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Morality
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===Moral cognition=== Moral cognition refers to cognitive processes implicated in moral judgment and decision making, and moral action. It consists of several domain-general cognitive processes, ranging from perception of a morally salient stimulus to reasoning when faced with a moral dilemma. While it is important to mention that there is not a single cognitive faculty dedicated exclusively to moral cognition,<ref name="Sinnott-Armstrong2012">{{cite journal |last1=Sinnott-Armstrong |first1=Walter |last2=Wheatley |first2=Thalia |title=The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to Philosophy |journal=Monist |date=2012 |volume=95 |issue=3 |pages=355–77 |doi=10.5840/monist201295319|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Sinnott-Armstrong2013">{{cite journal |last1=Sinnott-Armstrong |first1=Walter |last2=Wheatley |first2=Thalia |title=Are moral judgments unified? |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=13 February 2013 |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=451–74 |doi=10.1080/09515089.2012.736075|s2cid=143876741 }}</ref> characterizing the contributions of domain-general processes to moral behavior is a critical scientific endeavor to understand how morality works and how it can be improved.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Young |first1=Liane |last2=Dungan |first2=James |title=Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere |journal=Social Neuroscience |date=January 2012 |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1080/17470919.2011.569146|pmid=21590587 |s2cid=14074566 }}</ref> Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists investigate the inputs to these cognitive processes and their interactions, as well as how these contribute to moral behavior by running controlled experiments.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Yoder |first1=Keith J. |last2=Decety |first2=Jean |title=The neuroscience of morality and social decision-making |journal=Psychology, Crime & Law |date=12 December 2017 |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=279–95 |doi=10.1080/1068316X.2017.1414817|pmid=30766017 |pmc=6372234 }}</ref> In these experiments putatively moral versus nonmoral stimuli are compared to each other, while controlling for other variables such as content or working memory load. Often, the differential neural response to specifically moral statements or scenes, are examined using functional [[neuroimaging]] experiments. Critically, the specific cognitive processes that are involved depend on the prototypical situation that a person encounters.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Monin |first1=Benoît |last2=Pizarro |first2=David A. |last3=Beer |first3=Jennifer S. |title=Deciding versus reacting: Conceptions of moral judgment and the reason-affect debate. |journal=Review of General Psychology |date=2007 |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=99–111 |doi=10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.99|s2cid=144286153 }}</ref> For instance, while situations that require an active decision on a moral dilemma may require active reasoning, an immediate reaction to a shocking moral violation may involve quick, affect-laden processes. Nonetheless, certain cognitive skills such as being able to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, emotions to oneself, and others is a common feature of a broad range of prototypical situations. In line with this, a meta-analysis found overlapping activity between [[Moral emotions|moral emotion]] and [[moral reasoning]] tasks, suggesting a shared neural network for both tasks.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal |last1=Sevinc |first1=Gunes |last2=Spreng |first2=R. Nathan |title=Contextual and Perceptual Brain Processes Underlying Moral Cognition: A Quantitative Meta-Analysis of Moral Reasoning and Moral Emotions |journal=PLOS ONE |date=4 February 2014 |volume=9 |issue=2 |page=e87427 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0087427|pmid=24503959 |pmc=3913597 |bibcode=2014PLoSO...987427S |doi-access=free }}</ref> The results of this meta-analysis, however, also demonstrated that the processing of moral input is affected by task demands. Regarding the issues of morality in video games, some scholars believe that because players appear in video games as actors, they maintain a distance between their sense of self and the role of the game in terms of imagination. Therefore, the decision-making and moral behavior of players in the game are not representing player's Moral dogma.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bartel|first=Christopher|date=2015|title=Free will and moral responsibility in video games|url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10676-015-9383-8|journal=Ethics and Information Technology|language=en|volume=17|issue=4|pages=285–293|doi=10.1007/s10676-015-9383-8|s2cid=15800963|issn=1388-1957|url-access=subscription}}</ref> It has been recently found that moral judgment consists in concurrent evaluations of three different components that align with precepts from three dominant moral theories (virtue ethics, [[deontology]], and consequentialism): the character of a person (Agent-component, A); their actions (Deed-component, D); and the consequences brought about in the situation (Consequences-component, C).<ref>{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1371/journal.pone.0204631|title = Deciphering moral intuition: How agents, deeds, and consequences influence moral judgment|year = 2018|last1 = Dubljević|first1 = Veljko|last2 = Sattler|first2 = Sebastian|last3 = Racine|first3 = Eric|journal = PLOS ONE|volume = 13|issue = 10|page = e0204631|pmid = 30273370|pmc = 6166963|bibcode = 2018PLoSO..1304631D|doi-access = free}}</ref> This, implies that various inputs of the situation a person encounters affect moral cognition. [[Jonathan Haidt]] distinguishes between two types of moral cognition: moral intuition and moral reasoning. Moral intuition involves the fast, automatic, and [[Affect (psychology)|affective]] processes that result in an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike, ''without'' awareness of going through any steps. Conversely, moral reasoning does involve conscious mental activity to reach a moral judgment. Moral reasoning is controlled and less affective than moral intuition. When making moral judgments, humans perform moral reasoning to support their initial intuitive feeling. However, there are three ways humans can override their immediate intuitive response. The first way is conscious verbal reasoning (for example, examining costs and benefits). The second way is reframing a situation to see a new perspective or consequence, which triggers a different intuition. Finally, one can talk to other people which illuminates new arguments. In fact, interacting with other people is the cause of most moral change.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Haidt |first=Jonathan |date=18 May 2007 |title=The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology |journal=Science |volume=316 |issue=5827 |pages=998–1002|doi=10.1126/science.1137651 |pmid=17510357 |bibcode=2007Sci...316..998H }}</ref>
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