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==Controversy== ===Inefficiency=== Swift has been criticised for inefficiency. In 2018, the London-based ''[[Financial Times]]'' noted that transfers frequently "pass through multiple banks before reaching their final destination, making them time-consuming, costly and lacking transparency on how much money will arrive at the other end".<ref name=":0" /> Swift has since introduced an improved service called "Global Payments Innovation" (GPI), claiming it was adopted by 165 banks and was completing half its payments within 30 minutes.<ref name=":0" /> The new standard which included Swift Go was supposed to be utilised in receiving and transferring low-value international payments. One of the significant changes was the transaction amount, which would not differ from start to end. However, {{as of| 2023|lc=y}}, uptake was mixed. For instance, Alisherov Eraj, [[Alif Bank]] Treasury Department Swift Transfers & Banking Relationship Expert in the [[Tajikistan|Republic of Tajikistan]], describes that the leading cause for the late Swift Go adoption in Tajikistan was the [[Core Banking System]] itself. To connect to Swift Go, he adds, banking system interfaces needed to be upgraded and integrated with their software to be fully compatible; this hindered many banks from adopting the technology earlier. ===U.S. government surveillance=== A series of articles published on 23 June 2006 in ''[[The New York Times]]'', ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'', and the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'' revealed a program, named the [[Terrorist Finance Tracking Program]], which the [[US Treasury Department]], [[CIA|Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)]], and other [[United States government]]al agencies initiated after the [[11 September attacks]] to gain access to the SWIFT transaction database.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Brand |first=Constant |date=28 September 2005 |title=Belgian PM: Data Transfer Broke Rules |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092800585.html |access-date=23 May 2010}}</ref> After the publication of these articles, SWIFT quickly came under pressure for compromising the [[data privacy]] of its customers by allowing governments to gain access to sensitive personal information. In September 2006, the Belgian government declared that these SWIFT dealings with American governmental authorities were a breach of Belgian and [[European Union law|European]] [[privacy law]]s.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hart |first=Jeffrey A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yZHTEAAAQBAJ&dq=SWIFT+September+2006+Belgian+privacy&pg=PA117 |title=Essays on the History and Politics of the Internet: Cyberpolitics |date=2023-08-11 |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |isbn=978-1-5275-2871-0 |language=en}}</ref> In response, and to satisfy members' concerns about privacy, SWIFT began a process of improving its architecture by implementing a distributed architecture with a two-zone model for storing messages {{crossreference|(see {{slink||Operations centres}})}}. Concurrently, the [[European Union]] negotiated an agreement with the [[Federal government of the United States|United States government]] to permit the transfer of intra-EU SWIFT transaction information to the United States under certain circumstances. Because of concerns about its potential contents, the [[European Parliament]] adopted a position statement in September 2009, demanding to see the full text of the agreement and asking that it be fully compliant with EU privacy legislation, with oversight mechanisms emplaced to ensure that all data requests were handled appropriately.<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 September 2009 |title=European Parliament resolution of 17 September 2009 on the SWIFT Agreement |publisher=[[European Parliament]] |url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2009-0016&language=EN&ring=B7-2009-0038}}</ref> An interim agreement was signed without European Parliamentary approval by the [[European Council]] on 30 November 2009,<ref>{{Cite news |date=21 January 2010 |title=European Parliament to vote on interim agreement at February session |publisher=[[European Parliament]] |url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/019-67614-018-01-04-902-20100119IPR67613-18-01-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm}}</ref> the day before the [[Treaty of Lisbon|Lisbon Treaty]]—which would have prohibited such an agreement from being signed under the terms of the [[codecision procedure]]—formally came into effect. While the interim agreement was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2010, the text of the agreement was classified as "EU Restricted" until translations could be provided in all EU languages and published on 25 January 2010. On 11 February 2010, the European Parliament decided to reject the interim agreement between the EU and the US by 378 to 196 votes.