Editing Biosecurity (section)

===Future===
{{See also|Pandemic prevention#Biosafety technologies and biotechnology regulation}}
Biosecurity requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers, and [[law enforcement]] officials.<ref name=labbio>{{cite book|title=Laboratory Biosecurity Handbook|first1=Reynolds M. |last1=Salerno|first2= Jennifer|last2= Gaudioso|first3=Benjamin H.|last3= Brodsky|edition=Illustrated|publisher=CRC Press|date=2007|isbn=9781420006209|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V7XwtVhtr1oC&pg=PR11|page=xi|chapter=Preface|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Piper |first=Kelsey |date=2022-04-05 |title=Why experts are terrified of a human-made pandemic — and what we can do to stop it |url=https://www.vox.com/22937531/virus-lab-safety-pandemic-prevention |access-date=2022-04-08 |website=Vox |language=en}}</ref>

The emerging nature of newer biosecurity threats means that small-scale risks can blow up rapidly, which makes the development of an effective policy challenging owing to the limitations on time and resources available for analysing threats and estimating the likelihood of their occurrence.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Del Rio Vilas|first1= Alberto|last2=Voller|first2= Fay |last3=Montibeller|first3= Gilberto|last4=Franco |first4= L. Alberto | last5=Sribhashyam |first5=Sumitra| last6=Watson|first6=Eamon |last7=Hartley|first7=Matt| last8=Gibbens|first8=Jane C.|display-authors=3|date=2013-02-01|title=An integrated process and management tools for ranking multiple emerging threats to animal health|url=https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/25118 |s2cid-access=free |journal=Preventive Veterinary Medicine|volume=108|issue=2–3|pages=94–102|doi=10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.08.007|pmid=22954461|s2cid= 23937402 |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231106191721/https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/journal_contribution/An_integrated_process_and_management_tools_for_ranking_multiple_emerging_threats_to_animal_health/9500423 |archive-date= Nov 6, 2023 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jaspersen|first1=Johannes G.|last2=Montibeller|first2=Gilberto|date=2015-07-01|title=Probability Elicitation Under Severe Time Pressure: A Rank-Based Method|journal=Risk Analysis|volume=35 |issue=7|pages=1317–1335|doi=10.1111/risa.12357|issn=1539-6924|pmid=25850859|bibcode=2015RiskA..35.1317J |s2cid=30118666 |url=https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/21596 }}</ref> It is likely that further synergies with other disciplines, such as [[virology]] or the detection of [[chemical contaminant]]s, will develop over time.<ref name=infosan/>

Some uncertainties about the policy implementation for biosecurity remain for future. In order to carefully plan out preventive policies, policy makers need to be able to somewhat predict the probability and assess the risks; however, as the uncertain nature of the biosecurity issue goes it is largely difficult to predict and also involves a complex process as it requires a multidisciplinary approach. The policy choices they make to address an immediate threat could pose another threat in the future, facing an unintended trade-off.<ref name=koblentz2010/>

Philosopher [[Toby Ord]], in his 2020 book ''[[The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity]]'', puts into question whether the current international conventions regarding biotechnology research and development regulation, and self-regulation by biotechnology companies and the scientific community are adequate.<ref name=ord2020/><ref>{{Cite news|last=Ord|first=Toby|date=2021-03-23|title=Covid-19 has shown humanity how close we are to the edge|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/23/covid-19-humanity-resilience-climate-ai-pandemic|access-date=2021-03-26|issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

American scientists have proposed various [[policy]]-based measures to reduce the large risks from life sciences research – such as [[Pandemic prevention|pandemics through accident or misapplication]]. [[Risk management]] measures may include novel [[global governance|international guidelines]], effective oversight, improvement of US policies to influence policies globally, and identification of gaps in biosecurity policies along with potential approaches to address them.<ref>{{cite web |title=Forschung an Krankheitserregern soll sicherer werden |url=https://www.sciencemediacenter.de/alle-angebote/research-in-context/details/news/forschung-an-krankheitserregern-soll-sicherer-werden/ |website=Science Media Center Germany |date=2022 |access-date=17 January 2023 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pannu |first1=Jaspreet |last2=Palmer |first2=Megan J. |last3=Cicero |first3=Anita |last4=Relman |first4=David A. |last5=Lipsitch |first5=Marc |last6=Inglesby |first6=Tom |title=Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens |s2cid-access=free |url=https://www.science.org/cms/asset/f5fa7633-934b-402d-b23f-2661eacfdb36/science.adf6020.v1.pdf |journal=Science |date=16 December 2022 |volume=378 |issue=6625 |pages=1170–1172 |doi=10.1126/science.adf6020 |pmid=36480598 |bibcode=2022Sci...378.1170P |s2cid=254998228 |language=en |issn=0036-8075 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230523125753/https://www.science.org/cms/asset/f5fa7633-934b-402d-b23f-2661eacfdb36/science.adf6020.v1.pdf |archive-date= May 23, 2023 }}
* University press release: {{cite news |title=Stanford Researchers Recommend Stronger Oversight of Risky Research on Pathogens |url=https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-recommend-stronger-oversight-risky-research-pathogens |access-date=17 January 2023 |work=Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies |date= December 8, 2022 |first1=Ari |last1=Chasnoff |language=en}}</ref>

Researchers have also warned in 2024 of potential risks from [[mirror life]], a hypothetical form of life whose molecular building blocks have inverted [[chirality]]. If mirror bacteria were synthesized, they may be able to evade immune systems and spread in the environment without natural predators. They noted that the technology to create mirror bacteria was still probably more than a decade away, but called for a ban on research aiming to create them.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Adamala |first1=Katarzyna P. |last2=Agashe |first2=Deepa |last3=Belkaid |first3=Yasmine |last4=Bittencourt |first4=Daniela Matias de C. |last5=Cai |first5=Yizhi |last6=Chang |first6=Matthew W. |last7=Chen |first7=Irene A. |last8=Church |first8=George M. |last9=Cooper |first9=Vaughn S. |last10=Davis |first10=Mark M. |last11=Devaraj |first11=Neal K. |last12=Endy |first12=Drew |last13=Esvelt |first13=Kevin M. |last14=Glass |first14=John I. |last15=Hand |first15=Timothy W. |date=2024-12-12 |title=Confronting risks of mirror life |url=https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.ads9158 |journal=Science |volume=386 |issue=6728 |pages=1351–1353 |doi=10.1126/science.ads9158|pmid=39666824 |bibcode=2024Sci...386.1351A }}</ref>