Editing Anchoring effect (section)

==Influencing factors==

===Mood===
A wide range of research has linked sad or depressed moods with more extensive and accurate evaluation of problems.<ref name="BodenhausenGabriel2000">{{cite journal|last1=Bodenhausen|first1=G. V.|last2=Gabriel|first2=S.|last3=Lineberger|first3=M.|title=Sadness and Susceptibility to Judgmental Bias: The Case of Anchoring|journal=Psychological Science|volume=11|issue=4|year=2000|pages=320–323|doi=10.1111/1467-9280.00263|pmid=11273392|s2cid=16099891}}</ref> As a result of this, earlier studies hypothesized that people with more depressed moods would tend to use anchoring less than those with happier moods. However, more recent studies have shown the opposite effect: sad people are ''more'' likely to use anchoring than people with happy or neutral mood.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Englich | first1 = B. | last2 = Soder | first2 = K. | year = 2009 | title = Moody experts: How mood and expertise influence judgmental anchoring | journal = Judgment and Decision Making | volume = 4 | pages = 41–50 | doi = 10.1017/S1930297500000693 | doi-access = free }}</ref> In a study focusing on medical practitioners, it was found that physicians that possess positive moods are less susceptible to anchoring bias, when compared to physicians with neutral moods. This was specifically found to be because a positive mood leads to information processing that is more systematic which leads to more efficient problem solving. This leads to a decreased anchoring effect.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Chen |first1=Qijia |title=The Influence of Mood States on Anchoring Effects |url=https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/54481/Qijia_CHEN_Thesis%20Manuscript_The%20Influence%20of%20Mood%20States%20on%20Anchoring%20Effects.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y |website=Knowledge Bank |publisher=The Ohio State University |access-date=12 May 2022}}</ref>

===Personal Experience===
Early research found that experts (those with high knowledge, experience, or expertise in some field) were more resistant to the anchoring effect. However, anchoring happens unconsciously which means that unless someone who is knowledgeable is warned prior, they are still susceptible to anchoring.<ref name="WilsonHouston1996" /> Since then, however, numerous studies have demonstrated that while experience can sometimes reduce the effect, even experts are susceptible to anchoring. In a study concerning the effects of anchoring on judicial decisions, researchers found that even experienced legal professionals were affected by anchoring. This remained true even when the anchors provided were arbitrary and unrelated to the case in question.<ref name="EnglichMussweiler2006">{{cite journal|last1=Englich|first1=B.|last3=Strack|first3=Fritz|last2=Mussweiler|first2=Thomas|title=Playing Dice With Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision Making|journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin|volume=32|issue=2|year=2006|pages=188–200|doi=10.1177/0146167205282152|pmid=16382081|s2cid=17079629}}</ref> Also, this relates to goal setting, where more experienced individuals will set goals based on their past experiences which consequently affects end results in negotiations.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-11-26|title=The Anchoring Effect and How it Can Impact Your Negotiation|url=https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/the-drawbacks-of-goals/|access-date=2020-10-07|website=PON - Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School|language=en-US}}</ref>
[[File:Big Five 1.png|thumb|The Big Five personality traits]]

