Editing Protectionism (section)

===Economic impact===

====Living standards====
A 2016 study found that "trade typically favors the poor", as they spend a greater share of their earnings on goods, as free trade reduces the costs of goods.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fajgelbaum|first1=Pablo D.|last2=Khandelwal|first2=Amit K.|date=1 August 2016|title=Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|language=en|volume=131|issue=3|pages=1113–80|doi=10.1093/qje/qjw013|s2cid=9094432|issn=0033-5533|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w20331.pdf}}</ref> Other research found that China's entry to the [[World Trade Organization|WTO]] benefited US consumers, as the price of Chinese goods were substantially reduced.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://voxeu.org/article/china-s-wto-entry-benefits-us-consumers|title=China's WTO entry benefits US consumers|last1=Amiti|first1=Mary|last2=Dai|first2=Mi|date=28 June 2017|website=VoxEU.org|access-date=28 June 2017|last3=Feenstra|first3=Robert|last4=Romalis|first4=John}}</ref> Harvard economist [[Dani Rodrik]] argues that while globalization and free trade does contribute to social problems, "a serious retreat into protectionism would hurt the many groups that benefit from trade and would result in the same kind of social conflicts that globalization itself generates. We have to recognize that erecting trade barriers will help in only a limited set of circumstances and that trade policy will rarely be the best response to the problems [of globalization]".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/57/1iie2415.pdf|title=Has Globalization Gone Too Far?|last=Rodrik|first=Dani|publisher=Institute for International Economics}}</ref>

====Growth====
An empirical study by Furceri et al. (2019) concluded that protectionist measures like tariff increases have a significant adverse impact on domestic output and productivity.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Furceri |first1=Davide |title=Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs |last2=Hannan |first2=Swarnali A. |last3=Ostry |first3=Jonathon D. |last4=Rose |first4=Andrew K. |publisher=International Monetary Fund |year=2019 |isbn=9781484390061 |pages=4}}</ref> A prominent 1999 study by Jeffrey A. Frankel and David H. Romer found while controlling for relevant factors, that free trade does have a positive impact on growth and incomes. The effect is quantitatively large and statistically significant.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Frankel|first1=Jeffrey A|last2=Romer|first2=David|date=June 1999|title=Does Trade Cause Growth?|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=89|issue=3|pages=379–99|doi=10.1257/aer.89.3.379|issn=0002-8282|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Economist [[Arvind Panagariya]] criticizes the view that protectionism is good for growth. Such arguments, according to him, arise from "revisionist interpretation" of [[Four Asian Tigers|East Asian "tigers"]]' economic history. The Asian tigers achieved a rapid increase in per capita income without any "redistributive social programs", through free trade, which advanced Western economies took a century to achieve.<ref name=":6" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Panagariya |first=Arvind |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/free-trade-and-prosperity-9780190914493?cc=us&lang=en& |title=Free Trade and Prosperity: How Openness Helps the Developing Countries Grow Richer and Combat Poverty |date=2019 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-091449-3 |location=Oxford, New York}}</ref>

According to economic historians Findlay and O'Rourke, there is a consensus in the economics literature that protectionist policies in the interwar period "hurt the world economy overall, although there is a debate about whether the effect was large or small."<ref name=":3" />

According to Dartmouth economist [[Douglas Irwin]], "that there is a correlation between high tariffs and growth in the late nineteenth century cannot be denied. But correlation is not causation... there is no reason for necessarily thinking that import protection was a good policy just because the economic outcome was good: the outcome could have been driven by factors completely unrelated to the tariff, or perhaps could have been even better in the absence of protection."<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Irwin|first=Douglas A.|date=1 January 2001|title=Tariffs and Growth in Late Nineteenth-Century America|journal=World Economy|language=en|volume=24|issue=1|pages=15–30|doi=10.1111/1467-9701.00341|issn=1467-9701|citeseerx=10.1.1.200.5492|s2cid=153647738}}</ref> Irwin furthermore writes that "few observers have argued outright that the high tariffs caused such growth."<ref name=":2" />

One study by the economic historian Brian Varian found no correlation between tariffs and growth among the Australian colonies in the late nineteenth century, a time when each of the colonies had the independence to set their own tariffs.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Varian |first=Brian D. |date=2022 |title=Revisiting the tariff-growth correlation: The Australasian colonies, 1866–1900 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aehr.12233 |journal=Australian Economic History Review |language=en |volume=62 |issue=1 |pages=47–65 |doi=10.1111/aehr.12233 |issn=0004-8992}}</ref>