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Brand |first=Constant |date=11 February 2010 |title=Parliament rejects bank transfer data deal |work=European Voice |url=http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/02/parliament-rejects-bank-transfer-data-deal/67144.aspx}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=11 February 2010 |title=Euro MPs block bank data deal with US |work=[[BBC News]] |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8510471.stm}}</ref> One week earlier, the parliament's civil liberties committee had already rejected the deal, citing legal reservations.<ref>{{Cite news |date=11 February 2010 |title=European parliament rejects SWIFT deal for sharing bank data with US |work=[[Deutsche Welle|DW]] |agency=Reuters |url=http://www.dw.com/en/european-parliament-rejects-swift-deal-for-sharing-bank-data-with-us/a-5239595}}</ref> In March 2011, it was reported that two mechanisms of data protection had failed: [[EUROPOL]] released a report complaining that requests for information from the US had been too vague (making it impossible to make judgments on validity)<ref name="2011spiegel">{{Cite news |last=Schult |first=Christoph |date=16 March 2011 |title=Brussels Eyes a Halt to SWIFT Data Agreement |work=Der Spiegel |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,751262,00.html}}</ref> and that the guaranteed right for European citizens to know whether their information had been accessed by US authorities had not been put into practice.<ref name="2011spiegel" /> ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' reported in September 2013 that the [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) widely monitors banking transactions via SWIFT, as well as credit card transactions.<ref name="speigel">{{Cite web |date=15 September 2013 |title='Follow the Money': NSA Spies on International Payments |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html |access-date=18 September 2013 |website=Der Spiegel}}</ref> The NSA intercepted and retained data from the SWIFT network used by thousands of banks to securely send transaction information. SWIFT was named as a "target", according to documents leaked by [[Edward Snowden]]. The documents revealed that the NSA spied on SWIFT using a variety of methods, including reading "SWIFT printer traffic from numerous banks".<ref name=speigel/> In April 2017, a group known as the [[Shadow Brokers]] released files allegedly from the NSA which indicate that the agency monitored financial transactions made through SWIFT.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Baldwin |first=Clare |author-link=Clare Baldwin |date=15 April 2017 |title=Hackers release files indicating NSA monitored global bank transfers |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-swift-idUSKBN17G1HC |access-date=15 April 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lawler |first=Richard |title=Shadow Brokers release also suggests NSA spied on bank transactions |url=https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/14/shadow-brokers-release-also-suggest-nsa-spied-on-bank-transactio/ |access-date=15 April 2017 |website=Engadget|date=15 April 2017 }}</ref> ===SWIFT and sanctions=== ====Iran==== In January 2012, the advocacy group [[United Against Nuclear Iran]] (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran's banking system, including the [[Central Bank of Iran]]. UANI asserted that Iran's membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT's own corporate rules.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gladstone |first=Rick |date=31 January 2012 |title=Iran Praises Nuclear Talks with Team from U.N. |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-calls-un-nuclear-teams-visit-constructive.html |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref> Consequently, in February 2012, the [[United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs|U.S. Senate Banking Committee]] unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using [[Informal value transfer system|IVTS]]. [[Mark Wallace]], president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.<ref name="nyt">{{Cite news |last=Gladstone |first=Rick |date=3 February 2012 |title=Senate Panel Approves Potentially Toughest Penalty Yet Against Iran's Wallet |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/tough-iran-penalty-clears-senate-banking-panel.html |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref> Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,<ref name="nyt" /> but later{{when|date=May 2021}} said that "it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Solomon |first1=Jay |last2=& Adam Entous |date=4 February 2012 |title=Banking Hub Adds to Pressure on Iran |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203889904577201330206741436 |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref> Targeted banks would be—amongst others—[[Saderat Bank of Iran]], [[Bank Mellat]], [[Post Bank of Iran]] and [[Sepah Bank]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 February 2012 |title=Banking's SWIFT says ready to block Iran transactions |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-sanctions-swift-idUSL5E8DH31020120217 |access-date=17 February 2012}}</ref> On 17 March 2012, following an agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the [[Council of the European Union]] and the council's subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network. In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Torchia |first=Andrew |date=17 February 2016 |title=Iranian banks reconnected to SWIFT network after four-year hiatus |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSKCN0VQ1FD |access-date=21 April 2016}}</ref> In November 2024, Iran implemented a [[paradigm shift]] approach to shift the focus from the SWIFT payment system by initiating the concept of bringing [[ACUMER]]. ACUMER was coined by Iran as a retaliation to the international sanctions imposed by the United States which has ever since limited Iran's competitive edge in the context of [[international trade]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last= |date=2024-11-25 |title=Iran top banker: Significant measures taken to counter sanctions |url=https://en.irna.ir/news/85670174/Iran-top-banker-Significant-measures-taken-to-counter-sanctions |access-date=2025-02-26 |website=IRNA English |language=en}}</ref> Iran had long conceived an idea of bringing a viable alternative option to SWIFT in order to actively engage in smooth economic activities and international trade.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-25 |title=Iran unveils SWIFT competitor called ACUMER |url=https://www.intellinews.com/iran-unveils-swift-competitor-called-acumer-354944/ |access-date=2025-02-26 |website=www.intellinews.com |language=en}}</ref> ====Israel==== In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke [[Banking in Israel|Israeli banks]]' access to its network owing to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.<ref>[http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.619514 International banking giant refuses to cut off Israel, despite boycott calls]. ''[[Haaretz]]''. 7 October 2014.</ref> ====Russia and Belarus==== {{See also|SWIFT ban against Russian banks}} Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to [[Russian military intervention in Ukraine (2014–present)|Russian military intervention in Ukraine]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hutton |first1=Robert |last2=Ian Wishart |date=29 August 2014 |title=U.K. Wants EU to Block Russia From SWIFT Banking Network |agency=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-29/u-k-wants-eu-to-block-russia-from-swift-banking-network.html |access-date=31 August 2014}}</ref> However, SWIFT refused to do so.<ref>{{Cite press release |title=SWIFT Sanctions Statement |url=http://www.swift.com/about_swift/shownews?param_dcr=news.data/en/swift_com/2014/PR_swift_sanctions_statement.xml |work=swift.com}}</ref> [[SPFS]], a Russian alternative to SWIFT, was developed by the [[Central Bank of Russia]] as a backup measure.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Turak |first=Natasha |date=23 May 2018 |title=Russia's central bank governor touts Moscow alternative to SWIFT transfer system as protection from US sanctions |publisher=CNBC |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/23/russias-central-bank-governor-touts-moscow-alternative-to-swift-transfer-system-as-protection-from-us-sanctions.html |access-date=4 October 2018}}</ref> During the [[prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Shalal|first=Andrea|date=2022-02-11|title=SWIFT off Russia sanctions list, state banks likely target -U.S., EU officials|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swift-off-russia-sanctions-list-state-banks-likely-target-us-eu-officials-2022-02-11/|access-date=2022-02-14}}</ref> Following the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the foreign ministers of the Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks' exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.<ref>{{cite web |title=EU unlikely to cut Russia off SWIFT for now, sources say |url=https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/eu-unlikely-to-cut-russia-off-swift-for-now-sources-say/ar-AAUf89H |website=Reuters |access-date=24 February 2022 |language=en |date=24 February 2022}}</ref> The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove a few Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.<ref>{{cite web |title=Joint Statement on further restrictive economic measures |url=https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1423 |website=ec.europa.eu |date=26 February 2022 |access-date=26 February 2022}}</ref><ref name=":2" /> On 20 March 2023, Russia was banned from SWIFT.<ref>{{cite web |title=New financial messaging rules for Russia approved {{!