Editing Preemptive war (section)

==Intention==
{{More citations needed section|date=July 2017}}

The intention with a preemptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection, for instance, while vulnerable during transport or [[mobilization]].

In his "Rationalist Explanations for War," James Fearon attributes the use of preemptive strikes by rational states to both offensive advantages and commitment problems between states.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fearon|first=James|date=1995|title=Rationalist Explanations for War|url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/505e/d8c92f0b1ca9afdccdf4890f4e79415ee788.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200625045154/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/505e/d8c92f0b1ca9afdccdf4890f4e79415ee788.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=2020-06-25|journal=International Organization|volume=49|issue=3|pages=379–414|doi=10.1017/s0020818300033324|s2cid=38573183}}</ref> When a nation possesses a first strike advantage and believes itself to have a high probability of winning a war, there is a narrower ''de facto'' bargaining range between it and an opposing country for peaceful settlements. In extreme cases, if the probability of winning minus the probable costs of war is high enough, no self-enforcing peaceful outcome exists. In his discussion of preventative war arising from a commitment problem, Fearon builds an infinite-horizon model expected payoffs from period t on are (pt/(l - δ)) - Ca for state A and ((1 -pt)/(l - δ)) - Cb for
state B, where Ca and Cb are costs incurred the respective states and δ is the state discount of the future period payoffs.

The model shows that a peaceful settlement can be reached at any period that both states prefer, but strategic issues arise when there is no credible third-party guaranteer of the two states committing to a peaceful foreign policy. If there is going to be a shift in the military power between states in the future, and no credible restraint is placed on the rising military power not to exploit its future advantage, it is rational for the state with declining military power to use a preventative attack while it has a higher chance of winning the war. Fearon points out that the declining state attacks are caused not by fear of a future attack but because the future peace settlement would be worse for it than in the current period. The lack of trust that leads to a declining power's preemptive strike stems not from uncertainty about intentions of different nations but from "the situation, the structure of preferences and opportunities, that gives one party incentive to renege" on its peaceful cooperation and exploit its increased military potential in the future to win a more profitable peace settlement for itself. Thus, Fearon shows that preemptive military action is taken by nations when there is an unfavorable shift in military potential in the future that leads to a shrinking bargain range for a peaceful settlement in the current period but with no credible commitment by the other party to avoid exploiting its improved military potential in the future.