Editing Public–private partnership (section)

===Value for money===
[[File:The Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Shri Montek Singh Ahluwalia delivering the Keynote Address at the inauguration of the conference on Public Private Partnership in transmission of electricity, in New Delhi.jpg|thumb|The Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Shri Montek Singh Ahluwalia delivering the Keynote Address at the inauguration of the conference on Public Private Partnership in transmission of electricity, in New Delhi. (2010)]]
In response to these negative findings about the costs and quality of P3 projects, proponents developed formal procedures for the assessment of PPPs which focused heavily on [[value for money]]. Heather Whiteside defines P3 "Value for money" as:<blockquote>
Not to be confused with lower overall project costs, value for money is a concept used to evaluate P3 private-partner bids against a hypothetical public sector comparator designed to approximate the costs of a fully public option (in terms of design, construction, financing, and operations). P3 value for money calculations consider a range of costs, the exact nature of which has changed over time and varies by jurisdiction. One thing that does remain consistent, however, is the favoring of "risk transfer" to the private partner, to the detriment of the public sector comparator.<ref name=":0" />{{rp|chapter 1}}</blockquote>Value for money assessment procedures were incorporated into the [[Private finance initiative|PFI]] and its [[Public–private partnerships in Australia|Australian]] and [[Public–private partnership in Canada|Canadian]] counterparts beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A 2012 study showed that value-for-money frameworks were still inadequate as an effective method of evaluating PPP proposals.<ref name="Siemiatycki 2012" /> The problem is that it is unclear what the catchy term "value-for-money" means in the technical details relating to their practical implementation. A Scottish auditor once qualified this use of the term as "technocratic mumbo-jumbo".<ref name=":0" />{{rp|chapter 4}}

Project promoters often contract a [[PPP unit]] or one of the [[Big Four accounting firms]] to conduct the value for money assessments.  Because these firms also offer PPP consultancy services, they have a vested interest in recommending the PPP option over the traditional public procurement method.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":04" /> The lack of transparency surrounding individual PPP projects makes it difficult to draft independent value-for-money assessments.<ref>{{cite web|date=23 May 2012|title=Comment: PFI is dead, long live PFI|url=http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2012/05/23/comment-pfi-is-dead-long-live-pfi|access-date=30 September 2012|publisher=Politics.co.uk}}</ref>

A number of Australian studies of early initiatives to promote private investment in infrastructure concluded that in most cases, the schemes being proposed were inferior to the standard model of [[public procurement]] based on competitively tendered construction of publicly owned assets.<ref>Economic Planning Advisory Commission (EPAC) 1995a,b; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications Transport and Microeconomic Reform 1997; Harris 1996; Industry Commission 1996; Quiggin 1996</ref> In 2009, the [[New Zealand Treasury]], in response to inquiries by the new [[New Zealand National Party|National Party]] government, released a report on PPP schemes that concluded that "there is little reliable empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of PPPs" and that there "are other ways of obtaining private sector finance", as well as that "the advantages of PPPs must be weighed against the contractual complexities and rigidities they entail".<ref name="MISGUIDED">{{Cite news|date=1 June 2009|title=Brian Rudman: Promised electric trains derailed by misguided enthusiasm|work=[[The New Zealand Herald]]|url=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10575753|access-date=21 February 2010}}</ref>

In the United Kingdom, many [[private finance initiative]] programs ran dramatically over budget and have not provided value for money for the taxpayer, with some projects costing more to cancel than to complete. An in-depth study conducted by the National Audit Office of the United Kingdom concluded that the private finance initiative model had proved to be more expensive and less efficient in supporting hospitals, schools, and other public infrastructure than public financing.<ref>United Kingdom, National Audit Office, PF1 and PF2, a report by the Comptroller and
Auditor General (London, 2018)</ref> A [[Treasury Select Committee|treasury select committee]] stated that 'PFI was no more efficient than other forms of borrowing and it was "illusory" that it shielded the taxpayer from risk'.<ref name="BBCnews2011">{{Citation|last=Tyrie|first=Andrew|title=PFI poor value for money, says MPs|date=19 August 2011|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14574059|newspaper=BBC News|access-date=<!----- 25th July 2012 ----->}}</ref>