}} Bank of Russia |url=https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14635 |website=[[Central Bank of Russia]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812012003mp_/http://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14635 |archive-date=2023-08-12}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author1=Adeela Naureen |author2=Waqar K Kauravi |title=De-dollarisation and emerging global order |url=https://tribune.com.pk/story/2415289/de-dollarisation-and-emerging-global-order |work=[[The Express Tribune]] |date=6 May 2023 |language=en}}</ref> The [[European Union]] issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus; the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Martin |first=Jessica |date=27 February 2022 |title=EU extends Russia sanctions to airspace, media, Belarus |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/west-seeks-to-cripple-russian-banks-currency-in-ukraine-sanctions/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220301014247/https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/west-seeks-to-cripple-russian-banks-currency-in-ukraine-sanctions/ |archive-date=1 March 2022 |access-date=1 March 2022 |website=Euractiv |language=en-GB}}</ref> After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,<ref>{{Cite tweet|number=1497981026093703180|user=nexta_tv|title=Lithuanian Prime Minister proposed to disconnect Belarus from SWIFT}}</ref> the [[European Union]], which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate [[President of Belarus]], started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 February 2022 |title=EU to impose new sanctions on Belarus this week -EU official |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-impose-new-sanctions-belarus-this-week-eu-official-2022-02-28/ |url-status=live |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220302205535/https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-impose-new-sanctions-belarus-this-week-eu-official-2022-02-28/ |archive-date=2 March 2022}}</ref> ===Security=== {{See also|Bangladesh Bank robbery}} In 2016 an $81 million theft from the [[Bangladesh]] central bank via its account at the New York [[Federal Reserve Bank of New York|Federal Reserve Bank]] was traced to [[Hacker (computer security)|hacker]] penetration of SWIFT's Alliance Access software, according to a ''New York Times'' report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.<ref>Corkery, Michael, [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/business/dealbook/hackers-81-million-sneak-attack-on-world-banking.html "Hackers’ $81 Million Sneak Attack on World Banking"], ''The New York Times'', 30 April 2016. Retrieved 1 May 2016.</ref> Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred at a commercial bank in Vietnam.<ref name="Second Attack Reported NYT">{{Cite news |last=Corkery, Michael |date=12 May 2016 |title=Once Again, Thieves Enter Swift Financial Network and Steal |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/business/dealbook/swift-global-bank-network-attack.html |access-date=13 May 2016}}</ref><ref name="ReutersSpecialReport">{{Cite news |last1=Bergin |first1=Tom |last2=Layne |first2=Nathan |date=20 May 2016 |title=Special Report: Cyber thieves exploit banks' faith in SWIFT transfer network |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-heist-swift-specialreport-idUSKCN0YB0DD |access-date=24 May 2016}}</ref> Both attacks involved [[malware]] written both to issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers and then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.<ref name="Second Attack Reported NYT" /> In May 2016, [[Banco del Austro]] (BDA) in Ecuador sued [[Wells Fargo]] after Wells Fargo honoured $12 million in fund transfer requests that had been placed by thieves.<ref name="ReutersSpecialReport" /> In this case, the thieves sent SWIFT messages that resembled recently cancelled transfer requests from BDA, with slightly altered amounts; the reports do not detail how the thieves gained access to send the SWIFT messages. BDA asserts that Wells Fargo should have detected the suspicious SWIFT messages, which were placed outside of normal BDA working hours and were of an unusual size. Wells Fargo claims that BDA is responsible for the loss, as the thieves gained access to the legitimate SWIFT credentials of a BDA employee and sent fully authenticated SWIFT messages.<ref name="ReutersSpecialReport" /> In the first half of 2016, an anonymous Ukrainian bank and others—even "dozens" that are not being made public—were variously reported to have been "compromised" through the SWIFT network and to have lost money.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Metzger |first=Max |date=28 June 2016 |title=SWIFT robbers swoop on Ukrainian bank |url=http://www.scmagazineuk.com/swift-robbers-swoop-on-ukrainian-bank/article/506140/ |access-date=29 June 2016 |publisher=[[SC Magazine]] UK}}</ref> In March 2022, Swiss newspaper ''[[Neue Zürcher Zeitung]]'' reported about the increased security precautions by the State Police of [[Thurgau]] at the SWIFT data centre in [[Diessenhofen]]. After most of the Russian banks had been excluded from the private payment system, the risk of sabotage was considered higher. Inhabitants of the town described the large complex as a "fortress" or "prison" where frequent security checks of the fenced property are conducted.<ref>Gyr, Marcel (1 March 2022). [https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/das-swift-rechenzentrum-in-der-schweiz-wird-polizeilich-geschuetzt-aus-angst-vor-sabotage-ld.1672402?reduced=true "Das Swift-Rechenzentrum in der Schweiz wird polizeilich geschützt – wegen der Gefahr von Sabotage"] (in German) ''NZZ.com''. Retrieved 2 March 2022.</ref>
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