Expertise is when a judge has relevant knowledge. In a study using price estimation of cars, it was found that relevant knowledge positively influenced anchoring. Expertise in cognitive bias is related to experience however the two are not exclusively exhaustive. In a study using stock return estimates, it was found that expertise decreases behavioural bias significantly. It was found that other factors like cognitive ability and experience where there is no susceptibility to anchoring or a susceptibility as it increases, tend to become factors that decrease the effects of anchoring when they are an expert.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kaustia |first1=Markku |last2=Alho |first2=Eeva |last3=Puttonen |first3=Vesa |title=How Much Does Expertise Reduce Behavioral Biases? The Case of Anchoring Effects in Stock Return Estimates |url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2008.00018.x |journal=  Financial Management|year=2008 |volume=37 |issue=3 |pages=391–412 |doi=10.1111/j.1755-053X.2008.00018.x |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== Personality ===
Correlational research on anchoring bias and personality traits yielded mixed results, with emphasis on the [[Big Five personality traits]] which includes: Conscientiousness (orderly and responsible), neuroticism (uneasy and anxious), extraversion (sociable and outgoing), openness (intelligence and creativity) and agreeableness (polite and trusting). One study found that participants who were high in the Openness trait were more influenced by anchors set by others when estimating the length of the Mississippi river, with no other personality traits correlating to the effects of anchoring.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=McElroy |first1=Todd |last2=Dowd |first2=Keith |date=February 2007 |title=Susceptibility to anchoring effects: How openness-to-experience influences responses to anchoring cues |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500000279 |journal=Judgment and Decision Making |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=48–53 |doi=10.1017/s1930297500000279 |issn=1930-2975}}</ref>However, other research showed that it was conscientiousness and agreeableness that increased anchoring biases, while anchoring effects were diminished in participants high in the extraversion trait. <ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Eroglu |first1=Cuneyt |last2=Croxton |first2=Keely L. |date=2010-01-01 |title=Biases in judgmental adjustments of statistical forecasts: The role of individual differences |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0169207009000442 |journal=International Journal of Forecasting |series=Special Section: European Election Forecasting |volume=26 |issue=1 |pages=116–133 |doi=10.1016/j.ijforecast.2009.02.005 |issn=0169-2070|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Furnham |first1=Adrian |last2=Boo |first2=Hua Chu |date=2011-02-01 |title=A literature review of the anchoring effect |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053535710001411 |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=35–42 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.008 |issn=1053-5357|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===Cognitive ability===
The impact of [[cognitive ability]] on anchoring is contested. A recent study on willingness to pay for consumer goods found that anchoring decreased in those with greater cognitive ability, though it did not disappear.<ref name="BergmanEllingsen2010">{{cite journal|last1=Bergman|first1=Oscar|last2=Ellingsen|first2=Tore|last3=Johannesson|first3=Magnus|last4=Svensson|first4=Cicek|title=Anchoring and cognitive ability|journal=Economics Letters|volume=107|issue=1|year=2010|pages=66–68|doi=10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.028}}</ref> Another study, however, found that cognitive ability had no significant effect on how likely people were to use anchoring.<ref name="OechsslerRoider2009">{{cite journal|last1=Oechssler|first1=Jörg|last2=Roider|first2=Andreas|last3=Schmitz|first3=Patrick W.|title=Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases|journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|volume=72|issue=1|year=2009|pages=147–152|doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.018|url=https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/21701/2/roder2.pdf}}</ref> In a poker-like experiment that included people of differing academic achievement and psychometric reasoning scoring, it has been found that anchoring is not related to education level. It also found that numerical reasoning and reflection scores had a negative association with anchoring susceptibility.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Welsh |first1=Matthew |last2=Delfabbo |first2=Paul |last3=Burns |first3=Nicholas |last4=Begg |first4=Steve |title=Individual differences in anchoring: Numerical ability, education and experience. |url=https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/69973/1/hdl_69973.pdf |website=digital.library.adelaide.edu.au|publisher=University of Adelaide |access-date=12 May 2022}}</ref>

===Overconfidence===

Although overconfidence emanates from the heuristic and refers more specifically to a behavioural tendency to take their initial assessment and put more emphasis on it during making their initial assessment leading to cognitive conceit.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dubard Barbosa |first1=Saulo |last2=Fayolle |first2=Alain |last3=Smith |first3=Brett |title=Biased and overconfident, unbiased but going for it: How framing and anchoring affect the decision to start a new venture |journal=Journal of Business Venturing |year=2019 |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=528–557 |doi=10.1016/j.jbusvent.2018.12.006 |s2cid=169264017 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Cognitive conceit or overconfidence arises from other factors like personal cognitive attributes such as knowledge and decision-making ability, decreasing the probability to pursue external sources of confirmation. This factor has also been shown to arise with tasks with greater difficulty. Even within subject matter experts, they were also prey to such behaviour of overconfidence and should more so, actively reduce such behaviour. Following the study of estimations under uncertain, despite several attempts to curb overconfidence proving unsuccessful,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fischhoff |first1=Baruch |title=Debiasing |journal=Judgment Under Uncertainty |date=30 April 1982 |pages=422–444 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511809477.032|isbn=9780521284141 }}</ref> Tversky and Kahneman (1971) suggest an effective solution to overconfidence is for subjects to explicitly establish anchors to help reduce overconfidence in their estimates.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=A. |last2=Kahneman |first2=D. |title=Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases |journal=Science |date=27 September 1974 |volume=185 |issue=4157 |pages=1124–1131 |doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124|pmid=17835457 |bibcode=1974Sci...185.1124T |s2cid=143452957 }}</ref>