According to Oxford economic historian Kevin O'Rourke, "It seems clear that protection was important for the growth of US manufacturing in the first half of the 19th century; but this does not necessarily imply that the tariff was beneficial for GDP growth. Protectionists have often pointed to German and American industrialization during this period as evidence in favor of their position, but economic growth is influenced by many factors other than trade policy, and it is important to control for these when assessing the links between tariffs and growth."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=H. O'Rourke|first=Kevin|date=1 November 2000|title=British trade policy in the 19th century: a review article|journal=European Journal of Political Economy|volume=16|issue=4|pages=829–42|doi=10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00043-9}}</ref>

====Developing world====
{{See also|Infant industry argument|Protectionism in the United States}}

There is broad consensus among economists that free trade helps workers in developing countries, even though they are not subject to the stringent health and labor standards of developed countries. This is because "the growth of manufacturing—and of the myriad other jobs that the new export sector creates—has a ripple effect throughout the economy" that creates competition among producers, lifting wages and living conditions.<ref>Krugman, Paul (21 March 1997). [http://www.slate.com/id/1918/ In Praise of Cheap Labor] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110907073142/http://www.slate.com/id/1918 |date=7 September 2011 }}. ''Slate''.</ref> The Nobel laureates [[Milton Friedman]] and [[Paul Krugman]] have argued for free trade as a model for [[economic development]].<ref name="See P 1994" /> [[Alan Greenspan]], former chair of the American [[Federal Reserve]], has criticized protectionist proposals as leading "to an atrophy of our competitive ability. ... If the protectionist route is followed, newer, more efficient industries will have less scope to expand, and overall output and economic welfare will suffer."<ref>Sicilia, David B. & Cruikshank, Jeffrey L. (2000). ''The Greenspan Effect'', p. 131. New York: McGraw-Hill. {{ISBN|978-0-07-134919-2}}.</ref>

Protectionists postulate that new industries may require protection from entrenched foreign competition in order to develop. Mainstream economists do concede that tariffs can in the short-term help domestic industries to develop but are contingent on the short-term nature of the protective tariffs and the ability of the government to pick the winners.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-22/the-case-for-protecting-infant-industries|title=The Case for Protecting Infant Industries|date=22 December 2016|work=Bloomberg.com|access-date=24 June 2017}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Baldwin|first=Robert E.|date=1969|title=The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection|jstor=1828905|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=77|issue=3|pages=295–305|doi=10.1086/259517|s2cid=154784307}}</ref> The problems are that protective tariffs will not be reduced after the infant industry reaches a foothold, and that governments will not pick industries that are likely to succeed.<ref name=":4" /> Economists have identified a number of cases across different countries and industries where attempts to shelter infant industries failed.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=O|first1=Krueger, Anne|last2=Baran|first2=Tuncer|date=1982|title=An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument|url=http://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a72_3ay_3a1982_3ai_3a5_3ap_3a1142-52.htm|journal=American Economic Review|volume=72|issue=5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Choudhri|first1=Ehsan U.|last2=Hakura|first2=Dalia S.|date=2000|title=International Trade and Productivity Growth: Exploring the Sectoral Effects for Developing Countries|jstor=3867624|journal=IMF Staff Papers|volume=47|issue=1|pages=30–53|doi=10.2307/3867624 |url=http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/03777-9781451843521/03777-9781451843521/03777-9781451843521.xml }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Baldwin |first1=Richard E. |last2=Krugman |first2=Paul |date=June 1986 |title=Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories |doi=10.3386/w1936 |journal=NBER Working Paper No. 1936 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Luzio|first1=Eduardo|last2=Greenstein|first2=Shane|date=1995|title=Measuring the Performance of a Protected Infant Industry: The Case of Brazilian Microcomputers |journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics|volume=77|issue=4|pages=622–633|doi=10.2307/2109811|jstor=2109811|hdl=2142/29917|url=https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/2142/29917/2/measuringperform93180luzi.pdf|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/us-tire-tariffs-saving-few-jobs-high-cost|title=US Tire Tariffs: Saving Few Jobs at High Cost|date=2 March 2016|work=PIIE|access-date=24 June 2017|language=en}}</ref>

==== Intellectual property ====
{{Main article|TRIPS Agreement|Intellectual property}}
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an [[international agreement|international legal agreement]] between all the member nations of the [[World Trade Organization]] (WTO). It establishes minimum standards for the regulation by national governments of different forms of [[intellectual property]] (IP) as applied to nationals of other WTO member nations.<ref>See TRIPS Art. 1(3).</ref> TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the [[Uruguay Round]] of the [[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]] (GATT){{efn|The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a [[treaty|legal agreement]] between many countries, whose overall purpose was to promote [[international trade]] by reducing or eliminating [[trade barrier]]s such as [[tariffs]] or [[import quota|quotas]]. According to its preamble, its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis."}} between 1989 and 1990<ref>{{Cite book|title=The TRIPS Agreement: Negotiating History|last=Gervais|first=Daniel|publisher=Sweet & Maxwell|year=2012|location=London|pages=Part I}}</ref> and is administered by the WTO. Statements by the World Bank indicate that TRIPS has not led to a demonstrable acceleration of investment to low-income countries, though it may have done so for middle-income countries.<ref name="Xiong 2012b 155"/>

