Editing Plato (section)

== Philosophy ==
{{main|Platonism}}
{{Platonism}}
In Plato's dialogues, Socrates and his company of disputants had something to say on many subjects, including several aspects of [[metaphysics]]. These include religion and science, human nature, love, and sexuality. More than one dialogue contrasts perception and [[reality]], [[nature]] and custom, and body and soul. [[F. M. Cornford|Francis Cornford]] identified the "twin pillars of Platonism" as the theory of Forms, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the doctrine of immortality of the soul.<ref>Francis Cornford, 1941. ''The Republic of Plato''. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. xxv.</ref>

=== The Forms ===
{{no sources|section|date=April 2025}}
{{See also|Theory of forms|l1=Plato's theory of Forms}}
In the dialogues Socrates regularly asks for the meaning of a general term (e. g. justice, truth, beauty), and criticizes those who instead give him particular examples, rather than the quality shared by all examples. "Platonism" and its theory of Forms (also known as 'theory of Ideas') denies the reality of the material world, considering it only an image or copy of the real world. According to this theory of Forms, there are these two kinds of things: the apparent world of material objects grasped by the senses, which constantly changes, and an unchanging and unseen world of Forms, grasped by reason ({{lang|grc|λογική}}). Plato's Forms represent [[Type (metaphysics)|types]] of things, as well as [[property (metaphysics)|properties]], patterns, and [[Relations (philosophy)|relations]], which are referred to as objects. Just as individual tables, chairs, and cars refer to objects in this world, 'tableness', 'chairness', and 'carness', as well as e.g. [[justice]], [[truth]], and [[beauty]] refer to objects in another world. One of Plato's most cited examples for the Forms were the truths of [[geometry]], such as the [[Pythagorean theorem]]. The theory of Forms is first introduced in the ''[[Phaedo]]'' dialogue (also known as ''On the Soul''), wherein Socrates disputes the [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]] of [[Anaxagoras]], then the most popular response to Heraclitus and Parmenides.

=== The Soul ===
{{See also|Plato's theory of soul}}
For Plato, as was characteristic of ancient Greek philosophy, the soul was that which gave life. Plato advocates a belief in the immortality of the soul, and several dialogues end with long speeches imagining the [[afterlife]]. In the ''Timaeus'', Socrates locates the parts of the soul within the human body: Reason is located in the head, spirit in the top third of the [[torso]], and the appetite in the middle third of the torso, down to the [[navel]].{{sfn|Dorter|2006|p=360}}

Furthermore, Plato evinces a belief in the theory of [[reincarnation]] in multiple dialogues (such as the ''Phaedo'' and ''Timaeus''). Scholars debate whether he intends the theory to be literally true, however.{{sfn|Jorgenson|2018}} He uses this idea of reincarnation to introduce the concept that knowledge is a matter of [[Anamnesis (philosophy)|recollection]] of things acquainted with before one is born, and not of observation or study.{{sfn|Baird & Kaufmann|2008}} Keeping with the theme of admitting his own ignorance, Socrates regularly complains of his forgetfulness. In the ''Meno'', Socrates uses a geometrical example to expound Plato's view that knowledge in this latter sense is acquired by recollection. Socrates elicits a fact concerning a geometrical construction from a slave boy, who could not have otherwise known the fact (due to the slave boy's lack of education). The knowledge must be of, Socrates concludes, an eternal, non-perceptible Form.

=== Epistemology ===
{{main|Platonic epistemology}}
Plato also discusses several aspects of [[epistemology]]. In several dialogues, Socrates inverts the common man's intuition about what is knowable and what is real. Reality is unavailable to those who use their senses. Socrates says that he who sees with his eyes is blind. While most people take the objects of their senses to be real if anything is, Socrates is contemptuous of people who think that something has to be graspable in the hands to be real. In other words, such people are willingly ignorant, living without divine inspiration and access to higher insights about reality. Although Plato has occasionally been presented as having been the first to write{{snd}}that [[knowledge]] is [[justified true belief]] in the ''Theaetetus'',{{sfn|Fine|2003|p=5}} Plato also identified problems with this same ''justified true belief'' definition in that same work, concluding that justification (or an "account") would require knowledge of ''difference'', meaning that the [[definition of knowledge]] is [[circular reasoning|circular]].{{sfn|McDowell|1973|p=256}}

In the ''Sophist'', ''[[Statesman (dialogue)|Statesman]]'', ''Republic'', ''Timaeus'', and the ''Parmenides'', Plato associates knowledge with the apprehension of unchanging Forms and their relationships to one another (which he calls "expertise" in dialectic), including through the processes of ''collection'' and ''division''.{{sfn|Taylor|2011|pp=176–187}} More explicitly, Plato himself argues in the ''Timaeus'' that knowledge is always proportionate to the realm from which it is gained. In other words, if one derives one's account of something experientially, because the world of sense is in flux, the views therein attained will be mere opinions. Meanwhile, opinions are characterized by a lack of necessity and stability. On the other hand, if one derives one's account of something by way of the non-sensible Forms, because these Forms are unchanging, so too is the account derived from them. That apprehension of Forms is required for knowledge may be taken to cohere with Plato's theory in the ''Theaetetus'' and ''Meno''.{{sfn|Lee|2011|p=432}} Indeed, the apprehension of Forms may be at the base of the account required for justification, in that it offers [[Foundationalism|foundational]] knowledge which itself needs no account, thereby avoiding an [[infinite regression]].{{sfn|Taylor|2011|p=189}}

[[File:Temida, Gdansk Court.jpg|thumb|upright=0.9|"What is justice?" forms one of the core quandaries of the ''Republic''.]]

