Editing Code of Hammurabi (section)

==Theories of purpose==
The purpose and legal authority of the Code have been disputed since the mid-20th century.{{sfnp|Kraus|1960|p=292}} Theories fall into three main categories: that it is [[legislation]], whether a [[code of law]] or a body of [[statute]]s; that it is a sort of [[law report]], containing records of past cases and judgments; and that it is an abstract work of [[jurisprudence]]. The jurisprudence theory has gained much support within Assyriology.{{sfnmp|1a1=Kraus|1y=1960|2a1=Oppenheim|2y=1977|3a1=Bottéro|3y=1992|3loc=chapter 10|4a1=Van De Mieroop|4y=2016|4loc=chapters 6–7}}

===Legislation===
{{multiple image
| total_width       = 300
| image1            = Mosaic of Justinianus I - Basilica San Vitale (Ravenna).jpg
| alt1              = Mosaic of Justinian I
| image2            = Napoleon Bonaparte.jpg
| alt2              = Painting of Napoleon Bonaparte in His Study at the Tuileries
| footer            = [[Justinian I]] of the [[Byzantine Empire]] (L) and [[Napoléon Bonaparte]] of France (R) both created legal codes to which the Louvre stele has been compared.
}}

The term "code" presupposes that the document was intended to be enforced as legislation. It was used by Scheil in his {{lang|la|editio princeps}},{{sfnmp|1a1=Souvay|1y=1910|2a1=Kraus|2y=1960|2p=283}} and widely adopted afterwards. C. H. W. Johns, one of the most prolific early commentators on the document, proclaimed that "the Code well deserves its name".{{sfnp|Johns|1903b|p=258}} Recent Assyriologists have used the term without comment,{{sfnmp|1a1=Pfeifer|1y=2011|2a1=Rositani|2y=2017}} as well as scholars outside Assyriology.{{sfnmp|1a1=Alkadry|1y=2002–2003|2a1=Pearn|2y=2016}} However, only if the text was intended as enforced legislation can it truly be called a code of law and its provisions laws.

The document, on first inspection, resembles a highly organised code similar to the [[Code of Justinian]] and the [[Napoleonic Code]].{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=170}} There is also evidence that {{lang|akk|dīnātum}}, which in the Code of Hammurabi sometimes denote individual "laws", were enforced.{{sfnp|Oppenheim|Reiner|1959|pp=150–153}} One copy of the Code calls it a {{lang|akk|ṣimdat šarrim}}, "royal decree", which denotes a kind of enforced legislation.{{sfnp|Bottéro|1992|pp=180–181}}

However, the arguments against this view are strong. Firstly, it would make a very unusual code—Reuven Yaron called the designation "Code" a "persistent misnomer".{{sfnp|Yaron|2013|p=580}} Vital areas of society and commerce are omitted.{{sfnmp|1a1=Driver|1a2=Miles|1y=1952|1pp=45ff.|2a1=Bottéro|2y=1992|2p=161}} For example, [[Marc Van De Mieroop]] observes that the Code "deals with cattle and agricultural fields, but it almost entirely ignores the work of shepherds, vital to Babylonia's economy".{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=165}} Then, against the legislation theory more generally, highly implausible circumstances are covered, such as [[threshing]] with goats, animals far too unruly for the task (law 270).{{sfnmp|1a1=Van De Mieroop|1y=2016|1p=167|2a1=Roth|2y=1995a|2p=130}} The laws are also strictly casuistic ("if{{nbsp}}... then"); unlike in the Mosaic Law, there are no apodictic laws (general commands). These would more obviously suggest prescriptive legislation. The strongest argument against the legislation theory, however, is that most judges appear to have paid the Code no attention. This line of criticism originated with [[Benno Landsberger]] in 1950.{{sfnp|Kraus|1960|p=292}} No Mesopotamian legal document explicitly references the Code or any other law collection,{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=170}} despite the great scale of the corpus.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=172}} Two references to prescriptions on "a stele" ({{lang|akk|narû}}){{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=173}} come closest. In contrast, numerous judgments cite royal {{lang|akk|mīšarum}}-decrees.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=170}} [[Raymond Westbrook]] held that this strengthened the [[argument from silence]] that ancient Near Eastern legal "codes" had legal import.{{sfnp|Westbrook|2003|p=19}} Furthermore, many Old Babylonian judgments run entirely counter to the Code's prescriptions.{{sfnmp|1a1=Oppenheim|1y=1977|1p=211|2a1=Bottéro|2y=1992|2pp=163–164|3a1=Roth|3y=1995a|3pp=5–6}}

===Law report===
[[File:Library of Ashurbanipal.jpg|thumb|alt=Photograph. Refer to caption|A [[British Museum]] display of tablets from the [[Library of Ashurbanipal]]. The Library lists a copy of the "judgments of Hammurabi" over a millennium after Hammurabi's death.]]