Critics argue that TRIPS limits the ability of governments to introduce competition for generic producers.<ref name="Trade, Doha">{{cite book |first=Richard |last=Newfarmer |title=Trade, Doha, and Development |publisher=The World Bank |edition=1st |year=2006 |page=292}}</ref> The TRIPS agreement allows the grant of compulsory licenses at a nation's discretion. TRIPS-plus conditions in the United States' FTAs with Australia, Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam have restricted the application of compulsory licenses to emergency situations, antitrust remedies, and cases of public non-commercial use.<ref name="Trade, Doha"/>

====Access to essential medicines====
One of the most visible conflicts over TRIPS has been [[AIDS]] drugs in [[AIDS in Africa|Africa]]. Despite the role that patents have played in maintaining higher drug costs for public health programs across Africa, this controversy has not led to a revision of TRIPS. Instead, an interpretive statement, the [[Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health|Doha Declaration]], was issued in November 2001, which indicated that TRIPS should not prevent states from dealing with public health crises and allowed for [[compulsory license]]s. After Doha, [[PhRMA]], the United States and to a lesser extent other developed nations began working to minimize the effect of the declaration.<ref>{{cite journal|author1=Timmermann, Cristian|author2=Henk van den Belt|date=2013|title=Intellectual property and global health: from corporate social responsibility to the access to knowledge movement|journal=Liverpool Law Review|volume=34|issue=1|pages=47–73|doi=10.1007/s10991-013-9129-9|s2cid=145492036|url=http://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/438139|access-date=31 October 2020|archive-date=23 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200623091949/https://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/438139|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2020, conflicts re-emerged over patents, copyrights and trade secrets related to [[COVID-19 vaccine]]s, diagnostics and treatments. [[South Africa]] and [[India]] proposed that WTO grant a temporary waiver to enable more widespread production of the vaccines, since suppressing the virus as quickly as possible benefits the entire world.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Nebehay|first=Emma Farge, Stephanie|date=2020-12-10|title=WTO delays decision on waiver on COVID-19 drug, vaccine rights|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wto-idUSKBN28K2WL|access-date=2021-02-25|archive-date=28 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210228221930/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wto-idUSKBN28K2WL|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Members to continue discussion on proposal for temporary IP waiver in response to COVID-19|url=https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/trip_10dec20_e.htm|access-date=2021-02-25|publisher=World Trade Organisation|language=en|archive-date=27 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227121050/https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/trip_10dec20_e.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> The waivers would be in addition to the existing, but cumbersome, flexibilities in TRIPS allowing countries to impose compulsory licenses.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Baker|first1=Brook K.|last2=Labonte|first2=Ronald|title=Dummy's guide to how trade rules affect access to COVID-19 vaccines|url=http://theconversation.com/dummys-guide-to-how-trade-rules-affect-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-152897|access-date=2021-02-25|website=The Conversation|date=9 January 2021 |language=en|archive-date=23 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210223131044/https://theconversation.com/dummys-guide-to-how-trade-rules-affect-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-152897|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-12-16|title=An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines|url=https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines|access-date=2021-02-25|publisher=Cato Institute|language=en|archive-date=25 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225100812/https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines|url-status=live}}</ref> Over 100 developing nations supported the waiver but it was blocked by the G7 members.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/g7-leaders-are-shooting-themselves-in-the-foot-by-failing-to-tackle-global-vaccine-access/|title=G7 leaders are shooting themselves in the foot by failing to tackle global vaccine access|publisher=Amnesty International|date=2021-02-19|access-date=2021-04-25}}</ref> This blocking was condemned by 400 organizations including [[Doctors Without Borders]] and 115 members of the [[European Parliament]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/1/can-a-waiver-on-ip-rights-solve-vaccine|title=Patently unfair: Can waivers help solve COVID vaccine inequality?|first=Virginia|last=Pietromarchi|work=Al Jazeera|date=2021-03-01|access-date=2021-04-26}}</ref> In June 2022, after extensive involvement of the [[European Union]], the WTO instead adopted a watered-down agreement that focuses only on vaccine patents, excludes high-income countries and China, and contains few provisions that are not covered by existing flexibilities.<ref>{{cite web |title=TRIPS Waiver {{!}} Covid-19 Response |url=https://covid19response.org/trips-waiver/ |website=covid19response.org}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=WTO finally agrees on a TRIPS deal. But not everyone is happy |url=https://www.devex.com/news/wto-finally-agrees-on-a-trips-deal-but-not-everyone-is-happy-103476 |website=Devex |language=en |date=17 June 2022}}</ref>