Editing Kyoto Protocol (section)

===Negotiations===

{{See also|Views on the Kyoto Protocol#Commentaries on negotiations}}

Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC commits industrialized countries to "[take] the lead" in reducing emissions.<ref name="grubb original unfccc target">
{{harvnb|Grubb|2003|p=144}}
</ref> The initial aim was for industrialized countries to stabilize their emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.<ref name="grubb original unfccc target"/> The failure of key industrialized countries to move in this direction was a principal reason why Kyoto moved to binding commitments.<ref name="grubb original unfccc target"/>

At the first UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Berlin, the [[Group of 77|G77]] was able to push for a mandate (the "Berlin mandate") where it was recognized that:<ref name="liverman berlin mandate">
{{harvnb|Liverman|2009|p=290}}
</ref>
* developed nations had contributed most to the then-current concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere (see [[Greenhouse gas emissions]]).
* developing country emissions per-capita (i.e., average emissions per head of population)<ref>{{citation
 | title=Table A1: Energy-related emissions: Indicator: per capita (metric tons)
 | chapter=Part II: Selected Development Indicators
 | chapter-url=http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1327504426766/8389626-1327510418796/Statistical-Annex.pdf
 | access-date=31 August 2012
 | archive-date=1 November 2012
 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121101133001/http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1327504426766/8389626-1327510418796/Statistical-Annex.pdf
 | url-status=live
 }}, in {{harvnb|World Bank|2010|p=370}}</ref> were still relatively low.
* and that the share of global emissions from developing countries would grow to meet their development needs.
During negotiations, the G-77 represented 133 developing countries. China was not a member of the group but an associate.<ref>
{{harvnb|Dessai|2001|p=4}}
</ref> It has since become a member.<ref>
{{harvnb|G-77|2011}}
</ref>

The Berlin mandate was recognized in the Kyoto Protocol in that developing countries were not subject to emission reduction commitments in the first Kyoto commitment period.<ref name="liverman berlin mandate"/> However, the large potential for growth in developing country emissions made negotiations on this issue tense.<ref name="grubb developing country emissions">
{{harvnb|Grubb|2003|pp=145–146}}
</ref> In the final agreement, the Clean Development Mechanism was designed to limit emissions in developing countries, but in such a way that developing countries do not bear the costs for limiting emissions.<ref name="grubb developing country emissions"/> The general assumption was that developing countries would face quantitative commitments in later commitment periods, and at the same time, developed countries would meet their first round commitments.<ref name="grubb developing country emissions"/>

====Emissions cuts====
[[File:Kyoto Parties with first period (2008-2012) greenhouse gas emissions limitations targets and the percentage change in their carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion between 1990 and 2009.png|thumb|upright=1.8|alt=Refer to caption|Kyoto Parties with first period (2008–12) greenhouse gas emissions limitations targets, and the percentage change in their carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion between 1990 and 2009. For more detailed country/region information, see [[Kyoto Protocol and government action]].]]
[[File:Overview map of states committed to greenhouse gas limitations in the first Kyoto Protocol period (years 2008-2012) (greyscale).png|thumb|upright=1.8|alt=Refer to caption|Overview map of states committed to greenhouse gas (GHG) limitations in the first Kyoto Protocol period (2008–12):<ref>{{cite web | date=n.d. | url=http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php | title=Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Annex B | publisher=United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change | access-date= 8 October 2011}}</ref><br />
{{legend|#000000|Annex I Parties who have agreed to reduce their GHG emissions below their individual base year levels (see definition in this article)}}
{{legend|#737373|Annex I Parties who have agreed to cap their GHG emissions at their base year levels}} {{legend|#f2f2f2|Non-Annex I Parties who are not obligated by caps or Annex I Parties with an emissions cap that allows their emissions to expand above their base year levels or countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol}}
<br />
For specific emission reduction commitments of Annex I Parties, see the section of the article on [[Kyoto Protocol#2012 emission targets and "flexible mechanisms"|2012 emission targets and "flexible mechanisms"]].<br />
<br />
The European Union as a whole has, in accordance with this treaty, committed itself to a reduction of 8%. However, many member states (such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Sweden) have not committed themselves to any reduction while France has committed itself not to expand its emissions (0% reduction).<ref>{{cite web |title=Kyoto 1st commitment period (2008–12) |url=https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress/kyoto_1_en |website=[[European Commission]] |access-date=2020-03-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161221064248/https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress/kyoto_1_en |archive-date=2016-12-21 |url-status=unfit}}</ref>]]
There were multiple emissions cuts [[Views on the Kyoto Protocol#Commentaries on negotiations|proposed by UNFCCC parties]] during negotiations. The G77 and China were in favour of strong uniform emission cuts across the developed world.<ref name="liverman negotiations">
{{harvnb|Liverman|2009|p=291}}
</ref> The US originally proposed for the second round of negotiations on Kyoto commitments to follow the negotiations of the first.<ref name="grubb second round negotiations">
{{harvnb|Grubb|2003|p=148}}
</ref> In the end, negotiations on the second period were set to open no later than 2005.<ref name="grubb second round negotiations"/> Countries over-achieving in their first period commitments can "bank" their unused allowances for use in the subsequent period.<ref name="grubb second round negotiations"/>

