Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
First day on the Somme
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
====Infantry==== A BEF manual published on 8 May 1916 (SS 109, ''Training of Divisions For Offensive Action''), described successions of lines to add driving power to the attack, to reach the objective with the capacity to consolidate the captured ground against counter-attack.{{sfn|Griffith|1996|p=56}}{{efn|[[Paddy Griffith]] criticised [[James Edward Edmonds|James Edmonds]], the official historian, for assuming that line-formations were rigid, not capable of [[Infiltration tactics|infiltration]] and inferior to small groups or blobs, despite them being complementary forms which were used throughout the war.{{sfn|Griffith|1996|p=56}}}} In the Fourth Army Tactical Notes of May 1916, battalions were allowed to attack on a front of {{nowrap|2β4 platoons}} in {{nowrap|8β4 waves}} about {{cvt|100|yd}} apart. Supporting lines were to pass through the leading ones, to avoid excessive demands on the energy and ability of individual soldiers. Weight of numbers was rejected as a tactic; each platoon was to carry half the burden of a brigade attack for a few minutes, before being relieved by a fresh wave. Platoons were divided into functions, fighting, mopping-up, support and carrying; the fighting platoons were to press on as the moppers-up secured the ground behind them. Support and carrying platoons could pick their way through artillery barrages with the tools and weapons needed to consolidate and defeat German counter-attacks.{{sfn|Griffith|1996|pp=56β57}} Some troops in carrying platoons had about {{cvt|66|lb}} of equipment and tools, whereas troops in the advanced platoons carried a [[rifle]], [[bayonet]], {{nowrap|170 rounds}} of ammunition, iron ration (an emergency ration of preserved food, tea, sugar and salt), two [[grenade]]s, pick, shovel or [[entrenching tool]], four empty sandbags, two [[PH helmet|gas helmets]], wire cutters, a [[smoke candle]] and a water-bottle.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|pp=196β211}}{{efn|In the 56th (1/1st London) Division, each man carried {{nowrap|200 rounds}} of small-arms ammunition, a waterproof sheet, haversack, iron ration and the day's ration, two or three sandbags, two gas helmets and a "proportion of wire-cutters, bill-hooks and tools".{{sfn|Dudley Ward|2001|p=31}}}} In the French army, the experience of 1915 showed that despite the power of French bombardments, infantry would enter a chaotic environment, full of German pockets of resistance and individuals who had been by-passed. By mid-1916 much of the French infantry in the Sixth Army were specialist rifle-and-bayonet men, bombers, rifle grenadiers or light machine-gun crews. Attacking waves were spread wider and companies trained to manoeuvre in small groups, to get behind surviving German defences, as {{lang|fr|Nettoyeurs de TranchΓ©es}} (trench cleaners) armed with hand-grenades and revolvers, searched captured ground for stray Germans and hidden machine-gunners, although such methods did not come into general use until later in the year.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=149β150}}
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)