/16/air-force-artificial-intelligence/ |newspaper=Washington Post |access-date=11 February 2023 |archive-date=1 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220801191802/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/16/air-force-artificial-intelligence/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The AI program, code-named ARTUμ, was developed by the U-2 Federal Laboratory.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tegler |first=Eric |date=16 Dec 2020 |title=An AI Co-Pilot Called 'ARTUμ' Just Took Command of A U-2's Sensor Systems On A Recon Mission |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2020/12/16/an-ai-co-pilot-called-artujust-took-command-of-a-u-2s-sensor-systems-on-a-reconnaissance-mission/?sh=29f6d7b61f08 |website=Forbes |access-date=11 February 2023 |archive-date=11 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230211073739/https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2020/12/16/an-ai-co-pilot-called-artujust-took-command-of-a-u-2s-sensor-systems-on-a-reconnaissance-mission/?sh=29f6d7b61f08 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the [[2023 Chinese balloon incident]], the U.S. Air Force used U-2 aircraft to monitor a Chinese balloon that crossed the United States and Canada. U-2 flights confirmed the balloon's surveillance package was outfitted with multiple antennas capable of conducting [[signals intelligence]] collection operations and that the craft had large [[solar panel]]s to power them.<ref>[https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u-2-spy-planes-snooped-on-chinese-surveillance-balloon "U-2 Spy Planes Snooped On Chinese Surveillance Balloon"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207020108/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u-2-spy-planes-snooped-on-chinese-surveillance-balloon |date=7 February 2023 }}. The Drive blog, 6 February 2023.</ref><ref>[https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-used-u-2-to-gather-intelligence-on-chinese-spy-balloon/ "US Used U-2 to Gather Intelligence on Chinese Spy Balloon"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230212173744/https://www.airandspaceforces.com/us-used-u-2-to-gather-intelligence-on-chinese-spy-balloon/ |date=12 February 2023 }}. ''Air & Space Forces Magazine'', 9 February 2023.</ref>

In 2025, [[Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force|Air Force Chief of Staff]] General [[David W. Allvin|David Allvin]] confirmed that the U-2 was being used to surveil the [[Mexico–United States border|US-Mexico border]]. The U-2 and [[Boeing RC-135|RC-135 Rivet Joint]] were used for [[Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance|ISR]] operations to track [[Cartels in Mexico|cartels]] located in Mexico.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Trevithick |first=Joseph |date=2025-03-14 |title=U-2 Spy Planes Are Flying Border Security Missions Air Force Confirms |url=https://www.twz.com/air/u-2-spy-planes-are-flying-border-security-missions-air-force-confirms |access-date=2025-03-28 |website=The War Zone |language=en-US}}</ref>

===United Kingdom===
Bissell suggested bringing the British into the program to increase the number of overflights. Prime Minister [[Harold Macmillan]] agreed with the plan, and four RAF officers were sent to Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas for training in May 1958. On 8 July, the senior British pilot, [[Squadron Leader]] Christopher H. Walker, was killed when his U-2 malfunctioned and crashed near Wayside, Texas. This was the first death involving the U-2, and the circumstances were not disclosed for over 50 years. Another pilot was quickly selected and sent to replace Walker. After training, the group of RAF U-2 pilots arrived in Turkey in November 1958, shortly after the CIA's Detachment B from Adana provided valuable intelligence during the [[1958 Lebanon crisis]] with both the United States and United Kingdom involvement. Since the September 1956 disclosure of Mediterranean photographs, the United Kingdom had received U-2 intelligence, except during the Suez Crisis. The CIA and Eisenhower viewed using British pilots as a way of increasing [[plausible deniability]] for the flights. The CIA also saw British participation as a way of obtaining additional Soviet overflights that the president would not authorize. The United Kingdom gained the ability to target flights toward areas of the world the United States was less interested in, and possibly avoid another Suez-like interruption of U-2 photographs.<ref name="lashmar19970126"/>{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=152–156, 181}}

Although the RAF unit operated as part of Detachment B, the UK formally received title to the U-2s their pilots would fly, and Eisenhower wrote to Macmillan that because of the separate lines of authority, the nations were conducting "two complementary programs rather than a joint one".{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|p=156}} A secret [[Secret Intelligence Service|MI6]] bank account paid the RAF pilots, whose cover was employment with the [[Meteorological Office]]. While most British flights occurred over the Middle East during the two years the UK program existed, two missions over Soviet sites were very successful.{{r|lashmar19970126}} The first targeted two missile test ranges, three nuclear complexes, and a large segment of railway in one of the test range areas. Operational ballistic missile sites were considered most likely close to railways but none were found.{{sfn|Brugioni|2010|pp=343, 378}} A second flight had as its main target the long-range bomber airfield at Saratov/Engels. The number of [[Myasishchev M-4|Bison]] long-range aircraft counted on the airfield settled the "[[bomber gap]]" controversy. Other targets were a missile test center and aircraft, aircraft engine and missile production plants. A new bomber with two engines at the base of the fin, the [[Tupolev Tu-22]], was discovered at one of the aircraft plants.{{sfn|Brugioni|2010|p=344}} Like Eisenhower, Macmillan personally approved the Soviet overflights.<ref name="lashmar19970126"/> The British direct involvement in overflights ended after the May 1960 U-2 downing incident; although four pilots remained stationed in California until 1974, the CIA's official history of the program stated that "RAF pilots never again conducted another overflight in an Agency U-2."{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=156–157, 181}} In 1960 and 1961 the first four pilots received the [[Air Force Cross (United Kingdom)|Air Force Cross]], but their U-2 experience remained secret.<ref name="lashmar19970126"/>