The EU initially argued for only three GHGs to be included – {{CO2}}, {{chem2|CH4}}, and {{chem2|N2O}} – with other gases such as HFCs regulated separately.<ref name="liverman negotiations"/> The EU also wanted to have a "bubble" commitment, whereby it could make a collective commitment that allowed some EU members to increase their emissions, while others cut theirs.<ref name="liverman negotiations"/>

The most vulnerable nations – the [[Alliance of Small Island States]] (AOSIS) – pushed for deep uniform cuts by developed nations, with the goal of having emissions reduced to the greatest possible extent.<ref name="liverman negotiations"/> Countries that had supported differentiation of targets had different ideas as to how it should be calculated, and many different indicators were proposed.<ref name="grubb differentiation"/> Two examples include differentiation of targets based on [[gross domestic product]] (GDP), and differentiation based on [[energy intensity]] (energy use per unit of economic output).<ref name="grubb differentiation">
{{harvnb|Grubb|2003|p=151}}
</ref>

The final targets negotiated in the Protocol are the result of last minute political compromises.<ref name="liverman negotiations"/> The targets closely match those decided by Argentinian [[Raul Estrada]], the [[diplomat]] who chaired the negotiations.<ref>
{{harvnb|Depledge|2000|p=46}}
</ref> The numbers given to each Party by Chairman Estrada were based on targets already pledged by Parties, information received on latest negotiating positions, and the goal of achieving the strongest possible environmental outcome.<ref>
{{harvnb|Depledge|2000|p=44}}
</ref> The final targets are weaker than those proposed by some Parties, e.g., the [[Alliance of Small Island States]] and the G-77 and China, but stronger than the targets proposed by others, e.g., Canada and the United States.<ref>
{{harvnb|Depledge|2000|p=45}}
</ref>

==== Relation to temperature targets ====
At the [[2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference|16th Conference of the Parties]] held in 2010, Parties to the UNFCCC agreed that future global warming should be limited [[2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference#Outcome|below 2°C]] relative to the pre-industrial temperature level.<ref>{{citation |author=[[United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change]] (UNFCCC) |title=Conference of the Parties - Sixteenth Session: Decision 1/CP.16: The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (English): Paragraph 4 |url=http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2 |page=3 |year=2011 |location=[[Bonn]], [[Germany]] |publisher=UNFCCC Secretariat |format=PDF |access-date=17 July 2012 |archive-date=13 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200113095453/https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2 |url-status=live }}</ref> One of the stabilization levels discussed in relation to this temperature target is to hold atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at 450 [[parts per million]] (ppm) {{CO2}}- eq.<ref>{{citation |author=[[International Energy Agency]] (IEA) |title=World Energy Outlook 2010 |page=380 |year=2010 |access-date=17 July 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120715234406/http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf |url-status=dead |chapter=13. Energy and the ultimate climate change target |chapter-url=http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf |location=Paris, France |publisher=IEA |isbn=978-92-64-08624-1 |archive-date=15 July 2012 |title-link=World Energy Outlook}}</ref> Stabilization at 450&nbsp;ppm could be associated with a 26 to 78% risk of exceeding the 2&nbsp;°C target.<ref>{{citation |last1=Levin |first1=K. |title=Working Paper: Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges |date=February 2010 |url=http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_pledges_2010-02-01.pdf |page=16 |location=Washington DC, USA |publisher=[[World Resources Institute]] |last2=Bradley |first2=R. |access-date=17 July 2012 |archive-date=13 May 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513000602/http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_pledges_2010-02-01.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

Scenarios assessed by Gupta ''et al.'' (2007)<ref name="450ppm scenarios">{{citation |last1=Gupta |first1=S. |title=Box 13.7 The range of the difference between emissions in 1990 and emission allowances in 2020/2050 for various GHG concentration levels for Annex I and non-Annex I countries as a group |df=dmy-all |access-date=17 July 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121210151654/http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch13s13-3-3-3.html |url-status=dead |chapter=Chapter 13: Policies, instruments, and co-operative arrangements |chapter-url=http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch13s13-3-3-3.html |display-authors=etal |archive-date=10 December 2012}}
, in {{harvnb|IPCC AR4 WG3|2007}}</ref> suggest that Annex I emissions would need to be 25% to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% to 95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The only Annex I Parties to have made voluntary pledges in line with this are Japan (25% below 1990 levels by 2020) and Norway (30–40% below 1990 levels by 2020).<ref>
{{citation |author=King, D. |title=International climate change negotiations: Key lessons and next steps |date=July 2011 |url=http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Climate-Negotiations-report_Final.pdf |page=12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113033748/http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Climate-Negotiations-report_Final.pdf |url-status=dead |chapter=Copenhagen and Cancun |location=Oxford, UK |publisher=Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford |display-authors=etal |archive-date=13 January 2012}}
</ref>

Gupta ''et al.'' (2007)<ref name="450ppm scenarios" /> also looked at what 450&nbsp;ppm scenarios projected for non-Annex I Parties. Projections indicated that by 2020, non-Annex I emissions in several regions ([[Latin America]], the [[Middle East]], [[East Asia]], and [[planned economy|centrally planned]] [[Asia]]) would need to be substantially reduced below [[Economics of climate change mitigation#Baselines|"business-as-usual"]].<ref name="450ppm scenarios" /> "Business-as-usual" are projected non-Annex I emissions in the absence of any new policies to control emissions. Projections indicated that by 2050, emissions in all non-Annex I regions would need to be substantially reduced below "business-as-usual".<ref name="450ppm scenarios" />