Editing Learned Hand (section)

==Philosophy==
[[Image:William James, philosopher.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Pragmatism|Pragmatic]] philosopher [[William James]] was one of Hand's teachers at [[Harvard College]].]]

Hand's study of philosophy at Harvard left a lasting imprint on his thought. As a student, he lost his faith in God, and from that point on he became a [[skepticism|skeptic]].<ref>"Skepticism is my only gospel, but I don't want to make a dogma out of it." Qtd. in [[Lewis F. Powell]], "Foreword", {{Harvnb|Gunther| 1994| p= x}}</ref> Hand's view of the world has been identified as [[moral relativism|relativistic]]; in the words of scholar Kathryn Griffith, "[i]t was his devotion to a concept of relative values that prompted him to question opinions of the Supreme Court which appeared to place one value absolutely above the others, whether the value was that of individual freedom or equality or the protection of young people from obscene literature."<ref name="Griffith1973-vii">{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| p=vii}}</ref> Hand instead sought objective standards in constitutional law, most famously in [[obscenity]] and [[civil liberties]] cases.<ref>{{Harvnb| Gunther| 1994|p=405}}</ref> He saw the Constitution and the law as compromises to resolve conflicting interests, possessing no moral force of their own.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schick|1970| p=165}}; {{Harvnb|Dworkin|1996|p=12}}</ref> This denial that any divine or [[natural rights]] are embodied in the Constitution led Hand to a [[legal positivism|positivistic]] view of the [[United States Bill of Rights|Bill of Rights]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith|1973|p=192}}; {{Harvnb|Dworkin|1996|p=342}}</ref> In this approach, provisions of the Constitution, such as freedom of press, freedom of speech, and equal protection, should be interpreted through their wording and in the light of historical analysis rather than as "guides on concrete occasions".<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| pp=131–140}}; {{Harvnb|White|2007|pp=217–218}}</ref> For Hand, moral values were a product of their times and a matter of taste.<ref name="Griffith1973-vii" />

Hand's civil instincts were at odds with the duty of a judge to stay aloof from politics.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schick|1970| p=186}}</ref> As a judge he respected even bad laws; as a member of society he felt free to question the decisions behind legislation. In his opinion, members of a democratic society should be involved in legislative decision-making.<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| pp=57–58}}; {{Harvnb|Dworkin|1996|pp=342–343}}</ref> He therefore regarded toleration as a prerequisite of civil liberty. In practice, this even meant that those who wish to promote ideas repugnant to the majority should be free to do so, within broad limits.<ref>"The limits Hand placed on choice are similar to those [[John Stuart Mill]] placed upon freedom when he denied the freedom to destroy liberty or the social and political structure which protected it." {{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| p=60}}</ref>

Hand's skepticism extended to his [[political philosophy]], once describing himself as "a conservative among liberals, and a liberal among conservatives".<ref>{{Harvnb|Carrington|1999|p=138}}; {{Harvnb|Polenberg|1995|pp=296–301}}</ref> As early as 1898, he rejected his family's Jeffersonian Democratic tradition.<ref>{{Harvnb| Gunther|1994|pp=62–63}}</ref> His thoughts on [[liberty]], collected in ''The Spirit of Liberty'' (1952), began by recalling the political philosophies of [[Thomas Jefferson]] and [[Alexander Hamilton]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunther|1994|pp=193–194}}</ref> Jefferson believed that each individual has a [[natural right|right]] to freedom, and that government, though necessary, threatens that freedom. In contrast, Hamilton argued that freedom depends on government: too much freedom leads to anarchy and the [[Ochlocracy|tyranny of the mob]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| p=65}}</ref> Hand, who believed, following [[Thomas Hobbes]], that the [[rule of law]] is the only alternative to the rule of brutality,<ref>{{Harvnb|Wyzanski| 1964|p=vi}}</ref> leaned towards Hamilton.<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| p=86.}} "Hamilton thought government consisted of combinations based on self-interest and that liberty did not rest on anarchy. Man required an ordered society, which included not only individual concerns but collective interests and which permitted human life to rise above that of the savage and made possible joint efforts and thus more comfort, security, and leisure for a better life. He believed that while Jacobins cried for liberty what they really wanted was to exercise their own tyranny over the mob. It appeared to Hand that history had proved Hamilton right."</ref> Since the freedom granted to the [[American pioneer]]s was no longer feasible,<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunther| 1994| p=193}}</ref> he accepted that individual liberty should be moderated by society's norms.<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| p=67}}</ref> He nevertheless saw the liberty to create and to choose as vital to peoples' humanity and entitled to legal protection. He assumed the goal of human beings to be the "good life", defined as each individual chooses.<ref>{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| p=190}}</ref>

Between 1910 and 1916, Hand tried to translate his political philosophy into political action. Having read Croly's ''[[The Promise of American Life]]'' and its anti-Jeffersonian plea for government [[economic interventionism|intervention]] in economic and social issues, he joined the Progressive Party.<ref name="G61">{{Harvnb|Griffith| 1973| pp=56–57,60–63}}</ref> He discovered that party politicking was incompatible not only with his role as a judge but with his philosophical objectivity. The [[pragmatism|pragmatic]] philosophy Hand had imbibed from [[William James]] at Harvard required each issue to be individually judged on its merits, without partiality. In contrast, political action required partisanship and a choice between values.<ref name="G61" /> After 1916, Hand preferred to retreat from party politics into a detached skepticism. His belief in [[planned economy|central planning]] resurfaced during the 1930s in his growing approval of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, as he once again—though this time as an observer—endorsed a program of government intervention.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunther|1994|p=453}}</ref> Hand was also an [[interventionism (politics)|interventionist]] on foreign policy, supporting U.S. involvement in both world wars, and disdained [[non-interventionism|isolationism]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunther| 1994| pp=368, 535}}</ref>