A second theory is that the Code is a sort of law report, and as such contains records of past cases and judgments, albeit phrased abstractly. This would provide one explanation for the casuistic format of the "laws"; indeed, [[Jean Bottéro]] believed he had found a record of a case that inspired one.{{sfnp|Bottéro|1992|pp=171–172}} However, such finds are inconclusive and very rare, despite the scale of the Mesopotamian legal corpus.{{sfnp|Bottéro|1992|pp=163–164}} Furthermore, legal judgments were frequently recorded in Mesopotamia, and they recount the facts of the case without generalising them.{{sfnmp|1a1=Roth|1y=2001|2a1=Klein|2y=2007}} These judgments were concerned almost exclusively with points of fact, prompting Martha Roth to comment: "I know of only one case out of thousands extant that might be said to revolve around a point of law".{{sfnp|Roth|2001|p=255}}

===Jurisprudence===
A third theory, which has gained traction within Assyriology, is that the Code is not a true code but an abstract treatise on how judgments should be formulated. This led Fritz Rudolf Kraus, in an early formulation of the theory, to call it jurisprudence ({{lang|de|Rechtssprüche}}).{{sfnp|Kraus|1960|p=288}} Kraus proposed that it was a work of Mesopotamian scholarship in the same category as omen collections like {{lang|akk|[[šumma ālu]]}} and {{lang|akk|ana ittišu}}.{{sfnp|Kraus|1960|p=288}} Others have provided their own versions of this theory.{{sfnmp|1a1=Saggs|1y=1965|1pp=80ff.|2a1=Oppenheim|2y=1977|2p=287|3a1=Bottéro|3y=1992|3pp=166–167|4a1=Van De Mieroop|4y=2016|4loc=chapters 6–7}} [[A. Leo Oppenheim]] remarked that the Code of Hammurabi and similar Mesopotamian law collections "represent an interesting formulation of social criticism and should not be taken as normative directions".{{sfnp|Oppenheim|1977|p=158}}

This interpretation bypasses the problem of low congruence between the Code and actual legal judgments. Secondly, the Code does bear striking similarities to other works of Mesopotamian scholarship. Key points of similarity are the list format and the order of the items,{{sfnmp|1a1=Bottéro|1y=1992|1pp=173ff.|2a1=Van De Mieroop|2y=2016|2pp=165ff}} which Ann Guinan describes as a complex "serial logic".{{sfnp|Guinan|2014|p=115}} Marc Van De Mieroop explains that, in common with other works of Mesopotamian scholarship such as omen lists, king lists, and god lists, the entries of the Code of Hammurabi are arranged according to two principles. These are "opposition"—whereby a variable in one entry is altered to make another entry—and "pointillism"—whereby new conditions are added to an entry, or paradigmatic series pursued, to generate a sequence.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|pp=165ff.}} Van De Mieroop provides the following examples:

{{Blockquote|text=If a physician performs major surgery with a bronze lancet upon an [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}] and thus heals the [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}], or opens an [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}]'s temple with a bronze lancet and thus heals the [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}]'s eye, he shall take ten shekels of silver (as his fee).|title=Law 215{{sfnp|Roth|1995a|p=123}}|}}
{{Blockquote|text=If a physician performs major surgery with a bronze lancet upon an [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}] and thus causes the [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}]'s death, or opens an [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}]'s temple with a bronze lancet and thus blinds the [{{lang|akk|awīlum}}]'s eye, they shall cut off his hand.|title=Law 218{{sfnp|Roth|1995a|p=123}}|}}

Laws 215 and 218 illustrate the principle of opposition: one variable of the first law, the outcome of the operations, is altered to create the second.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=166}}

{{Blockquote|text=If there is either a soldier or [an auxiliary] who is taken captive while serving in a royal fortress [...] if he should [...] return and get back to his city, they shall return to him his field and orchard and he himself shall perform his service obligation.

If there is either a soldier or [an auxiliary] who is taken captive in a royal fortress, and his son is able to perform the service obligation, the field and orchard shall be given to him, and he shall perform his father's service obligation.

If his son is young and is unable to perform his father's service obligation, one third of the field and orchard shall be given to his mother, and his mother shall raise him.|title=Laws 27–29{{sfnp|Roth|1995a|p=86}}|}}

Here, following the principle of pointillism, circumstances are added to the first entry to create more entries.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|pp=166–167}} Pointillism also lets list entries be generated by following paradigmatic series common to multiple branches of scholarship. It can thus explain the implausible entries. For example, in the case of the goat used for threshing (law 270),{{sfnp|Roth|1995a|p=130}} the previous laws concern other animals that ''were'' used for threshing. The established series of domesticated beasts dictated that a goat come next.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=167}}

[[Wolfram von Soden]], who decades earlier called this way of thinking {{lang|de|Listenwissenschaft}} ("list science"),{{sfnp|von Soden|1936}} often denigrated it.{{sfnmp|1a1=von Soden|1y=1936|2a1=von Soden|2y=1994|2pp=146, 158}} However, more recent writers, such as Marc Van De Mieroop, Jean Bottéro, and Ann Guinan, have either avoided value judgments or expressed admiration. Lists were central to Mesopotamian science and logic, and their distinctive structural principles let entries be generated infinitely.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=167}} Linking the Code to the scribal tradition within which "list science" emerged also explains why trainee scribes copied and studied it for over a millennium.{{sfnp|Roth|1995b|p=20}} The Code appears in a late Babylonian (7th–6th century BC) list of literary and scholarly texts.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=175}} No other law collection became so entrenched in the curriculum.{{sfnp|Charpin|2010|p=81}} Rather than a code of laws, then, it may be a scholarly treatise.{{sfnp|Van De Mieroop|2016|p=173}}

Much has been written on what the Code suggests about Old Babylonian society and its legal system.{{failed verification|date=March 2023}} For example, whether it demonstrates that there were no professional advocates,{{sfnp|Johns|1911}} or that there were professional judges.{{sfnp|Charpin|2010|p=52}} Scholars who approach the Code as a self-contained document renounce such claims.{{sfnmp|1a1=Kraus|1y=1960|1pp=295–296|2a1=Roth|2y=1995b|2pp=13ff}}