Editing Problem of induction (section)

===Biting the bullet: Keith Campbell and Claudio Costa===
An intuitive answer to Hume would be to say that a world inaccessible to any inductive procedure would simply not be conceivable. This intuition was taken into account by [[Keith Campbell (philosopher)|Keith Campbell]] by considering that, to be built, a concept must be reapplied, which demands a certain continuity in its object of application and consequently some openness to induction.<ref>"One form of Skepticism about Induction", in Richard Swinburne (ed.) ''The Justification of the Induction''. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974.</ref> [[Claudio Costa (philosopher)|Claudio Costa]] has noted that a future can only be a future of its own past if it holds some identity with it. Moreover, the nearer a future is to the point of junction with its past, the greater are the similarities tendentially involved. Consequently – ''contra'' Hume – some form of principle of homogeneity (causal or structural) between future and past must be warranted, which would make some inductive procedure always possible.<ref>Claudio Costa: ''Philosophical Semantics: Reintegrating Theoretical Philosophy'', Appendix to Ch. V, CSP, 2018.</ref>