===Motivation/rewards===

The motivation to be accurate in one's judgements seem to have mixed effects on the strength of anchoring. On one hand, According to Wegener's attitude change theory, it was widely accepted that the prevalent effects of anchoring was due to the pathway of low-elaboration, non-thoughtful processes.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wegener |first1=Duane T. |last2=Petty |first2=Richard E. |last3=Blankenship |first3=Kevin L. |last4=Detweiler-Bedell |first4=Brian |date=January 2010 |title=Elaboration and numerical anchoring: Implications of attitude theories for consumer judgment and decision making |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.003 |journal=Journal of Consumer Psychology |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=5–16 |doi=10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.003 |issn=1057-7408|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The lack of reward or consequences results in the assumption that anchors are a reasonable hint to the correct answer without considering contextual differences, categorical differences, or even the relevance of the anchor. There is also evidence that the effects of anchoring is diminished when there is prior warning about the phenomenon of insufficient adjustment <ref>{{Cite journal |last1=LeBoeuf |first1=Robyn A. |last2=Shafir |first2=Eldar |date=2009 |title=Anchoring on the "here" and "now" in time and distance judgments. |url=https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013665 |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=81–93 |doi=10.1037/a0013665 |pmid=19210082 |issn=1939-1285|url-access=subscription }}</ref> and self-generated anchors.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Epley |first1=Nicholas |last2=Gilovich |first2=Thomas |date=2005 |title=When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self-generated and externally provided anchors |url=https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.495 |journal=Journal of Behavioral Decision Making |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=199–212 |doi=10.1002/bdm.495 |issn=0894-3257|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":02">{{Cite journal |last1=Furnham |first1=Adrian |last2=Boo |first2=Hua Chu |date=2011-02-01 |title=A literature review of the anchoring effect |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053535710001411 |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=35–42 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.008 |issn=1053-5357|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

However, there is also conflicting evidence where increases in motivation does not correlate to a lowered rate of anchoring. There were no differences in the effects of anchoring when comparing participants who were offered monetary rewards for accurate answers to those who weren't.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=1974-09-27 |title=Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases |url=https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |journal=Science |volume=185 |issue=4157 |pages=1124–1131 |doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |pmid=17835457 |bibcode=1974Sci...185.1124T |issn=0036-8075|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Moreover, findings by Wilson et al. (1996) concluded that incentives and forewarnings did not eliminate anchoring effects.<ref name="WilsonHouston1996"/>

This could be explained by high elaborative anchoring - When motivated to be accurate, participants engage in more cognitively demanding thought processes, searching for existing information, including prior experiences and established anchors.<ref name=":02" /> The high need for accuracy lead to more effortful thought processes, and putting a heavier emphasis on anchors since they are representations of prior knowledge in what we perceive as similar categories. Findings have demonstrated that both a high and low need to be accurate result in susceptibility to the influence of anchoring effects, even when one is motivated to explicitly avoid them.<ref name=":02" />

===Culture===

Culture has been identified as an influencing factor in susceptibility to the anchoring effect. A study comparing students from Poland and India found that while both groups were affected by anchoring, the degree of susceptibility varied significantly by cultural background. Polish students demonstrated lower susceptibility to anchoring compared to Indian students.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Czerwonka |first=Monika |date=2017-09-01 |title=Anchoring and Overconfidence: The Influence of Culture and Cognitive Abilities |url=https://doi.org/10.1515/ijme-2017-0018 |journal=International Journal of Management and Economics |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=48–66 |doi=10.1515/ijme-2017-0018 |issn=2299-9701}}</ref> Researchers proposed that individuals from cultures characterized by holistic thinking styles—more common in East and South Asian societies—are more prone to contextual influences and thus more susceptible to anchoring.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Choi |first1=Incheol |last2=Koo |first2=Minkyung |last3=Jong An Choi |date=May 2007 |title=Individual Differences in Analytic Versus Holistic Thinking |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206298568 |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin |volume=33 |issue=5 |pages=691–705 |doi=10.1177/0146167206298568 |pmid=17440200 |issn=0146-1672|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Nisbett |first1=Richard E. |last2=Peng |first2=Kaiping |last3=Choi |first3=Incheol |last4=Norenzayan |first4=Ara |date=2001 |title=Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. |url=https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.108.2.291 |journal=Psychological Review |volume=108 |issue=2 |pages=291–310 |doi= 10.1037/0033-295x.108.2.291|pmid=11381831 |issn=0033-295X|url-access=subscription }} {{doi|10.1037//0033-295x.108.2.291}}</ref> Additionally, cultural differences in overconfidence were observed, with Indian students displaying a higher rate of overprecision compared to Polish students. This is explained by the differences in cultural difference in tolerances for ambiguity and risk (uncertainty avoidance), with Poland scoring high and India scoring medium to low on [[Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory#:~:text=Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is,structure derived from factor analysis.|Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kuźmińska-Haberla |first=Aleksandra |chapter=Poland and India in the Light of Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions |series=Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics |date=2018 |title=Eurasian Economic Perspectives |chapter-url=https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/eurchp/978-3-319-67916-7_17.html |volume=8/2 |language=en |pages=267–283|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-67916-7_17 |isbn=978-3-319-67915-0 }}</ref>