Editing Predatory pricing (section)

====Output restriction rule====
Williamson offers the output restriction rule to restrain dominant firms from engaging in predatory pricing. The rule stipulates that upon the entry of a new firm in a market, a dominant firm cannot abuse their position by increasing their output above the pre-entry level.<ref name="jstor.org">{{Cite journal |last=Williamson |first=Oliver E. |date=1977 |title=Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/795652 |journal=The Yale Law Journal |volume=87 |issue=2 |pages=284–340 |doi=10.2307/795652 |issn=0044-0094}}</ref> A prevention period of 12 to 18 months should be adequate for new entrants to establish a market identity and understand economies of scale while disincentivizing dominant firms from holding excess capacity.<ref name="jstor.org"/> Williamson suggests that the output restriction rule possesses greater welfare properties than the short-run marginal cost rule or short-run average cost rule.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Williamson |first=Oliver E. |date=1981 |title=Predatory Pricing Rules: A Comment on Williamson's Output Restriction Rule: Reply to Lefever |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/796084 |journal=The Yale Law Journal |volume=90 |issue=7 |pages=1646–1649 |doi=10.2307/796084 |issn=0044-0094|url-access=subscription }}</ref>