===Taiwan===
{{main|Black Cat Squadron}}
[[File:Roundel of the Republic of China (1961–1974) – Black Cat Squadron.svg|thumb|upright=0.8|Official emblem of the [[Black Cat Squadron]]]]
[[File:U-2 cockpit view.jpg|thumb|U-2 pilot's view in the cockpit: The large circular monitor is vital for navigation, evading interceptors and surface-to-air missiles as early as possible. (2016)]]

Beginning in the 1950s, Taiwan's [[Republic of China Air Force]] (ROCAF) used the RB-57D aircraft for reconnaissance missions over the People's Republic of China (PRC), but suffered two losses when MiG-17s and [[S-75 Dvina|SA-2]] surface-to-air missiles intercepted and downed the aircraft.

Taiwanese and American authorities reached an agreement in 1958 to create the 35th Squadron, nicknamed the [[Black Cat Squadron]], composed of two U-2Cs in Taoyuan Air Base in northern Taiwan, at an isolated part of the air base. To create misdirection typical of the time, the unit was created under the cover of high altitude weather research missions for ROCAF. To the U.S. government, the 35th Squadron and any U.S. CIA/USAF personnel assigned to the unit were known as Detachment H on all documents. But instead of being under normal USAF control, the project was known as Project Razor,<ref>[http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=135 "Project RAZOR."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008222047/http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=135 |date=8 October 2011 }} ''Taiwan Air Blog'', updated 11 April 2007. Retrieved: 14 September 2009.</ref><ref>[http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=136 "Project RAZOR."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008222124/http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=136 |date=8 October 2011 }} ''Taiwan Air Blog'', updated 15 April 2007. Retrieved: 14 September 2009.</ref> and was run directly by the CIA with USAF assistance. Each of the 35th Squadron's operational missions had to be approved by both the U.S. and the ROC presidents beforehand. A further layer of security and secrecy was enforced by all U.S. military and CIA/government personnel stationed in Taoyuan assigned to Detachment H having been issued official documents and IDs with false names and cover titles as Lockheed employees/representatives in civilian clothes. The ROCAF personnel would never know their U.S. counterparts' real names and rank/titles, or which U.S. government agencies they were dealing with. A total of 26 of 28 ROC pilots sent to the U.S. completed training between 1959 and 1973, at Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas.<ref>[http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/pilots.html "Taiwan Air Power, U-2 Page, pilots."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091002144725/http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/pilots.html |date=2 October 2009 }} ''taiwanairpower.org''. Retrieved: 24 February 2010.</ref> On 3 August 1959, a U-2 on a training mission out of Laughlin AFB, piloted by ROCAF Major Mike Hua, made a successful unassisted nighttime emergency landing at [[Cortez, Colorado]], that became known as the [[Cortez, Colorado#1959 U-2 emergency landing|Miracle at Cortez]]. Major Hua was awarded the USAF Distinguished Flying Cross for saving the aircraft.<ref>{{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20230405200706/http://cortezeaa1451.org/CortezU2.htm "U-2 Landing at Cortez (3 August 1959)."]}} ''cortezeaa1451.org''. Retrieved: 12 December 2011.</ref><ref>[http://www.hmhfp.info/SG_09E.html "50th Anniversary Night Forced Landing in Cortez, CO (Slideshow/video in both Chinese and English)."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091230140334/http://www.hmhfp.info/SG_09E.html |date=30 December 2009}} ''hmhfp.info''. Retrieved: 14 February 2010</ref><ref>Steves, Bob. [http://www.hmhfp.info/clp/AFM.pdf "There I was ..."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721205059/http://www.hmhfp.info/clp/AFM.pdf |date=21 July 2011}} ''Air Force'', February 1989. Retrieved: 14 February 2010.</ref><ref>Hua, Hsichun M. [http://www.hmhfp.info/pbl/miracle_cortez.html "A miracle at Cortez."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721205111/http://www.hmhfp.info/pbl/miracle_cortez.html |date=21 July 2011}} ''Air Force Magazine'', August 1989. Retrieved: 14 February 2010.</ref>