=== Ethics ===
{{see also|Form of the Good}}
Several dialogues discuss [[ethics]] including virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, crime and punishment, and justice and medicine. Socrates presents the famous [[Euthyphro dilemma]] in the [[Euthyphro|dialogue]] of the same name: "Is the [[piety|pious]] ([[:wikt:ὅσιος|τὸ ὅσιον]]) loved by the [[deity|gods]] because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" ([[Stephanus pagination|10a]]) In the ''Protagoras'' dialogue it is argued through Socrates that virtue is innate and cannot be learned, that no one does bad on purpose, and to know what is good results in doing what is good; that knowledge is virtue. In the ''Republic'', Plato poses the question, "What is justice?" and by examining both individual justice and the justice that informs societies, Plato is able not only to inform metaphysics, but also ethics and politics with the question: "What is the basis of moral and social obligation?" Plato's well-known answer rests upon the fundamental responsibility to seek wisdom, wisdom which leads to an understanding of the Form of the Good. Plato views "The Good" as the supreme Form, somehow existing even "beyond being". In this manner, justice is obtained when knowledge of how to fulfill one's moral and political function in society is put into practice.

=== Politics ===
{{main|Plato's political philosophy}}
[[File:POxy3679 Parts Plato Republic.jpg|thumb|[[Oxyrhynchus Papyri]], with fragment of Plato's ''Republic'']]
The dialogues also discuss politics. Some of Plato's most famous doctrines are contained in the ''Republic'' as well as in the ''[[Laws (dialogue)|Laws]]'' and the ''Statesman''. Because these opinions are not spoken directly by Plato and vary between dialogues, they cannot be straightforwardly assumed as representing Plato's own views.

Socrates asserts that societies have a tripartite class structure corresponding to the appetite/spirit/reason structure of the individual soul. The appetite/spirit/reason are analogous to the castes of society.{{sfn|Blössner|2007|pp=345–349}}
* ''Productive'' (Workers)&nbsp;– the labourers, carpenters, plumbers, masons, merchants, farmers, ranchers, etc. These correspond to the "appetite" part of the soul.
* ''Protective'' (Warriors or Guardians)&nbsp;– those who are adventurous, strong and brave; in the armed forces. These correspond to the "spirit" part of the soul.
* ''Governing'' (Rulers or Philosopher Kings)&nbsp;– those who are intelligent, rational, self-controlled, in love with wisdom, well suited to make decisions for the community. These correspond to the "reason" part of the soul and are very few.

According to Socrates, a state made up of different kinds of souls will, overall, decline from an aristocracy (rule by the best) to a [[timocracy]] (rule by the honourable), then to an oligarchy (rule by the few), then to a [[democracy]] (rule by the people), and finally to [[tyranny]] (rule by one person, rule by a tyrant).{{sfn|Blössner|2007|p=350}}

=== Rhetoric and poetry ===
Several dialogues tackle questions about art, including rhetoric and rhapsody. Socrates says that poetry is inspired by the [[muses]], and is not rational. He speaks approvingly of this, and other forms of [[divine madness]] (drunkenness, eroticism, and dreaming) in the ''Phaedrus'',<ref>''Phaedrus ''(265a–c)</ref> and yet in the ''Republic'' wants to outlaw Homer's great poetry, and laughter as well. Scholars often view Plato's philosophy as at odds with rhetoric due to his criticisms of rhetoric in the ''[[Gorgias (dialogue)|Gorgias]]'' and his ambivalence toward rhetoric expressed in the ''[[Phaedrus (dialogue)|Phaedrus]]''. But other contemporary researchers contest the idea that Plato despised rhetoric and instead view his dialogues as a dramatization of complex rhetorical principles.{{sfn|Kastely|2015}} Plato made abundant use of mythological narratives in his own work; it is generally agreed that the main purpose for Plato in using myths was didactic.{{sfn|Jorgenson|2018|p=199}} He considered that only a few people were capable or interested in following a reasoned philosophical discourse, but men in general are attracted by stories and tales. Consequently, then, he used the myth to convey the conclusions of the philosophical reasoning.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Partenie |first1=Catalin |title=Plato's Myths |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-myths/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170527053738/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-myths/|archive-date=27 May 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> Notable examples include the story of [[Atlantis]], the [[Myth of Er]], and the [[Allegory of the Cave]].

=== Unwritten doctrines ===
{{Main|Plato's unwritten doctrines|Allegorical interpretations of Plato}}
[[Plato's unwritten doctrines]] are,{{sfn|Reale|1990|p=14f}} according to some ancient sources, the most fundamental metaphysical teaching of Plato, which he disclosed only orally, and some say only to his most trusted fellows, and which he may have kept secret from the public, although many modern scholars{{who|date=January 2023}} doubt these claims. It is, however, said that Plato once disclosed this knowledge to the public in his lecture ''On the Good'' ({{lang|grc|Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ}}), in which the Good ({{lang|grc|τὸ ἀγαθόν}}) is identified with the One (the Unity, {{lang|grc|τὸ ἕν}}), the fundamental ontological principle. The most important aspect of this interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the continuity between his teaching and the Neoplatonic interpretation of [[Plotinus]]. All the sources related to the {{lang|grc|ἄγραφα δόγματα}} have been collected by Konrad Gaiser and published as ''Testimonia Platonica''.{{sfn|Gaiser|1998}}