Editing Middle Way (section)

=== Yogācāra ===
The Yogācāra school examines emptiness through its central teaching of the three basic modes of existence or "three natures" (''[[Svabhava|svabhāva]]'').<ref>Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 176.</ref><ref name="auto">Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vasubandhu/</ref> In Yogācāra, the ultimate basis for the erroneous conceptualizations we make about existence (like ideas of a self, etc.) is the ''Paratantra-svabhāva'', which is the [[dependently originated]] nature of [[dharmas]], or the causal process of the fabrication of things. According to the  ''[[Mahāyānasaṃgraha]]'' (2:25) this basis is considered to be an ultimately existing (''[[Paramārtha-satya|paramārtha]]'') basis. However, this basis is empty since the events in this causal flow do not exist on their own and are dependent phenomena.<ref name="auto"/><ref>Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, pp. 177–178.</ref>

In Yogācāra, emptiness is understood mainly as an absence of duality which holds that ultimate reality is beyond all dualities like self and other (or any other concepts like 'physical' and 'non-physical', internal and external).<ref name="auto"/><ref>Skilton, Andrew (1994). ''A Concise History of Buddhism''. Windhorse Publications, London:. pg 124</ref> All dualities are an unreal superimposition since ultimately there is only an interconnected causal stream of mental events.<ref name="auto"/>

Unlike Madhyamaka, Yogācāra philosophy argues that there is a sense in which consciousness can be said to exist, that is, it exists in a dependent and empty way.<ref name=":16">King, Richard, Early Yogācāra and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 pp. 659–683.</ref> Indeed, [[Madhyamaka]] philosophers were criticized by Yogācārins like Asanga for being nihilistic (and thus, of having fallen from the middle way). According to Asanga "If nothing is real, there cannot be any ideas (''prajñapti''). Someone who holds this view is a nihilist."<ref>Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). ''Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals?'' pp. 124–129. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}}.</ref> The Yogācāra position is that there is something that exists, the empty and purely mental (''prajñapti-matra'') stream of dependent arising. The ''[[Yogacarabhumi-sastra|Bodhisattvabhūmi]]'' argues that it is only logical to speak of emptiness if there is ''something'' that is empty.<ref name=":16" />