In January 1961, the CIA provided the ROC with its first two U-2Cs, and in April the squadron flew its first mission over mainland China. In the wake of the Gary Powers incident, the Taiwanese program of China overflights was redesignated TACKLE, a subset of the new IDEALIST program.<ref name="cia1969">[https://web.archive.org/web/20170123181403/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP72R00410R000100070004-7.pdf Forecast of  NRP Aircraft and Satellite Activities for May  1969, Top Secret (S), National Reconnaissance Office, Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP72R00410R00010)W00A0-7]</ref> Other countries were occasionally overflown by the 35th Squadron, including North Korea,<ref>[http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=302 "Target North Korea."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008222149/http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=302 |date=8 October 2011 }} ''Taiwan Air Blog'', updated 23 April 2009. Retrieved: 15 September 2009.</ref> North Vietnam and Laos; however, the main objective of the 35th Squadron was to conduct reconnaissance missions assessing the [[People's Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons|PRC's nuclear capabilities]]. For this purpose, the ROC pilots flew as far as [[Gansu]] and other remote regions in northwest China. Some missions, to satisfy mission requirements including range, and to add some element of surprise, had the 35th Squadron's U-2s flying from or recovered at other U.S. air bases in Southeast Asia and Eastern Asia, such as [[Kunsan Air Base]] in South Korea, or [[Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base|Takhli]] in Thailand. All U.S. airbases in the region were listed as emergency/alternate recovery airfields and could be used besides the 35th Squadron's home base at Taoyuan Air Base in Taiwan. Initially, all film taken by the Black Cat Squadron would be flown to Okinawa or Guam for processing and development, and the U.S. forces would not share any mission photos with ROC. In the late 1960s, the USAF agreed to share complete sets of mission photos and help set up a photo development and interpretation unit at Taoyuan.

In 1968, the ROC U-2C/F/G fleet was replaced with the newer U-2R. However, with the overwhelming threats from [[S-75 Dvina|SA-2]] missiles and [[MiG-21]] interceptors, along with the [[rapprochement]] between the U.S. and the PRC, the ROC U-2s stopped entering Chinese airspace, only conducting electronic intelligence-gathering and photo-reconnaissance missions using new Long Range Oblique Reconnaissance (LOROP) cameras on the U-2R from above international waters. The last U-2 mission over mainland China took place on 16 March 1968. After that, all missions had the U-2 fly outside a buffer zone at least {{convert|20|nmi|km|sigfig=2|sp=us}} around China.

During his visit to China in 1972, U.S. president [[Richard Nixon]] promised the Chinese to cease all reconnaissance missions near and over China, though this was also practical as by 1972 U.S. photo satellites could provide better overhead images without risking losing aircraft and pilots, or provoking international incidents. The last 35th Squadron mission was flown by Sungchou "Mike" Chiu on 24 May 1974.<ref name="taiwanairpower32">[http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=32 "The End of an Era."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008222239/http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=32 |date=8 October 2011 }} ''Taiwan Air Blog'', 7 April 2006. Retrieved: 14 September 2009.</ref>

By the end of the ROC's U-2 operations, a total of 19 U-2C/F/G/R aircraft had been operated by the 35th Squadron from 1959 to 1974.<ref name="Aircraft">[http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/aircraft.html "U-2 page: Aircraft."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091226210500/http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/aircraft.html |date=26 December 2009 }} ''Taiwan Air Power''. Retrieved: 26 December 2009</ref> The squadron flew some 220 missions,<ref>[http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/missions.html "U-2 page: Missions."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110516225231/http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/missions.html |date=16 May 2011 }} ''Taiwan Air Power''. Retrieved: 26 December 2009.</ref> with about half over mainland China, resulting in five aircraft shot down, with three fatalities and two pilots captured; one aircraft lost while performing an operational mission off the Chinese coast, with the pilot killed; and another seven aircraft lost in training with six pilots killed.<ref name="TPLoss">[http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/losses.html "U2 Operations: Losses."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091002144641/http://www.taiwanairpower.org/u2/losses.html |date=2 October 2009 }} ''Taiwanpower.org'', 21 September 2014. Retrieved: 7 December 2015.</ref><ref name="Aircraft"/> On 29 July 1974, the two remaining U-2R aircraft in ROC possession were flown from Taoyuan Air Base in Taiwan to Edwards AFB, California, US, and turned over to the USAF.<ref name="taiwanairpower32"/><ref>[http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=551 "Thou Shalt Not Fly ... Ever."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008222324/http://taiwanairpower.org/blog/?p=551 |date=8 October 2011 }} ''Taiwan Air Power'', 1 August 2009. Retrieved: 14 September 2009</ref><ref>"Brief History of U-2." ''Defence International Taiwan, ROC (全球防衛雜誌),'' Vol. 35, Issue 5, May 2002.</ref>